

The Changing Idea of Loyalty in the Official Historiography  
of the Qianlong Period, 1736-1795.

by

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the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
of the  
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I hereby declare that this thesis, submitted for examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Australian National University, represents my own original work and that it has not been previously submitted to this or any other institution in application for admission to a degree, diploma or other qualification.

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## Acknowledgments

Since I began the research for this thesis in 1996, I have incurred many debts of obligation. First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Ma Fung-shan and the members of the advisory committee, Prof. William Jenner, Dr. Geremie Barme, and Dr. Colin Jeffcott, for their support and encouragement as well as their valuable criticisms of the drafts of my work. I am especially thankful to Dr. Barme who has always made constructive suggestions about the style of my writing, which are particularly helpful to a non-native speaker of English like me.

I am indebted to Dr. Koon-pui Ho, my mentor and former teacher at the University of Hong Kong, who aroused my interest in the chosen topic and kept offering me expert advice and sending me his new publications, which inspired me in the study of Qing historiography.

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period of my study.

## Abstract

Last but not least, my deepest gratitude should go to my wife Liza for her patience, understanding, and love during the past years, without which this thesis would have never been completed.

Sympathy with the resistance activities provoked an ambivalent feeling among Han literati. Despite regarding themselves Qing subjects, they still admired Ming loyalists for their courage and integrity in insisting on the Neo-Confucian principles of loyalty throughout the resistance movement. Therefore, in remembering and writing about the martyrs, the educated Han elite faced a conflict between political and cultural identities. This political and cultural dilemma evolved into a particular discourse on the historical events and the figures of the Ming-Qing transition. The literati's introspection finally created a shared perspective on the details and nature of that period history which partly based on the Confucian moral standard of virtue. This shared perspective eventually demanded of the imperial house a recognition of the moral dimension of the deeds of the Ming loyalists. In response to pressure from the literati, in the later part of his reign the Emperor Qianlong made a number of concessions which included an official reinterpretation of the conquest history and an open commendation of the Southern Ming martyrs. This new government policy led to the compilation of the *Qinding shengchao xingyao zhuan* by the Erchen zhuan and the *Nichen zhuan*.

With reference to these three official biographical projects, this thesis analyzes the changing high-Qing imperial attitude toward Ming loyalists and early-Qing collaborators. It argues that the new imperial attitude was not a one-sided concession of the Manchurian ruler to the Han Chinese. Rather it tries to demonstrate that by making such concessions, the emperor deliberately attempted to reconstruct intellectual discourse on



## Abstract

The history of Ming-Qing dynastic change, 1644-1662, left its imprint on the mind of the early-Qing Han Chinese. Sympathy with the resistance activists provoked an ambivalent feeling among Han literati. Despite regarding themselves Qing subjects, they still admired Ming loyalists for their courage and integrity in insisting on the Neo-Confucian principles of loyalty throughout the resistance movement. Therefore, in remembering and writing about the martyrs, the educated Han elite faced a conflict between political and cultural identities. This political and cultural dilemma evolved into a particular discourse on the historical events and the figures of the Ming-Qing transition. The literati's introspection finally created a shared perspective on the details and nature of that period history which purely based on the Confucian moral standard of virtue. This shared perspective eventually demanded of the imperial house a recognition of the moral dimension of the deeds of the Ming loyalists. In response to pressure from the literati, in the later part of his reign the Emperor Qianlong made a number of concessions which included an official reinterpretation of the conquest history and an open commendation of the Southern Ming martyrs. This new government policy led to the compilation of the *Qinding shengchao xunjie zhuchen lu*, the *Erchen zhuan*, and the *Nichen zhuan*.

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Chinese culture with imperial hegemony. Apart from endorsing the moral arguments of early-Qing historians, Qianlong employed specific selection criteria, a taxonomy, detailed contents, and a narrative style that repeatedly affirmed the traditional Neo-Confucian doctrine of loyalism and required his subjects to pledge their absolute loyalty to the throne. The compilation of these historiographical projects, which emphasized commendation for loyalty and condemnation of disloyalty, became a form of imperial ideological indoctrination that promoted the development of absolute monarchy in eighteenth-century China.

The historical biographical projects, together with literary and historical inquiries during the Qianlong reign, brought an end to the debates among the educated elite on Southern Ming history and resulted, for several decades at least, in the suppression of views at variance with imperial interpretations. They also had a profound influence on the transmission of collective memory for Ming loyalists, for now the images of the historical figures were recast; no longer were they anti-Qing heroes but rather they were represented as Confucian martyrs who upheld, first and foremost, the principle of dynastic loyalty. However, the emperor never realized his ambition to achieve absolute cultural hegemony and his deliberate attempts to cleanse the popular heritage of various undesirable elements were far from successful. This was evinced in the fact that, despite the Qianlong censorship, a large number of proscribed and non-standard historical works survived into the early nineteenth century and certain unorthodox views were still to shape the writings of post-Qianlong historians.

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## Introduction

Since the 1990s, the influence of Qianlong-era 乾隆 (1736-1795, the reign period of Aisin Gioro Hongli 弘曆, 1711-1799) official historiography on the development of Chinese culture in late-imperial times has drawn the attention of many historians in the field of Qing (1644-1911) history. Moreover, its negative effects on Qing scholarship have also become a topic of interest in current research. As many recent studies point out, the official projects initiated and compiled during this period reveal the emperor's desire to use history as a means of ideological control. Like the so-called Qianlong literary inquisition, the compilation of official histories, which were primarily aimed at directing literati opinion, was regarded one of the main cultural characteristics of high Qing autocracy. Notwithstanding the high-handed measures of the emperor, the present work argues that this process of Qianlong-era ideological indoctrination was not solely the result of imperial fiat. To a certain extent, the process involved in the compilation of the major biographical-historical works discussed below also demonstrated a significant cultural compromise between the Manchu ruler and his Han subjects in the context of intellectual discourse regarding the Chinese past. In establishing his authoritative interpretations of China's dynastic histories, Emperor Qianlong was influenced by the general views of his time and he went to considerable lengths to incorporate the popular ideas of the Han literati in these projects so as to strengthen their allegiance to the orthodox ideology promoted by the court. These complex cultural and ideological negotiations consequently led to various imperial concessions being made to the educated elite in regard to certain controversial historical issues, though such concessions were finite and conditional.

Among the Qianlong projects, the Ming-Qing biographies are especially noteworthy. This is because not only do they provide detailed insights into the further development of Manchu-Han conciliation in eighteenth-century China but they are also valuable cases for the study of the high-Qing orthodox ideology in that period. The use of “praise and blame” (*bao bian* 褒貶) in regard to the subjects of the official works shows that Emperor Qianlong was at pains to eliminate the residual ethnic tension caused by the Manchu conquest history of 1644-1662. During the compilation of these biographies, most of the moral arguments employed by early-Qing scholars in favor of the recognition of the moral virtues of the late-Ming loyalists—arguments ignored by previous emperors—were eventually adopted by the throne and subsumed in the new biographies under the rubric of the Neo-Confucian principle of commending loyalty and condemning disloyalty. The emperor’s tactics in handling these historiographical projects were successful in that, on the one hand, they were aimed at addressing and overcoming the continuing ambivalence of the Han literati to the fall of the Ming and the issue of dynastic loyalty by absorbing their views and, on the other hand, he skillfully manipulated in his favor the general consensus regarding the need to reinforce the Neo-Confucian doctrine of loyalism. The overall result of these efforts was that the development of absolute monarchy was facilitated in the high Qing.

This study focuses on the last three Qianlong official historiographical projects, the *Qinding shengchao xunjie zhuchen lu* 欽定勝朝殉節諸臣錄 (*Records of all officials [and subjects] who died out of loyalty to the fallen dynasty, authorized by the emperor [Qianlong]*), the *Erchen zhuan* 貳臣傳 (*Biographies of twice-serving ministers*), and the *Nichen zhuan* 逆臣傳 (*Biographies of traitors*), initiated by the emperor in 1775, 1777, and 1790 respectively. Through an analysis of these works, I attempt to recount the compilation of Ming-Qing biographies in the high-



Qing era and analyze their symbiotic relation to Qing discourse on Neo-Confucian principles of loyalty. I examine the historical factors that contributed to the changing imperial attitude toward the Southern Ming (1644-1662) loyalists in the 1700s. Also, based on the private writings of the Qing scholars, I discuss how and to what extent the new official approach to the resistance history influenced the Qianlong and post-Qianlong ideas of loyalty

The thesis consists of three major sections: a study of the socio-cultural context of the late-Qianlong historiographical projects, the works themselves, and their influence on the Qianlong and post-Qianlong discourse on loyalty. In the first part (chapters 1 and 2), I give an account of the socio-cultural environment that favored the development of this particular kind of official historiography in the high Qing, as well as the impact it had on the formation of a shared perspective on loyalty among the Han literati. These are factors which laid a theoretical foundation for the compilation of official biographies in the Qianlong era. I argue that the Qianlong approach to the history of the Ming-Qing transition was a product of a cultural compromise, rather than simply the reflection of the emperor's personal will. In fact, the shared perspective on the resistance history developed in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries had generated a popular opinion among the literati for an official recognition of the moral deeds of the late-Ming martyrs. In response to this, Emperor Qianlong began to reconsider the previous imperial stance regarding the conquest history, and this resulted in an official reinterpretation of that period history which was more in accord with the socio-cultural context of his times.

During the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing periods, there was a consensus that dynastic loyalty was a moral obligation of the official class. While common people could alter their political identity after a new ruling

house came to power as the result of dynastic change, officials of the defunct dynasty were required to observe their life-long responsibility to the former regime and refuse any official position offered by the new government. In other words, dynastic loyalty was a matter of personal and private choice for common people but compulsory to officials. With reference to the three official biographical projects, I examine in the second part of the thesis (chapters 3 and 4) how this idea of loyalty was manipulated and employed by the emperor to serve current political realities, and particularly how this was reflected in the compilation of the three major biographical works. Through my study of the evolution of a complex series of selection criteria, a particular taxonomy of loyalty, and the detailed selection of biographical subjects, I analyze the complicated relationship between official historiography and orthodox ideology in late imperial China.

In the third part (chapter 5), I attempt to evaluate the significance of the official Ming-Qing biographies in regard to the cultural hegemony of the imperial house, as well as reflect on the influence they had on later private historiographical works and the construction of post-Qianlong ideas of loyalty. From the time of the late Qing, the effectiveness of Qianlong cultural policies has been a particular topic of debate. While heterodox ideas were suppressed during the Qianlong reign, the court failed to prevent popular heritage of several undesirable elements from being circulated in public. However, the cultural influence of the orthodox views on Chinese historical criticism was undeniable and even in modern scholarship, the approach and argument of some Chinese historians are still unconsciously affected by these views. It is hoped that the findings of this research will shed new light on Qing intellectual history and contribute to a better understanding of those times.

## 1. China in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

### The Downfall of the Ming

#### PART I: SOCIO-CULTURAL CONTEXT

The corrupt Ming empire was on the edge of disintegration as a consequence of economic bankruptcy and social disorder.<sup>1</sup> Since 1627, droughts and famines had been frequent throughout North China.<sup>2</sup> The problems in the northwest were most serious, in which the wilds were full of dead bodies of the starved and cannibalism was a general phenomenon due to the shortage of food.<sup>3</sup> As the government failed to provide adequate relief to the disaster regions, victims of the natural calamity were forced to leave their homeland and wander from province to province for food.<sup>4</sup> The huge number of refugees became a potential force of social unrest and eventually led to insurrection.<sup>5</sup> Mutinies of the demobilized soldiers and rebellions of the hungry peasants at first broke out in Shaanxi and immediately diffused to every corner of the country.<sup>6</sup> The escalating alien aggression in the

<sup>1</sup> For the analysis of the decline of the Ming, see Ray Huang, *1367, A Year of No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline* (New Haven and London: Yale University, 1981) and Allen Chen, *The Glory and Fall of the Ming Dynasty* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 161-183.

<sup>2</sup> Zhongguo shi qianqian qianqian hexue yanjiuyuan 中國史前史研究所, *Zhongguo shi qianqian hexue yanjiu xiji* 中國史前史研究所集刊 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe 人民出版社, 1981), pp. 34-95.

<sup>3</sup> Li Jing 李景 (d. 1622), *Mingqi zhidao* 明季紀略 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1984), vol. 1, juan 5, p. 126.

<sup>4</sup> Wu Weiye 吳偉業 (1609-1672), *Sui lou jilu* 隨樓紀略 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe 上海古籍出版社, 1992), juan 1, pp. 36-37 and Li Jing, *Mingqi zhidao*, vol. 1, juan 5, p. 126.

<sup>5</sup> For the origins and discussion on the late Ming social disorder, see Li Wenbin 李文彬, *Wanming shidai* 萬明時代 (Chengdu: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1984); James Panken, *The Peasants' Revolt of the Late Ming Dynasty* (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1970); and David Yang, *Disaster relief Policies: Co-existence of the Ming Dynasty* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991).



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<sup>2</sup> Zhongyang qixiangju qixiang kexue yanjiuyuan 中央氣象局氣象科學研究院, comp., *Zhongguo jin wubainian hanlao fenbu tuji* 中國近五百年旱澇分布圖集 (Beijing: Ditu chubanshe 地圖出版社, 1981), pp. 84-93.

<sup>3</sup> Ji Liuqi 計六奇 (b. 1622), *Mingji beilue* 明季北略 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1984), vol. 1, *juan* 5, p. 106.

<sup>4</sup> Wu Weiye 吳偉業 (1609-1672), *Sui kou jilue* 綏寇紀略 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe 上海古籍出版社, 1992), *juan* 1, pp. 36-37 and Ji Liuqi, *Mingji beilue*, vol. 1, *juan* 6, p. 126.

<sup>5</sup> For the narratives and discussion on the late Ming social disorder, see Li Wenzhi 李文治, *Wan Ming minbian* 晚明民變 (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1948); James Parsons, *The Peasant Rebellions of the late Ming Dynasty* (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1970); and, James Tong, *Disorder under Heaven: Collective Violence in the Ming Dynasty* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991).

north frontier further consumed the military strength of the empire and accelerated its decline.<sup>6</sup> On April 25, 1644, an army of rebels led by Li Zicheng 李自成 (1606-1645) captured the imperial capital, Beijing, and Emperor Chongzhen 崇禎 (Zhu Youjian 朱由檢, 1611-1644, r. 1627-1644) committed suicide at Coal Hill, north of the imperial palace.<sup>7</sup> The unexpected tragedy deeply shocked the whole empire and the emperor's death unleashed complete chaos and uncertainty throughout the country.<sup>8</sup> Shortly after the incidents, the Manchus, who had been battling with the Ming for more than half a century, were invited by Wu Sangui 吳三桂 (1612-1678), the Ming general at Liaodong, to "exterminate the bandits and rescue the people from the fire and water."<sup>9</sup> They then seized this opportunity to advance across the Great Wall, quickly dislodged Li and his followers from Beijing,<sup>10</sup> conquered North China, and finally established

<sup>6</sup> Li Guangtao 李光濤 (1902-1984), "Lun Jianzhou yu liuzei xiang yin wang Ming" 建州與流賊相因亡明, *Guoli zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan* 國立中央研究院歷史語言研究所集刊, vol. 12 (Jan. 1947): 193-236; Ray Huang, "The Liao-tung Campaign of 1619," *Oriens Extremus*, 28 (1981): 30-54; Frederic Wakeman, *The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth Century China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), vol. 1, pp. 23-86, 157-224; and, Sun Wenliang 孫文良, "Mingchao xing wang suo xi Liaodong zhi deshi" 明朝興亡所繫遼東之得失, in *Yamane Yukio kyōju taikyō kinen Mindaishi ronsō* 山根幸夫教授退休記念明代史論叢 (Tokyo: Kyuko shoin 汲古書院, 1990), vol. 1, pp. 645-662.

<sup>7</sup> Ji Liuqi, *Mingji beilüe*, vol. 2, *juan* 20, pp. 450-457 and Zhang Tingyu 張廷玉 (1672-1755) et al. comps., *Mingshi* 明史 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1974), vol. 2, *juan* 24, p. 334. According to Tan Qian 談遷 (1594-1658), Chongzhen committed suicide on April 24. See Tan, *Guo que* 國權 (Beijing: Guji chubanshe 古籍出版社, 1958), vol. 6, *juan* 100, p. 6043.

<sup>8</sup> Ji Liuqi, *Mingji nanlue* 明季南略 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1984), *juan* 1, p. 6.

<sup>9</sup> Batai 巴泰 (d. 1690) et al. comps., *Shizu Zhanghuangdi shilu* 世祖章皇帝實錄 in *Qing shilu* 清實錄 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1985), vol. 3, *juan* 4, Shunzhi year 1, month 4, pp. 53-55. For the analysis of the early Manchu-Han relationship, see Gertraude Roth, "The Manchu-Chinese Relationship, 1618-1636," in *From Ming to Ch'ing: Conquest, Region, and Continuity in Seventeenth-Century China*, Jonathan D. Spence and John E. Wills, Jr. eds. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1979), pp. 1-38.

<sup>10</sup> *Shizu Zhanghuangdi shilu*, *juan* 5, Shunzhi year 1, month 5, p. 57



their rule, the Qing dynasty, over the Han Chinese.<sup>11</sup> However, it took the conquerors another eighteen years at a considerable cost to crush the resistance movements headed by the Ming princes from the coastal to the southwestern regions.

The flames of warfare spread far and widely in South China for years while the Qing forces moved southward. After Beijing fell into the hands of the Manchus, the Southern Ming regimes, with the support of the Ming loyalists in Nanjing, Fujian, Zhejiang, and Guangdong, continued to resist the invaders one after another: the Hongguang 弘光 (1644-1645), followed by the Longwu 隆武 (1645-1646) and the Lu 魯 (1645-1652), and then the Yongli 永曆 (1647-1662).<sup>12</sup> With the imperial lineage of the Ming prince, every regime proclaimed that it was the only legitimate rule under Heaven and called on loyal subjects of the Ming to fight for the restoration of the fallen dynasty.<sup>13</sup> Nonetheless, weakened by the internal strife among the factions<sup>14</sup> and under fierce attacks of the Qing troops, the Ming regimes in mainland China came to an end in 1662 when the last Ming claimant, Zhu Youlang 朱由榔 (also known as Emperor Yongli, 1623-1662, *r.* 1646-1662), was captured in Burma and executed in Yunnan.<sup>15</sup> Although the authority established by the anti-Qing hero Zheng Chenggong 鄭成功

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<sup>11</sup> Five months after they entered Beijing, the Manchus proclaimed the city the new capital of the Qing dynasty. *Shizu Zhanghuangdi shilu*, *juan* 9, Shunzhi year 1, month 10, p. 91.

<sup>12</sup> For the resistance Movement of the Chinese against the Qing in South China, see Lynn Struve, *The Southern Ming, 1644-1662* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984).

<sup>13</sup> Ji Liuqi, *Mingji nanlüe*, *juan* 1, pp. 10-11; *juan* 7, p. 303; *juan* 9, p. 334; and, Shao Tingcai 邵廷案[采] (1648-1711), *Dongnan jishi* 東南紀事 (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian 上海書店, 1982), pp. 149-150.

<sup>14</sup> Ji Liuqi, *Mingji nanlüe*, *juan* 1, pp. 41-44; *juan* 2, 79-80; *juan* 3, pp. 159-162; 195-200; *juan* 5, pp. 288-289; and, *juan* 12, pp. 396-397.

<sup>15</sup> Maqi 馬齊 (Maci, 1652-1739) et al. comps., *Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu* 聖祖仁皇帝實錄, in *Qing shilu*, (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1985), vol. 4, *juan* 6, Kangxi year 1, month 2, pp. 106-107 and J. C. Yang, "Chu Yu-lang" in *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912)*, Arthur Hummel (1884-1975) ed. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1943), vol. 1, p. 194-195.



(Koxinga, 1624-1662) in Taiwan continued the resistance policy after his death, by mid 1662 the Manchus had basically succeeded in gaining effective control over the territories they occupied.

## The Establishment of the Qing

The occupation of Beijing in 1644 marked the beginning of the new dynasty. With the collaboration of surrendered Han Chinese, the Qing armies won the major battles one by one and helped the new empire enlarge its southern territories bit by bit. Notwithstanding the succession of military victories, the conquerors had not solved the problem of ruling a large empire in which they were an alien minority. Since the new Beijing government was founded, how to resume socio-political order and pacify the ruled Han Chinese had become two major challenges to the Manchu rulers. As many historians have pointed out, before they entered Beijing, the Manchus had a long history of Sinification, in which institutional transformation took place.<sup>16</sup> However, in an epoch of drastic changes, existing Manchu political institutions introduced by the previous khans Nurhaci (Nuerhachi 努爾哈赤, 1559-1626) and Abahai (Huangtaiji 皇太極, 1592-1643) during the Later Jin (Hou Jin 後金, 1616-1636) period<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Franz Michael, *The Origin of Manchu Rule in China: Frontier and Bureaucracy as Interacting Forces in the Chinese Empire* (New York: Octagon Books, Inc., 1965); Guan donggui 管東貴, "Manzu ru guan qian de wenhua fazhan dui tamen houlai Hanhua de yingxiang" 滿族入關前的文化發展對他們後來漢化的影響, *Guoli zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan* 國立中央研究院歷史語言研究所集刊, 40.1

(Oct. 1968): 255-279; and, Pamela Crossley, *The Manchus* (Cambridge, M.A.: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1997), p. 78. Also see Ye Gaoshu 葉高樹, "Qing ru guan qian tong yu Han guan de celüe" 清入關前統御漢官的策略, *Shi yun* 史耘, 1 (Sept. 1995): 89-113.

<sup>17</sup> For a study of these institutions, see Chen Wenshi 陳文石, "Qing Taizong shidai de zhongyao zhengzhi cuoshi" 清太宗時代的重要政治措施, *Guoli zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan* 國立中央研究院歷史語言研究所集刊, 40.1 (Oct. 1968): 295-370.

could no longer cope with urgent demands of the new situation after 1644. To ensure their ultimate triumph, the alien rulers had to employ new tactics and systems to safeguard their ruling position in the recently occupied regions inside the Great Wall.

In order to consolidate its governance, the Beijing new court initiated a series of policies and reforms. Entering Beijing, the Regent Dorgon (Duoergun 多爾袞, 1612-1650), who recognized the main causes of the Ming's demise, immediately announced the removal of all the late-Ming maladministration, exorbitant taxes, and harsh levies.<sup>18</sup> To maintain an effective government, he soon combined the Ming and Qing administration systems with necessary modifications. In the fifth year (1648) of his regency, a policy of synarchy, which offered the Han Chinese an equal opportunity of taking senior government positions as their Manchu counterparts, was implemented in major central departments. In the central secretariats, Han Chinese were recruited into the Inner Three Courts as grand secretaries.<sup>19</sup> While the supervisory roles were still played by the Manchus, the Chinese, including both Han Chinese and Chinese bannermen (those who submitted to the Qing and were assigned to the Chinese banners before 1644), occupied a greater number and a larger proportion of positions requiring academic excellence or ceremonial or administrative expertise.<sup>20</sup> In the chief executive bodies, the Six Ministries, the positions of ministers were monopolized by the Manchus in the first four years and the Han Chinese could only serve as vice-ministers, but by 1648, the latter were

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<sup>18</sup> Guoli zhongyan yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo 國立中央研究院歷史語言研究所 ed., *Ming-Qing shiliao, Bingbian* 明清史料, 丙編, (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan 商務印書館, 1936), vol. 1, p. 9.

<sup>19</sup> See the "Tables of Grand Secretaries," I, in *Qingshi gao* 清史稿 (Zhao, Erxun 趙爾巽 [1844-1927] et al. ed., vol. 21 [Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1976]), *juan* 174, pp. 6091-6094.

<sup>20</sup> Adam Lui, *Two Rulers in One Reign: Dorgon and Shun-chih, 1644-1660*, Faculty of Asian Studies Monographs, New Series No. 13, Canberra: Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1989, pp. 23-40.



appointed parallel to the former. Thus, from this year onward, each Ministry generally had two ministers, one Manchu and one Han Chinese, and four vice-ministers, two Manchu and two Han Chinese.<sup>21</sup> This practice of joint administration, on the one hand, kept a balance of power between the two races in the government and, on the other hand, served as a means for the alien monarch to absorb the Chinese elite into the bureaucracy and win their collaboration and support in his rule of the empire.<sup>22</sup> In local administration, since the Manchus were strangers to local affairs, to avoid ethnic misunderstanding and unnecessary friction and to pacify the submitted subjects, the new government relied heavily on the Chinese bannermen to control the conquered regions and even allowed the Han Chinese to have a pronounced domination at the provincial level.<sup>23</sup> In consequence, most of the provincial governor-generals, governors and senior officials came from the Chinese bannermen and the Han Chinese.<sup>24</sup> These policies and reforms were proved successful as the government quickly got on the right track and the conquered regions resumed social order within a short period of time.

<sup>21</sup> See the "Tables of Ministers," IA, in *Qingshi gao*, vol. 22 (1976), *juan* 178, pp. 6322-6330. Also see Piero Corradini, "Civil Administration at the Beginning of the Manchu Dynasty: A Note on the Establishment of the Six Ministries (*Liu-pu*)," *Oriens Extremus*, 9 (1962): 133-138; Zhang Deze 張德澤, *Qingdai guojia jiguan kaolue* 清代國家機關考略 (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue chubanshe 中國人民大學出版社), 1981, p. 38, p. 43, 57, 79; pp. 107-108, 128-129; and, Li Pengnian 李鵬年 et al., *Qingdai zhongyan guojia jiguan gaishu* 清代中央國家機關概述 (Beijing: Zijincheng chubanshe 紫禁城出版社), 1989, p. 139; pp. 146-147; p. 180, 287, 313, 381.

<sup>22</sup> When the Qing Beijing government was founded in 1644, a number of Chinese were recommended by the surrendered Ming officials to Dorgon for appointment. See *Shunzhi yuan nian neiwai guanshu zoushu* 順治元年內外官署奏疏 (Beijing daxue yanjiusuo 北京大學研究所國學門 [Graduate School of Chinese Studies, Peking University], preface, 1931).

<sup>23</sup> Raymond Chu and William Saywell, *Career Patterns in the Ch'ing Dynasty: The Office of Governor-general* (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan, 1984), pp. 32-33.

<sup>24</sup> See the "Tables of Senior Local Officials," I & V in *Qingshi gao*, vol. 24 (1976), *juan* 197, pp. 7056-7064 and vol. 25 (1976), pp. 7481-7490. Also see Wakeman, *The Great Enterprise*, vol. 2, Appendix C, "Banner Officials in Local Administration," pp. 1140-



Despite Dorgon's achievements during his regency, it is undeniable that some of his political decisions were inopportune. For example, orders regarding encircling the land (*quandi* 圈地) in 1646-1647,<sup>25</sup> which allowed the Manchu bannermen to have a free hand to occupy the land in North China, resulted in widespread discontent among the Chinese residents.<sup>26</sup> It was much worse that the hair-cutting (*tifa* 剃髮) policy of 1645,<sup>27</sup> which forced the capitulated Chinese to shave the front of their heads according to the Manchu style, directly incurred anti-Qing campaigns in Jiangnan.<sup>28</sup> The Chinese responses were far beyond the ruler's expectations and, to a large extent, hindered the unification process of the new empire. The early Manchu misrule reflected not only Dorgon's Manchu-oriented stand and his strong intention of defending the interests of the new ruling class but also his suspicion about the loyalty of the conquered Chinese. When the regent died at the prime of life in 1650, Manchu-Han antagonism remained unsolved and how to solve this problem became one of the chief tasks of the emperor, who then was just in his adolescence.

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<sup>25</sup> *Shizu Zhanghuangdi shilu*, juan 12, Shunzhi year 1, month 12, p. 117 and juan 20, Shunzhi year 2, month 9, p. 181.

<sup>26</sup> Wakeman, *The Great Enterprise*, vol. 1, pp. 469-476.

<sup>27</sup> Gugong bowuyuan 故宮博物院, ed., *Duoergun shezheng riji* 多爾袞攝政日記 (Beiping [Beijing]: Gugong Bowuyuan 故宮博物院, 1933), p. 1a and *Shizu Zhanghuangdi shilu*, Shunzhi year 2, month 6, p. 151.

<sup>28</sup> Martin Martino (1614-1661), *Bellum Tartaricum, or the Conquest of the Great and Most Renowned Empire of China*, English translation (London: John Crook, 1654), p. 127 and Frederic Wakeman, "Localism and Loyalism during the Ch'ing Conquest of Kiangnan: The Tragedy of Chiang-yin." in *Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China*, Wakeman and Carolyn Grant eds. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 43-85. Also see Chen Shengxi 陳生璽, "Qingchu tifaling de shishi yu Hanzu dizhu jieji de paixi douzheng" 清初剃髮令的實施與漢族地主階級的派系鬥爭, in *Ming-Qing yi dai shi dujian* 明清易代史獨見 (Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou guji chubanshe 中州古籍出版社, 1991), pp. 142-161; Chen, "Tifaling zai Jiangnan diqu de baoxing yu renmin de fankang douzheng" 剃髮令在江南地區的暴行與人民的反抗鬥爭, *ibid.*, pp. 162-192; and, Chen, "Lun Qingchu Jiangnan diqu de fan tifa douzheng" 論清初江南地區的反剃髮鬥爭, in *Ming-Qingshi lunwen ji* 明清史論文集, vol. 2 (Tianjin: Tianjin guji chubanshe 天津古籍出版社, 1991), pp. 206-233.

Emperor Shunzhi 順治 (Fulin 福臨, 1638-1661, *r.* 1644-1661), the ninth son of Abahai, was the first Manchu emperor of China. His enthronement indeed was a compromise between various court factions.<sup>29</sup> Since he ascended to the throne, the *de facto* power of decision-making had been in the hands of his uncle Regent Dorgon. It was not until the death of his uncle and the elimination of possible opponents that he assumed full political power.<sup>30</sup> When the diligent and promising young emperor began his personal rule in the early 1650s, he showed his ambition and devotion to make the empire prosperous. As the problems of corruption and administrative abuses still seriously threatened social stability, he started a conscientious effort to construct a clean and honest government. A series of measures and inspections were carried out to improve the administrative quality at all levels. Under strict monitoring and supervision, a great number of officials who had been found guilty of fiscal malfeasance were dismissed and punished. Although the social and institutional roots of corruption had not been removed, to a certain extent, the long period of struggle against administrative abuses achieved marked results.<sup>31</sup> The anti-corruption campaign together with tax concessions<sup>32</sup> provided favorable

<sup>29</sup> Li Ge 李格, "Guanyu Duoergun yongli Fulin wenti de kaocha" 關於多爾袞擁立福臨問題的考察, *Qingshi luncong* 清史論叢, no. 2 (1980), pp. 263-274 and Zhang Yuxing 張玉興, "Duoergun yongli Fulin kaoshi 多爾袞擁立福臨考實, *Gugong bowuyuan yuankan* 故宮博物院院刊, 1984.1 (Feb. 1984): 25-31. Also see Zhao Guangxian 趙光賢, "Qingchu zhu wang zheng guo ji" 清初諸王爭國記, *Furen xuezhi* 輔仁學志, 12.1-2 (Dec. 1944): 1-9; Zhou Yuanlian 周遠濂 and Zhao Shiyu 趙世瑜, *Huangfu shezhengwang Duoergun quanzhuan* 皇父攝政王多爾袞全傳 (Changchun: Jilin wenshi chubanshe 吉林文史出版社), 1986, pp. 128-134; and, Chen Zuorong 陳作榮 (1927-1989) and Zhao Yi 趙毅, *Duoergun pingzhuan* 多爾袞評傳 (Changchun: Dongbei shifan daxue chubanshe, 東北師範大學出版社, 1993), pp. 137-145.

<sup>30</sup> Zhou Yuanlian 周遠濂, *Shunzhi di* 順治帝 (Changchun: Jilin wenshi chubanshe 吉林文史出版社, 1993), pp. 36-46.

<sup>31</sup> Wei Qingyuan 韋慶遠, "Ming-Qing dang'an yu Shunzhi guanchang" 《明清檔案》與順治官場, in *Ming-Qingshi xinxi* 明清史新析 (Beijing: Shehui kexue chubanshe 社會科學出版社, 1995), pp. 287-317. Also see Zhou Yuanlian, *Shunzhi di*, pp. 118-174.

<sup>32</sup> *Shizu Zhanghuangdi shilu*, *juan* 52, Shunzhi year 8, month 1, p. 410; *juan* 53, month 2,



conditions for local economic recovery after the wars of unification.

The most notable theme of the Shunzhi reign was the emperor's attempt during the decade of 1651-1661 to relieve the ethnic tension between the Manchus and the Han Chinese. Being a Manchu monarch, Emperor Shunzhi had no hesitation in preserving Manchu dominance and upholding the Manchu-oriented principle established by his predecessors. Yet, he also saw ethnic conciliation as an inevitable step in gaining the popular support of the Han Chinese, especially Han Chinese scholar-officials, which was important for the maintenance of long-term security and stability of the empire. To quell the Chinese discontent over discrimination, a policy of "equal treatment" was initiated to create a new political equilibrium between the two races.<sup>33</sup> Under this policy, those Manchus who victimized or oppressed their Chinese colleagues were penalized and institutional adjustments were introduced.<sup>34</sup> Two edicts concerning the latter changes were noteworthy. Before 1653, the authority of memorializing the emperor on behalf of the government departments was controlled exclusively by the Manchu ministers. On January 31, 1653, the emperor issued a significant edict to the Inner Three Courts, ordering the Manchus to share this authority with their Chinese colleagues and instructing them thereafter that the departmental memorials be submitted jointly by the Manchu and Chinese officials.<sup>35</sup> Six years later, he sent

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p. 416; 420; 421; 422; *juan* 54, intercalary month 2, p. 434; *juan* 59, month 8, p. 470; *juan* 61, year 9, month 11, p. 481; month 12, p. 482; *juan* 84, year 11, month 8, p. 666; and, *juan* 114, year 15, month 1, p. 890.

<sup>33</sup> Adam Lui, "Manchu-Chinese Relations and the Imperial 'Equal Treatment' Policy, 1651-1660." *Journal of Asian History*, 19.2 (1985): 143-165.

<sup>34</sup> The case of Zhang Xuanxi 張懸錫 (Zhang Yuanxi 張元錫, d. 1658) and Maleji 麻勒吉 (d. 1689) may serve as one of the examples to show the emperor's attitude toward the Manchu-Han disputes. In 1658, Zhang was insulted by Maleji and committed suicide. When the case was reported to the throne, the latter was demoted. See *Shizu Zhanghuangdi shilu*, *juan* 117, Shunzhi year 15, month 5, p. 909; *juan* 118, month 6, pp. 920-921; and, *juan* 119, month 7, p. 925.

<sup>35</sup> *Shizu Zhanghuangdi shilu*, *juan* 71, Shunzhi year 10, month 1, pp. 559-560.



another critical edict to the Ministry of Personnel, further instructing that the authority of keeping the seal (i.e. serving as the chief administrator) of each governmental department be held by the minister, either Manchu or Chinese, who had seniority in the department, regardless of his ethnicity.<sup>36</sup> The early-Qing precedent of giving the Manchu officials in the central government a higher rank than their Chinese counterparts was thus superseded and replaced by a new rule of “equal position equal ranking.”<sup>37</sup> These edicts signified both an end of the Manchu monopoly of power in the civil service and the advancement of the power and status of Chinese officials in the bureaucracy. By now, the latter, at least on paper, enjoyed an equal standing to the former in regard to deliberation on government policies.

The acts of the emperor could be also explained by his inclination toward Chinese culture. Shunzhi began his governance with little Chinese literacy. He acquired the knowledge by self-study after ascending to office and, before long developed a keen interest in Chinese novels and Buddhism.<sup>38</sup> Apart from personal preference, it was much important that as his knowledge was enriched, Shunzhi found the Confucian mode of monarch-minister relationship a useful tool in facilitating the development of the absolute monarchy. The unforgettable experiences of struggling for power alerted him to the threat to the throne of Manchu feudalism. Therefore, from 1651, the emperor had intentionally appointed more Chinese officials whom he trusted in the Inner Three Courts and their

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<sup>36</sup> *Shizu Zhanghuangdi shilu*, juan 129, Shunzhi year 16, month 10, p. 998.

<sup>37</sup> Li, Hongzhang 李鴻章 (1823-1901) et al. comps., *Qinding da Qing huidian shili* 欽定大清會典事例, in *Qinding da Qing huidian tu shili* 欽定大清會典圖事例, (Taipei: Qiwen shuju 啓文書局, 1963), vol. 6, juan 18, pp. 5300-5302.

<sup>38</sup> Chen Yuan 陳垣 (1880-1971), “Tang Ruowang yu Mu Chenmin” 湯若望與木陳忞, in *Chen Yuan shixue lunzhu xuan* 陳垣史學論著選, Chen Lesu 陳樂素 and Chen Zhichao 陳智超 eds. (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin chubanshe 上海人民出版社, 1981), p. 450.

sequent institution, the Grand Secretariat.<sup>39</sup> To him, those newly recruited through the civil examinations were much preferable because they seemed to have fewer connections with court factions. As a result, their number in the advisory bodies increased with the years.<sup>40</sup> The extended influence of the Chinese elements in governance during the 1650s marked a further step of transformation of the court from Manchu feudal rule into a Chinese bureaucratic administration and provided the emperor with an efficient way to curb the Manchu aristocracy and put the princes under his control. But, the policy also had unavoidable side effects. At first, the advancement of the Chinese in the central bureaucracy provoked the Manchu diehards, who regarded this a violation of the Manchu-oriented principle.<sup>41</sup> Moreover, the conflicting interests of regionalism among the Chinese factions, in particular those of the surrendered former Ming officials, aroused factionalism in the court.<sup>42</sup>

Through his actions and proclamations the Shunzhi Emperor was convinced by Chinese ideas of emperorship and during his reign of 1651-1661, he did his best to perform as an ideal Confucian emperor.<sup>43</sup> This established a precedent and model for his successors. His attempt to combine the Manchu military and administrative eight-banner organization with Chinese governmental institutions also indicated a direction for the further institutional development of the empire. Unfortunately, the emperor died young in 1661 of smallpox, at the age of twenty two (twenty-

<sup>39</sup> "Tables of Grand Secretaries," I, *Qingshi gao*, vol. 21, pp. 6095-6109.

<sup>40</sup> Zhou Yuanlian, *Shunzhi di*, pp. 335-342.

<sup>41</sup> Zhou Yuanlian, *Shunzhi di*, pp. 345-386.

<sup>42</sup> Wakeman, *The Great Enterprise*, vol. 2, pp. 951-966. The Chinese factionalism also tangled with the Manchu-Han conflicts. For the analysis, see Han Hengyu 韓恒煜, "Chen Mingxia 'nandang' an shu lue" 陳名夏 "南黨" 案述略, *Qingshi luncong* 清史論叢, 7 (1986): 149-165.

<sup>43</sup> This was further evinced in the emperor's self-criticism in the edicts of December 24, 1654 and March 6, 1660. See *Shizu Zhanghuangdi shilu*, *juan* 87, Shunzhi year 11, month 11, pp. 684 abd *juan* 131, Shunzhi year 17, month 1, pp. 1014-1015.

four *sui* 歲 in Chinese terms).<sup>44</sup> In the imperial will, he designated his third son Xuanye 玄燁, the Emperor Kangxi 康熙 (1654-1722, r. 1661-1722), as his successor and appointed Soni (Suoni 索尼, 1601-1667), Suksaha (Sukesaha 蘇克薩哈, d. 1667), Ebilun (Ebilong 遏必隆, d. 1674), and Oboi 鰲拜 (Aobai, d. 1669) the four regents to assist the new throne in his minority.<sup>45</sup> The sudden death of Shunzhi offered an opportunity to the conservative Manchus led by the ruthless Regent Oboi, who resisted the Manchu Sinification, to superimpose their Manchu approach to governance despite Chinese protests. The eight-year Oboi regency in fact represented the extreme expression of Manchu-oriented rule and can be regarded as the “last stand of Manchu conservatism.”<sup>46</sup>

### The Consolidation of Qing Rule and the Sinification of the Alien Regime

The Kangxi reign (1662-1722) was a crucial period in Qing history. While mainland China was unified by Qing forces in the Shunzhi period, the new dynasty was consolidated during the Kangxi era. The remarkable achievements of the Kangxi reign may be viewed from two interrelated perspectives: military victories and institutional transformation. Among the former were the suppression of the Three Feudatories (*sanfan* 三藩) Rebellion in 1681, the subjugation of Taiwan in 1683, and the conclusion of

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<sup>44</sup> Shunzhi was born on March 15, 1638 and died on February 5, 1661. See Fang Chao-ying, “Fu-lin,” in *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912)*, vol. 1, p. 255, 258.

<sup>45</sup> *Shizu Zhanghuangdi shilu*, juan 144, Shunzhi year 18, month 1, p. 1106. Also see Wang Sizhi 王思治, “Kangxidi ji wei yu si dachen fuzheng de youlai” 康熙帝繼位與四大臣輔政的由來, *Qingshi lun gao* 清史論稿 (Chengdu: Bashu chubanshe 巴蜀出版社, 1987), pp. 230-246 and Jin, Chengyi 金承藝, “Kangxi di Xuanye ru cheng datong shilu” 康熙帝玄燁入承大統實錄, in *Zheng Tianting jinian lunwenji* 鄭天挺紀念論文集, Wu Tingqiu 吳廷璆 et al. eds. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1990), pp. 524-557.

<sup>46</sup> Robert Oxnam, *Ruling From Horseback: Manchu Politics in the Oboi Regency, 1661-1669* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 8.



the Treaty of Nerchinsk with Russia in 1689. The latter was reflected in the establishment of a strong central government run by a civil bureaucracy. These accomplishments, together with the adoption of Confucianism as the state orthodoxy, helped the Manchus legitimize their rule and win the general recognition of the Han Chinese during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.

The child-emperor Kangxi was enthroned at the tender age of seven (eight *sui*) but the reins of power were not in his hands until eight years later (1669) when Oboi and his clique were arrested and sentenced variously to prison and death.<sup>47</sup> After reaching his majority, the emperor was immediately confronted with the growing problem of regionalism in the Chinese feudatories. As one of the significant items in the political agenda that drew the throne's attention, the problem could be traced back to the early-Qing policy of "using Chinese to control Chinese" (*yi Han zhi Han* 以漢制漢), which was comprehensively implemented during the conquest period out of military and political expediency.<sup>48</sup> It allowed those Chinese generals who led armies in the south to enjoy a high degree of autonomy in military administration and to be granted prestigious feudatory titles in recognition of their military exploits. Despite its effectiveness in accelerating the conquest of South China, the policy gave these generals a golden opportunity to develop their own military power through wars and establish a strong hold on the region they occupied. Hence, when South China was pacified in 1661, the powers of the three ambitious Chinese

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<sup>47</sup> *Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu, Qing shilu*, vol. 4, *juan* 30, Kangxi year 8, month 5, pp. 396-397, 397-403.

<sup>48</sup> Lawrence Kessler, *K'ang-hsi and the Consolidation of Ch'ing Rule, 1661-1684* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 75. In fact, the policy was firstly introduced by Abahai but fully implemented only after 1644. See Sun Wenliang, "Lun Qingchu Man-Han minzu zhengce de xingcheng 論清初滿漢民族政策的形成", in *Manzu jueqi yu Ming-Qing xing wang* 滿族崛起與明清興亡 (Shenyang: Liaoning daxue chubanshe 遼寧大學出版社, 1992), pp. 314-326.

feudatories, Wu Sangui, Shang Kexi 尚可喜 (1604-1676), and Geng Jingzhong 耿精忠 (d. 1682), rose to such a level that the central government found it difficult to control them. The situation posed a risk to the political security of the regime.<sup>49</sup> When Kangxi determined to disband the feudatories, a rebellion broke out in 1673.<sup>50</sup> Due to their unsavory reputation, the feudatories could muster little popular support. Their conflicting interests and strategic mistakes also made it impossible for them to win the war.<sup>51</sup> On the contrary, the emperor was astute and resourceful enough to mobilize the whole country to fight against the adventurers.<sup>52</sup> After an eight-year campaign, he successfully quelled the rebellion in 1681 and took advantage of this to wipe out any potential regional threats to the imperial house.<sup>53</sup> Thus, by 1681, the entire empire was firmly controlled by a strong central government. Obviously, the emperor was well satisfied with his achievements and in commemoration of the victory, he ordered the compilation of an official history entitled *The Strategies of Quelling the*

<sup>49</sup> Liu Jian 劉健, *Ting wen lu* 庭聞錄 (Preface, 1719, reprinted, Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, 1985), *juan* 4, pp. 12b-13a; Wei Yuan 魏源 (1794-1857), *Sheng wu ji* 聖武記 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1984), *juan* 2, pp. 61-62; Kai-fu Tsao "The Rebellion of the Three Feudatories Against the Manchu Throne in China, 1673-1661: Its Setting and Significance," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1966, pp. 5-69; and, Liu Fengyun 劉鳳雲, *Qingdai sanfan yanjiu* 清代三藩研究 (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue chubanshe 中國人民大學出版社, 1994), pp. 128-175.

<sup>50</sup> Zhaolian 昭槤 (1776-1802), *Xiaoting zalu* 嘯亭雜錄 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1980), *juan* 1, pp. 5-6 and *Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu*, *Qing shilu*, vol. 4, *juan* 43, Kangxi year 12, month 8, pp. 569-570 and *juan* 44, month 12, p. 585.

<sup>51</sup> Fang Chao-ying, "Wu San-kuei," in *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912)*, vol. 2, p. 879 and Wakeman, *The Great Enterprise*, vol. 2, p. 1102, pp. 1109-1112. According to Kai-fu Tsao, during the rebellion, Wu Sangui had gained little popular support due to his Burma expedition and murder of the last Ming prince. See Tsao's "The Rebellion of the Three Feudatories Against the Manchu Throne in China," pp. 183-184.

<sup>52</sup> For the analysis of the Kangxi anti-Three Feudatories strategies, see Kai-fu Tsao, "The Rebellion of the Three Feudatories Against the Manchu Throne in China," pp. 82-101, 106-107; Lawrence Kessler, *K'ang-hsi and the Consolidation of Ch'ing Rule*, pp. 81-90; and, Liu Fengyun, *Qingdai sanfan yanjiu*, pp. 241-308.

<sup>53</sup> *Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu*, *Qing shilu*, vol. 4, *juan* 96, Kangxi year 20, month 7, pp. 1218; Kai-fu Tsao, "The Rebellion of the Three Feudatories Against the Manchu Throne in China," pp. 141-159; and, Liu Fengyun, *Qingdai sanfan yanjiu*, pp. 315-327.



*Three Rebels, or the Pingding sannifang'an* 平定三逆方案 in 1682.<sup>54</sup>

As soon as these internal threats were eliminated, Kangxi turned his attention to the security of the empire's frontiers. The long-time harassment of the coastal areas of Fujian by the remnants of the Zheng army on Taiwan was his chief concern. The Zheng forces were established by the anti-Qing hero Zheng Chenggong in 1661 when he retreated from Fujian after his defeat in Nanjing in 1659.<sup>55</sup> Zheng died the following year but his successors, having a firm economic and military base in Taiwan, upheld the policy of resistance against the Manchus. In the 1660s and 1670s, the imperial government's strategies regarding coastal defense were rather passive. Maritime activities were banned and the coastal population was evacuated inland.<sup>56</sup> These strategies were far from effective as the Zheng troops had taken advantage of the *sanfan* crisis to invade Fujian and occupy islands near Zhejiang, Fujian, and North Guangdong.<sup>57</sup> Since the emperor decided to concentrate the efforts on suppressing the three feudatories, during the period of 1673-1681, he employed a policy of amnesty and enlistment in dealing with the Zheng group.<sup>58</sup> This policy, however, could

<sup>54</sup> See *Yingyin Wenyuange siku quanshu* 景印文淵閣四庫全書 (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu yinshuguan 臺灣商務印書館, 1983-1986), vol. 354.

<sup>55</sup> Yang Ying 楊英, *Xian wang shilu jiaozhu* 先王實錄校注, annotated by Chen Bisheng 陳碧生 (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe 福建人民出版社, 1981), pp. 243-265; Ruan Min 阮旻 (b. 1627), *Haishang jianwen lu dingben* 海上見聞錄定本 (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe 福建人民出版社, 1982), pp. 43-47; and, Jiang Risheng 江日昇, *Taiwan waiji* 臺灣外記 (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe 福建人民出版社, 1983), pp. 155-169.

<sup>56</sup> Xie Guozhen, "Qingchu dongnan yanhai qianjie kao" 清初東南沿海遷界考, in *Ming-Qing zhi ji dang she yundong kao* 明清之際黨社運動考 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1982), pp. 237-269; "Qingchu dongnan yanhai qianjie bukao" 清初東南沿海遷界補考, *ibid.*, 270-278; and, "Ji Qingchu tonghai an" 記清初通海案, *ibid.*, pp. 179-288.

<sup>57</sup> Xiamen Daxue Taiwan yanjiu suo 廈門大學臺灣研究所 and Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan bianji bu 中國第一歷史檔案館編輯部, comp., *Kangxi tongyi Taiwan dang'an shiliao xuanji* 康熙統一臺灣檔案史料選輯 (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe 福建人民出版社, 1983), document no. 41, pp. 89-90; no. 44, pp. 94-96; no. 49, pp. 107-108; no. 53-54, pp. 108-200; no. 57, pp. 112-113; and, no. 90-92, pp. 156-158.

<sup>58</sup> *Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu, Qing shilu*, vol. 4, *juan* 49, Kangxi year 13, month 8, p. 639.



neither win the compromise of the Zheng's followers nor prevent them from attacking the coastal regions. Therefore, following the end of the *sanfan* war in 1681, Kangxi decided to take a firm stance against the Zheng "rebels."<sup>59</sup> By then, the government considered military force the best way to resolve the problem and actively prepared for an expedition to Taiwan.<sup>60</sup> The surrendered Zheng general Shi Lang 施琅 (1621-1696),<sup>61</sup> who had a thorough knowledge of Taiwan and was experienced in naval warfare, was appointed to work with the governor of Fujian, Yao Qisheng 姚啓聖 (1624-1684), during the preparatory stage of the expedition.<sup>62</sup> Two years later, Shi led the Qing navies to conquer Taiwan and thereby ended the forty-year "rebellion" of the Zheng family.<sup>63</sup>

In addition to the pacification of Taiwan, Kangxi also took an active approach to the military affairs of the north frontier and launched several campaigns against Russian expansion and challenges of the Mongol princes. Since assuming full power, the emperor had been well aware of Russian penetration and the Sino-Russian conflicts in the north-eastern territories of the empire. During the 1670s, in order to safeguard the northern boundary and prepare for military mobilization, the government organized the indigenous population of the Amur region into "New Manchu" banners and moved the nearby Mongol tribes to the new settlements in the interior.<sup>64</sup>

<sup>59</sup> *Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu, Qing shilu*, vol. 4, *juan* 96, Kangxi year 20, month 6, p. 1213.

<sup>60</sup> *Kangxi tongyi Taiwan dang'an shiliao xuanji*, document no. 147-150, pp. 241-250.

<sup>61</sup> For a study of Shi Lang's surrender to Qing, see Zhou Xueyu 周雪玉, "Shi Lang yu Zheng Yao er ren guanxi puxi" 施琅與鄭、姚二人關係剖析, *Mingshi yanjiu zhuan* 明史研究專刊, vol. 5 (Dec. 1982): 227-276.

<sup>62</sup> *Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu, Qing shilu*, vol. 4, *juan* 96, Kangxi year 20, month 9, p. 1220.

<sup>63</sup> Shi Lang, *Jing hai ji shi* 靖海紀事, edited and annotated by Wang Duoquan 王鐸全 (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe 福建人民出版社, 1983), pp. 107-113.

<sup>64</sup> Lawrence Kessler, *K'anghsi and the Consolidation of the Ch'ing Rule*, p. 101 and Meng Zhaoxin 孟昭信, *Kangxi di* 康熙帝 (Changchun: Jilin wen shi zhe chubanshe 吉林文史出版社, 1993), pp. 143-146.

After the *sanfan* rebellion, Kangxi found it possible to take a further step to halt the Russian aggression and put his Mongol subjects under firm control. When diplomatic efforts failed to reach a compromise solution with the Russians, the Qing army launched an attack upon Albazin, the Russian center for colonial expansion in the East, and captured the Russian-founded city in 1685.<sup>65</sup> A peace conference between China and Russia was held in 1689 and the Treaty of Nerchinsk was signed by the two empires that same year.<sup>66</sup> In 1696-1697, being confident in his military powers, the emperor personally led three successful campaigns against Galdan (1644-1697), the rebel Mongol prince who declared open defiance to the Qing authority during the 1690s, and finally established a solid defensive border in the north.<sup>67</sup>

Kangxi's military achievements had a profound effect on the consolidation of Qing rule. On the one hand, the quelling of the Three Feudatories and the capture of Taiwan solved the long-pending problems of regional instability and brought the central regions of the empire a long period of peace. The stable social environment facilitated agricultural development and coastal trade.<sup>68</sup> On the other hand, the prompt response of the government to the crises fully demonstrated its uncompromising stand against any physical challenge to its authority and the successive military

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<sup>65</sup> *Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu, Qing shilu*, vol. 5, *juan* 121, Kangxi year 24, month 6, pp. 274-277.

<sup>66</sup> *Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu, Qing shilu*, vol. 5, *juan* 140, Kangxi year 28, month 4, p. 543.

<sup>67</sup> Meng Zhaoxin, *Kangxi di*, pp. 190-210. Also see Peng Pusheng 彭普生, "Gaerdan zhi si" 噶爾丹之死, in *Ming-Qing dang'an yu lishi yanjiu: Zhongguo di yi lishi dang'anguan liushi zhounian jinian lunwenji* 明清檔案與歷史研究: 中國第一歷史檔案館六十周年紀念論文集, *Zhongguo di yi lishi dang'anguan* 中國第一歷史檔案館 ed. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1988), vol. 1, pp. 551-560.

<sup>68</sup> Shang Hongkui 商鴻達 (1907-1983), "Lüelun Qingchu jingji huifu he gonggu de guocheng ji qi chengjiu" 略論清初經濟恢復和鞏固的過程及其成就, *Beijing daxue xuebao* 北京大學學報, 1957.2 (May 1957): 113 and Li Longqian 李龍潛, *Ming-Qing jingji shi* 明清經濟史 (Guangzhou: Guangdong Gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe 廣東高等教

victories proved its unquestionable ability to crush both internal and external forces that threatened the security of the empire.

The Qing military accomplishments in the late seventeenth century were accompanied by concomitant institutional transformation. It is important to note that when Emperor Kangxi took full power, the generation of the Manchu warriors who had participated in the conquest war gradually faded from the scene and their political influence in the court had declined noticeably.<sup>69</sup> This gave the throne a reasonable flexibility to choose advisors and ministers with backgrounds other than that of Manchu bannermen.<sup>70</sup> Following in the footsteps of his father, Kangxi emphasized the principle of “equal treatment” in considering the appointments of his officials. In 1670, ten months after taking over the government, he ordered the abolition of Oboi’s discriminative ruling of 1656-1659 against the Chinese and restored Shunzhi’s policy of “equal position equal ranking” between Manchu and Chinese officials.<sup>71</sup> While insisting on an ethnic-political balance between the two races, he had no hesitation in promoting those talented and knowledgeable Chinese to the deliberative levels within the government. The appointments of the grand secretaries evidently reflected the attitude of the emperor and the chances of advancement for the Chinese scholar-officials in the bureaucracy. Among the forty-three grand secretaries appointed between 1670-1722, twenty-three were Han Chinese, sixteen Manchus, and four Chinese bannermen.<sup>72</sup> The bureaucratic

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育出版社, 1988) pp. 343-349.

<sup>69</sup> Yang Xuechen 楊學琛 and Zhou Yuanlian 周遠廉, *Qingdai baqi wangong guizu xingshuai shi* 清代八旗王公貴族興衰史 (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe 遼寧人民出版社, 1986), pp. 179-188.

<sup>70</sup> As Kessler notes that although the emperor’s key advisors were still Manchus, officials of non-banner backgrounds were advancing to the center of power. See *K’ang-hsi and the Consolidation of Ch’ing Rule*, p. 112.

<sup>71</sup> *Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu, Qing shilu*, vol. 4, *juan* 32, Kangxi year 9, month 3, p. 436.

<sup>72</sup> See the “Tables of Grand Secretaries,” I, in *Qingshi gao*, vol. 21, *juan* 174, pp. 6116-6141.



Sinification of the Kangxi period marked a milestone in Qing history. Even the Manchus whom the emperor selected differed significantly from their predecessors. They had assimilated Chinese culture to a high degree and most of them were bilingual in Chinese and Manchu, with a good command of both languages. For example, six out of the sixteen Manchu grand secretaries, including Songgotu (Suo'etu 索額圖, d. 1703), Mingju 明珠 (1635-1708), Ledehun (Ledehong 勒德洪), Alantai 阿蘭泰 (d. 1699), Songzhu 嵩祝 (1657-1735), and Maci (Maqi 馬齊, 1652-1739), took part in Kangxi period history projects.<sup>73</sup> Yisanga 伊桑阿 (1637-1703) was a successful *jinshi* 進士 candidate in the Manchu civil examination of 1652.<sup>74</sup> And, Fulun 佛倫 and Wenda 溫達 (d. 1715) served as translators in their earlier careers.<sup>75</sup> With the appointments of these Manchu and Chinese scholar-officials, the Qing “bureaucratic state” was firmly established by 1690s.<sup>76</sup>

As had been many previous emperors in Chinese history, the Kangxi Emperor was conscious of how best to develop a centralized government with imperial supremacy. Although Kangxi frequently consulted advisors in the various deliberative bodies on most political and military affairs<sup>77</sup> and always encouraged officials to express their view on government policies through the available channels,<sup>78</sup> he never let the ultimate power of

<sup>73</sup> *Qingshi liezhuan* 清史列傳 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1987), vol. 2, *juan* 8, p. 527; p. 530; vol. 3, *juan* 9, p. 629; vol. 4, *juan* 13, p. 983; and, *juan* 14, 1008. There is no biography of Ledehun in either *Qingshi liezhuan* or *Qingshi gao* but according to *Siku quanshu zongmu* 四庫全書總目, he was appointed as one of the editors in the compilation of *Pingding sannan fang'an* project. See Yongrong 永瑢 (1743-1790) et al. comps., *Siku quanshu zongmu* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1965), vol. 1, *juan* 49, p. 439.

<sup>74</sup> *Qingshi liezhuan*, vol. 3, *juan* 9, p. 627.

<sup>75</sup> *Qingshi liezhuan*, vol. 2, *juan* 8, p. 536 and vol. 3, *juan* 11, 770.

<sup>76</sup> Silas Wu, *Communication and Imperial control in China, Evolution of the Palace Memorial System, 1693-1735* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 7.

<sup>77</sup> Du Jiaji 杜家驥, “Dui Qing yizheng wang dachen huiyi de mouxie kaocha” 對清議政王大臣會議的某些考察, *Qingshi lun cong* 清史論叢, no. 7 (1986): 121.

<sup>78</sup> *Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan* 中國第一歷史檔案館, comp., *Kangxi qijuzhu* 康熙

decision-making fall into others' hands.<sup>79</sup> From 1669, the tireless emperor had quickly got used to a daily routine of reading all the memorials that reached him. Usually, he went through each memorial in detail by himself and responded promptly to the questions or proposals of the memorialist with clear answers and explicit instructions.<sup>80</sup> Moreover, except on some special occasions, he met officials daily at the morning audience to discuss the issues raised and offer his own resolutions based on their suggestions.<sup>81</sup> This style of personal rule made him particularly concerned with the quality of the information on which he based his decision-making. To free himself from the factional bias of the bureaucrats and to ensure the authenticity and accuracy of the information provided by the relevant officials, he initiated a new form of communication, the secret palace memorial system, between the throne and some of his subjects in 1693.<sup>82</sup> Through this system, the decision-maker could secretly bypass the formal institutions to draw any required information directly from various central and provincial officials he trusted who were outside the regular degree-holding Chinese bureaucracy and kept himself well-informed of the activities of factionalism in the court and the welfare of the people in the provinces.<sup>83</sup> The system was later institutionalized by his successors and became an effective means of

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起居注 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1984), vol. 2, Kangxi year 25, month 12, day 16, p. 1572; vol. 3, Kangxi year 54, month 12, day 12, p. 2235; and, *Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu, Qing shilu*, vol. 5, *juan* 110, Kangxi year 22, intercalary month 6, p. 125.

<sup>79</sup> *Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu, Qing shilu*, vol. 6, *juan* 233, Kangxi year 47, month 8, p. 335; *juan* 275, Kangxi year 56, month 11, p. 697; and, *juan* 284, Kangxi year 58, month 4, pp. 770.

<sup>80</sup> *Kangxi qijuzhu*, vol. 2, Kangxi year 21, month, day 26, 2, p. 816; year 23, month 10, day 15, p. 1240; and, year 23, month 11, day 4, p. 1250.

<sup>81</sup> *Kangxi qijuzhu*, vol. 2, Kangxi 21, month 9, day 21, p. 899 and year 23, month 5, day 11, p. 1180.

<sup>82</sup> Jonathan Spence, *Ts'ao Yin and the K'ang-hsi Emperor: Bondservant and Master* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 225-226 and Silas Wu, *Communication and Imperial control in China*, pp. 36-38.

<sup>83</sup> *Zhuang jifa* 莊吉發, *Qingdai zouzhe zhidu* 清代奏摺制度 (Taibei: Gugong bowuyuan 故宮博物院, 1979), p. 33.



imperial control over the bureaucracy during the eighteenth century.

In spite of this political measure, the emperor basically exercised his authority in a Confucian mode and the alien government under his emperorship was further Sinicized by Confucian tradition. The Kangxi regime was also noted for its contributions to the development of Chinese learning and Neo-Confucianism. On a personal level, Emperor Kangxi was enthusiastic about Chinese culture and had a deep commitment to Confucianism. As he stated:

I began my studies at the age of five *sui* and upon my enthronement at the age of eight *sui* [I] often sought instruction from my tutors regarding the exegeses on the *Daxue* 大學 [*The Great Learning*] and the *Zhongyong* 中庸 [*The Doctrine of the Mean*]. I was only happy when I had found their main meanings. I was punctilious in reciting every word of the texts [I] read each day and never gave in to self-deception. After mastering the works of the four masters [Confucius, 551-479 B.C.; Zeng Shen 曾參, also known as Zengzi 曾子, 505-436 B.C.; Kong Ji 孔伋, also known as Zisi 子思, ca. 438-402 B.C.; and Mencius, ca. 372-289 B.C.] [I] proceeded to *Shu jing* 書經 [*The Book of Documents*]. From [my study] of the precedents, plans, instructions and commands contained therein [I came to] understand how consciously emperors of antiquity sought to create Great Order and [I] hoped to see it realizes... Through repeated explorations [of the teachings of the Sages] I was determined that my mind shall come to accord with the principles and not stray from their course. [I sincerely] found that Righteousness and Principle delight the heart and thus never tire of this pleasure. Yet [for all of this I] have not the wisdom to grasp any real insight into the *Yi jing* 易經 [*Book of Changes*] although I have applied myself to its study.<sup>84</sup>

Notwithstanding his considerable application, because of the objection of his grandmother and the Manchu regents, Kangxi did not receive any formal education in the Chinese classics until 1669, after reaching his majority.<sup>85</sup>

When he could make his own decisions, he actively participated in two tutorial programs, the Lectures on the Classic (*jing yan* 經筵) and the Daily Tutoring (*ri jiang* 日講), which were delivered regularly by erudite Chinese

<sup>84</sup> Kangxi qijuzhu, vol. 2, Kangxi 23, month 11, day 4, p. 1249. Also see Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu, Qing shilu, vol. 5, juan 117, Kangxi year 23, month 11, p. 228. The emperor's devotion to learning even attracted the attention of the Jesuit Joachim Bouvet (1656-1730), see Bouvet, *Historique de l'Empereur de la Chine* (Paris: Meyndert Uytwerf, 1699, reprinted, Tiensin [Tianjin], 1940), pp. 72-103.

<sup>85</sup> Meng Zhaoxin, *Kangxi di*, p. 37.



scholar-officials in the imperial palace.<sup>86</sup> After 1699, the emperor devoted much of his leisure time to study and never missed any opportunity to discuss Confucian statecraft with his advisors.<sup>87</sup> This devotion partly came from his strong thirst for knowledge and appreciation of Confucian values and partly derived from his political awareness of the need to employ culture as a tool of governance.<sup>88</sup> Being an alien ruler, Kangxi was eager to acquire the knowledge required to govern his Chinese subjects and, needless to say, his pro-Confucian attitude could also be viewed as “a calculated attempt” to impress Chinese literati so as to win their admiration and recognition.<sup>89</sup> It is certain that his hard work bore fruit. Given his conscientious and constant study, he could be considered a well-qualified adept in Chinese classics.

As his knowledge of the Chinese classics steadily advanced, Kangxi became increasingly confident of his understanding of Confucianism. Instead of being passively influenced by his Confucian tutors, he made a concerted effort to interpret Confucian doctrine from the perspective of a ruler. To him, “Heaven gives birth to sages and makes them the rulers and teachers of people”<sup>90</sup> and hence, the emperor should be a sage who is responsible for not only the livelihood but also the moral advancement of his people.<sup>91</sup> Unlike the early-Qing Chinese scholars who shared the view that the educated elite were the transmitters of the Confucian tradition of the

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<sup>86</sup> Lawrence Kessler, *K'ang-hsi and the Consolidation of Ch'ing Rule*, pp. 137-146.

<sup>87</sup> *Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu*, *Qing shilu*, vol. 4, *juan* 41, Kangxi year 12, month 2, p.548; *Kangxi qijuzhu*, vol. 1, Kangxi 12, month 10, day 2, p.125; and, Meng Zhaoxin, *Kangxi di*, pp. 43-53.

<sup>88</sup> As Evelyn Rawski notes, Kangxi and other early-Qing emperors “adopted Chinese customs when it was politically expedient for them to do so and rejected them when it did not help them achieve their political goals.” Rawski, *The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), p. 7.

<sup>89</sup> Lawrence Kessler, *K'ang-hsi and the Consolidation of Ch'ing Rule*, p. 138.

<sup>90</sup> *Shengzu Renhuangdi yuzhi wenji* 聖祖仁皇帝御製文集, in *Yingyin Wenyuange siku quanshu*, vol. 1298, *chuiji* 初集, *juan* 19, p. 185.

Way (*daotong* 道統) and the defenders of this tradition against any abuse of power deriving from the rulers who represent the tradition of governance (*zhitong* 治統 or *zhengtong* 政統),<sup>92</sup> Kangxi emphasized the ancient Confucian ideal of unity between political authority and ethical truth and disagreed with the view that regarded *zhitong* and *daotong* as two separate traditions. He believed that at all times the former was linked to the transmission of the latter and it was the emperor who should embody both of these two traditions.<sup>93</sup> During his reign, apart from adopting the Cheng-Zhu 程朱 School of Neo-Confucianism as the state orthodoxy, he exerted himself to build up a self-image of being a sage-emperor and worked very hard at the cultural-political task of combining the tradition of governance with that of the Way.<sup>94</sup>

Kangxi's cultural policy which was based on his interpretation of Neo-Confucianism had profound consequences in Qing history. On the

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<sup>91</sup> *Shengzu Renhuangdi yuzhi wenji, chuj, juan 19*, p. 186.

<sup>92</sup> For the analysis of the origins of traditional Chinese thinking of the relation between *daotong* and *zhitong* (*zheng tong*), see Yu Ying-shih 余英時, "Daotong yu zheng tong zhi jian" 道統與政統之間, in *Shixue yu chuantong* 史學與傳統 (Taipei: Shibao wenhua chuban shiye gongsi 時報文化出版事業公司, 1982), pp. 30-70 and *Shi yu Zhongguo wenhua* 士與中國文化 (Shanghai: Shanghai remin chubanshe 上海人民出版社, 1987), pp. 84-112. Also see Yu's *Zhongguo zhishi jieceng shilun, gudai bian* 中國知識階層史論, 古代編 (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi 聯經出版事業公司, 1980), pp. 38-56.

<sup>93</sup> *Shengzu Renhuangdi yuzhi wenji, chuj, juan 19*, p. 185.

<sup>94</sup> Huang Chin-shing (Huang Jinxing 黃進興), "Qingchu zhengquan yishi xingtai zhi tanjiu: zhengzhi de daotong hua" 清初政權意識型態之探究: 政治的道統化, in *You ru sheng yu: quanli, xinyang yu zhengdang xing* 優入聖域: 權力、信仰與正當性 (Taipei: Yunchen wenhua 允晨文化, 1994), pp. 97-109. Also see Huang's *Philosophy, Philology and Politics in Eighteenth-century China: Li Fu and the Lu-Wang School under the Ch'ing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 148-155. Kangxi's attempted to legitimize the Qing rule by combining his *zhitong* with the *daotong* was not an innovation in Chinese history. As Chang Fentian 張分田 notices that Zhu Di 朱棣 (1360-1424, r. 1402-1424), the third emperor of the Ming, had employed the same tactic to legitimize his seizure of the throne after 1402. See Chang's analysis in *Zhongguo zhengzhi sixiang shi: Sui Tang Song Yuan Ming Qing juan* 中國政治思想史: 隋唐宋元明清卷, Liu, Zehua 劉澤華 and Zhang Fentian eds, (Hangzhou: Zhejiang Renmin shubanshe 浙江人民出版社, 1996), pp. 487-493.

one hand, with the recognition and appreciation of his Chinese subjects, Kangxi's approach clearly had proved the legitimacy of the Manchu rule in China and on the other hand, it also inspired the later Manchu monarchs, especially Yongzheng 雍正 (Yinzhen 胤禛, 1678-1735, r. 1723-1735) and Qianlong, with confidence and enthusiasm in extending the imperial authority to the cultural sphere.<sup>95</sup> The latter was clearly evident in the repeated attempts of Yongzheng and Qianlong in directing and manipulating the intellectual discourse on Chinese cultural and Confucian values. Although the later period of the Kangxi reign could not avoid criticism for its failure to control corruption and administrative abuses,<sup>96</sup> its accomplishments, military success, the transformation of the bureaucratic state, economic recovery and the development of Confucian ideology combined to lay a solid foundation for the flourishing of Qing rule in the eighteenth century.

## The Flourishing of Qing Rule and the Strengthening of Ideological Control

In his old age, the Kangxi Emperor was deeply hurt by the misdeeds of his designated heir apparent Yinreng 胤禵 (1674-1725),<sup>97</sup> who was first

<sup>95</sup> As Lynn Struve and Otani Toshio point out, the *Nanshan ji* 南山集 case of 1711-1713 marked an end of the Qing government's tolerance toward dissidents and after that ideological control became severe. Struve, "Ambivalence and Action: Some Frustrated Scholars of the K'ang-hsi Period," in *From Ming to Ch'ing*, p. 355 and Otani Toshio 大谷敏夫, *Shindai shisōshi kenkyū* 清代思想史研究 (Tokyo: Kyūko shoin 汲古書院, 1991), pp. 141-142. For the case, see Ho Koon-piu (He Guanbiao 何冠彪), *Dai Mingshi yanjiu* 戴名世研究 (Hong Kong: Department of Chinese, University of Hong Kong, 1987), pp. 253-310.

<sup>96</sup> Wang Jingqi 汪景祺 (1672-1726), *Dushutang xizheng suibi* 讀書堂西征隨筆 (Gugong bowuyuan 故宮博物院, 1936, reprinted, Shanghai: Shanghai shudian 上海書店, 1984), pp. 37a-41a.

<sup>97</sup> Silas Wu, *Passage to Power: K'ang-hsi and His Heir Apparent, 1661-1722* (Cambridge,



named crown prince in 1676, deposed in 1708, reinstated in 1709, and finally abandoned and jailed for life imprisonment in 1712.<sup>98</sup> After deposing Yinreng, the aging emperor had little intention to publicly designate another heir apparent<sup>99</sup> and the atmosphere of uncertainty unavoidably led to a fratricidal struggle among the princes for the succession.<sup>100</sup> Distressed by the factional activities of his sons, Kangxi died on December 20, 1722 leaving a posthumous decree that his fourth son, Yinzhen, the later Emperor Yongzheng, succeed as heir on the throne.<sup>101</sup> Nevertheless, the new emperor's ascension did not end his power struggle with the princes, who had previously organized a faction against him, and it took him several years of considerable effort to consolidate his position.<sup>102</sup> In the early years of his reign, Yongzheng was the subject of malicious rumors spread by his opponents, alleging that he poisoned his father and falsified the imperial will to usurp the throne.<sup>103</sup> These prevailing stories

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Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 91-105, 116-110.

<sup>98</sup> *Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu, Qing shilu*, vol. 4, *juan* 58, Kangxi year 14, month 12, p. 757; vol. 6, *juan* 234, Kangxi year 47, month 9, pp. 236-237; *juan* 237, Kangxi year 48, month 3, p. 367; and, *juan* 251, Kangxi year 51, month 10, pp. 486-488.

<sup>99</sup> *Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu, Qing shilu*, vol. 6, *juan* 253, Kangxi year 532, month 2, p. 504.

<sup>100</sup> For detail accounts of the factional disputes among the princes for the succession during the later Kangxi period, see Silas Wu, *Passage to Power*, pp. 122-146, 56-176.

<sup>101</sup> *Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu, Qing shilu*, vol. 6, *juan* 300, Kangxi year 61, month 11, pp. 902-903.

<sup>102</sup> Feng Erkang 馮爾康, *Yongzheng zhuan* 雍正傳 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe 人民出版社, 1985), pp. 86-96, 128-138.

<sup>103</sup> Yinzhen, comp., *Dayi juemi lu* 大義覺迷錄, in *Qingshi ziliao* 清史資料, Zhongguo shehui kexue yuan lishi yanjiu suo Qingshi yanjiu shi 中國社會科學院歷史研究所清史研究室 ed. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局), vol. 4, *juan* 3, p. 121. These rumors sparked a debate among historians on the legitimacy of Yongzheng's enthronement. See Meng Sen 孟森 (1868-1938), "Qing shizong ru cheng datong kaoshi" 清世宗入承大統考實, in *Ming-Qingshi lunzhu jikan* 明清史論著集刊 (Beining: Zhonghua shuju, 1959), pp. 519-572; Wang Zhonghan 王鍾翰, "Qing shizong duodi kaoshi" 清世宗奪嫡考實, *Yanjing xuebao* 燕京學報, 36 (June 1949): 205-261; Wang, "Yinzhen xi zheng jishi" 胤禛西征紀實, *Yanjing xuebao*, 38 (June 1950): 254-260; Wang, "Qing shengzu yizhao kaobian" 清聖祖遺詔考辨 in *Qingshi xinkao* 清史新考 (Shenyang: Liaoning daxue chubanshe 遼寧大學出版社, 1990), pp. 309-332; Fang Chao-ying, "Yin-Chên," in *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912)*, vol. 2, p. 916; Yang Qiqiao 楊啓樵,

seriously challenged the legitimacy of his succession and drew his particular attention to the significance of ideology control. It was not until 1728, in which the anti-Qing Zeng Jing 曾靜 (1679-1736) incident broke into the open, that the emperor found an opportunity to strike back on a full scale.

Zeng was a licentiate of Yongxing, Hunan, who was deprived of his degree due to his failure in one of the annual examinations. Having read the writings of the Zhejiang anti-Qing scholar Lü Liuliang 呂留良 (1629-1683) and influenced by Lü's anti-Qing ideas, Zeng wrote a letter to the Sichuan and Shaanxi governor-general Yue Zhongqi 岳鍾琪 (1686-1754), a descendant of the famous Southern Song 宋 (1127-1279) anti-Jin 金 (1115-1234) hero Yue Fei 岳飛 (1103-1141), in the hope of persuading the latter to revolt against the Manchu regime. The letter was delivered to Yue by Zeng's loyal disciple Zhang Xi 張熙 (d. 1736) on October 28, 1728. Having connived to win Zhang's confidence, Yue learnt the full details of the plot and its mastermind, Zeng Jing; thereupon he arrested both Zhang and Zeng, reporting the case to the throne.<sup>104</sup> From Zeng's confessions, Yongzheng was shocked to learn that the above-mentioned rumors about his succession to the throne were spread wildly throughout the empire and he immediately sensed the danger of these damaging slanders against him.<sup>105</sup>

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*Yongzheng di ji qi mizhe zhidu yanjiu* 雍正帝及其密摺制度研究, revised 2nd ed. (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing Co. 1985), pp. 45-64; Feng Erkang, "Kangxi chao de chuwei zhi zheng he Yinchen de shengli 康熙朝的儲位之爭和胤禛的勝利, in *Qingdai renwu yanjiu* 清代人物研究, Dai Yi 戴逸 and Luo Ming 羅明, eds. (Chengdu: Bashu shushe 巴蜀書社, 1992), pp. 295-322 (also see Feng's *Yongzheng zhuan*), pp. 59-74; and, Zhuang Jifa, *Guanyu Yongzheng jiwei de chuanshuo* 關於雍正繼位的傳說, in *Qingshi shiyi* 清史拾遺 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju 臺灣學生書局, 1992), pp. 36-47. According to Yang, Feng, and Zhuang, to a large extent, the rumors were groundless.

<sup>104</sup> Fang Chao-ying, "Tsêng Ching," *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912)*, vol. 2, p. 747-749 and Thomas Fisher, "Lü Liu-liang (1629-83) and the Tseng Ching Case (1728-33)," unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 1974, pp. 215-222.

<sup>105</sup> *Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan* 中國第一歷史檔案館, *Yongzheng chao qijuzhu cao* 雍正朝起居注冊, (Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1993), vol. 3, Yongzheng year 6, month 11, day 11, p. 2392 and *Dayi juemi lu*, *juan* 1, p. 10.



Unlike other “rebel” cases in Qing history, Yongzheng’s handling of the Zeng Jing case was extraordinary. While the innocent family members of Lü and those who were involved in the publication of his works were exiled or executed,<sup>106</sup> both Zeng and Zhang, the principle conspirators, were treated as gullible victims of rumor-mongers and at the end released with future immunity.<sup>107</sup> On November 2, 1729, the emperor ordered that the materials relating to the case be compiled into a book entitled the *Record of the Righteous Way for Enlightening the Misguided*, or the *Dayi juemi lu*.<sup>108</sup> The book was published in the following year<sup>109</sup> and ordered to be distributed throughout the empire. Evidently, the emperor had decided to make use of this case to launch a comprehensive propaganda campaign against his opponents and anti-Qing Chinese.

The four-juan *Dayi juemi lu* consisted of the imperial edicts concerning the incident, Zeng Jing’s and Zhang Xi’s confessions, most of which were in response to specific questions raised by the emperor, and an appendix of Zeng’s statements of repentance entitled the “Essay on my return to Humanheartedness,” or the *Guiren shuo* 歸仁說. Behind the emperor’s moralizing was a device: to refute the accusations initiated by opponents to the throne and the anti-Manchu ethnic prejudices advanced by Lü Liuliang and shared by the anti-Qing Chinese. In his edicts, Yongzheng defended Manchu legitimacy with references to the Confucian classics and Chinese history.<sup>110</sup> Quoting from *The Book of Documents* and *Analects*, he

<sup>106</sup> Oertai 鄂爾泰 (1680-1745) et al. comps, *Shizong Xianhuangdi shilu* 世宗憲皇帝實錄, in *Qing shilu*, vols. 7, juan 126, Yongzheng year 10, month 12, p. 654, 657.

<sup>107</sup> *Yongzheng chao qijuzhu cao*, vol 4, Yongzheng year 7, month 10, day 7, pp. 3180-3181 and *Dayi juemi lu*, juan 3, p. 127, 135.

<sup>108</sup> *Yongzheng chao qijuzhu cao*, vol 4, Yongzheng year 7, month 9, day 12, p. 3134 and *Dayi juemi lu*, juan 1, p. 9.

<sup>109</sup> Gugong bowuyuan 故宮博物院圖書館 and Liaoning sheng tushuguan 遼寧省圖書館, comp., *Qingdai neifu ke shu mulu jieti* 清代內府刻書目錄解題 (Beijing: Zijincheng chubanshe 紫禁城出版社, 1995), pp.252-253.

<sup>110</sup> Also see the analysis of Thomas Fisher, “Lü Liu-liang (1629-83) and the Tseng Ching



argued that the Mandate of Heaven was conferred on the basis of virtue, not geographic or ethnic origins.<sup>111</sup> According to *Mencius*, he stated, both the sage-emperor Shun (Di Shun 帝舜) and the sage-king Wen (Wen Wang 文王) were non-Chinese<sup>112</sup> but this did not prevent them from being sages and rulers of the Chinese. He further made special reference to the assertion of the Tang (618-907) scholar-official Han Yu 韓愈 (768-824), a defender of Confucianism who had attempted to constitute the Confucian genealogy to encounter the foreign-origin religion Buddhism, that the distinction between Chinese and barbarians was determined by their cultural life, as “Those Chinese who act in the barbarian way should be regarded barbarians while those barbarians who act in the Chinese way should be regarded as being Chinese” (*Zhongguo er yidi ye, ze yidi zhi; yidi er Zhongguo ye, ze zhongguo zhi* 中國而夷狄也, 則夷狄之; 夷狄而中國也, 則中國之).<sup>113</sup> These lead to the conclusion that any ethnic arguments against Manchu rule were groundless. In his discussion of the Ming-Qing dynastic change, Yongzheng further affirmed that the demise of the Ming was a result of the moral corruption of its ruling class, which made the regime lose the blessing of the Heaven and be destroyed by the rebels; and on the contrary, it was the Manchus who had avenged the Ming on the bandits, saved the Chinese people from catastrophe, and provided them a stable and prosperous livelihood for more than half a century.<sup>114</sup> Therefore, to him, the establishment of Qing rule was the embodiment of Heaven’s Will and its legitimacy was absolutely unquestionable. Those who ignored Heaven’s Will were definitely the “traitors through the ages” (*qiangu zhi zuiren* 千古

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Case (1728-33),” pp. 270-276.

<sup>111</sup> *Dayi juemi lu*, juan 1, pp. 3-5, p. 21.

<sup>112</sup> *Dayi juemi lu*, juan 1, p. 22.

<sup>113</sup> *Dayi juemi lu*, juan 1, p. 7.

<sup>114</sup> *Dayi juemi lu*, juan 1, pp. 5-6, 20-22.

之罪人) and should be condemned.<sup>115</sup>

As little information about the social response to the imperial arguments has been recorded, “it is impossible to evaluate the propaganda effectiveness of the *Dayi juemi lu* on its literati audience of the time.”<sup>116</sup> However, the work at least had two noteworthy consequences in Qing history. Firstly, it marked the beginning of the imperial attempt to establish its hegemony in the intellectual discourse on ethno-cultural issues and, secondly, it also provided a theoretical foundation for government inquisitions against any dissidents who questioned the imperial supremacy. The latter, in particular, was fully demonstrated in the official cultural activities of the Qianlong period.

Compared with his father, Emperor Yongzheng was much more conscious of employing Confucianism as a practical means of indoctrination, and emphasized loyalty, filial piety, and chastity. Yet, as many historians note, when installing Confucian thought as the state orthodoxy, he took a pragmatic and religious approach to combine it with Buddhism, Taoism, and even Legalism in an attempt to satisfy the demands of his autocracy.<sup>117</sup> To enforce the Confucian ideology, shortly after his enthronement, he ordered local officials to report all sorts of virtuous deeds of chaste widows and filial sons and daughters to the throne so as to honor them with imperial commendations (*jingbiao* 旌表) and make these cases the models for the

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<sup>115</sup> *Dayi juemi lu*, *juan* 1, p. 8.

<sup>116</sup> Thomas Fisher, “Lü Liu-liang (1629-83) and the Tseng Ching Case (1728-33),” p. 278.

<sup>117</sup> Huang Pei, *Autocracy at Work: A Study of the Yung-cheng Period, 1723-1735* (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1974), pp. 42-50; Gao Xiang 高翔, *Kang Yong Qian san di tongzhi sixiang yanjiu* 康雍乾三帝統治思想研究 (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chuhanshe 中國人民大學出版社, 1995), pp. 124-149; and, Yang, Naiji 楊乃濟 and Feng Zuozhe 馮佐哲, “Yongzhengdi de xiangrui guan yu tian ren gan ying shuo bian xi” 雍正帝的祥瑞觀與天人感應說辨析, *Qingshi lun cong* 清史論叢, 5 (1984): 192-220.

people.<sup>118</sup> In 1724, he issued the *Shengyu guangxun* 聖諭廣訓, or the *Amplified Instructions on the Sacred Edict*, which was his exposition of Kangxi's *Sacred Edict* of sixteen moral maxims that preached the Confucian values, and made it a basic text for every local school.<sup>119</sup> In addition, the government also carried out a great reform of the provincial and local education administration regarding the supervision of the scholastic activity and personal conduct of students. Under this policy, any ideas or opinions differing from the orthodox ideology based on the adopted Cheng-Zhu school of Neo-Confucianism were regarded as heterodoxy and prohibited.<sup>120</sup> Yongzheng rationalized his authoritarian cultural policy by referring to the Confucian sage-emperor ideal. According to this view, an emperor is both a teacher and a ruler of the people and, hence, it is his responsibility to provide guidance for the daily life of his subjects. Later, when Qianlong extended his imperial intervention to the intellectual discourse on history, the ruler's "sage-emperor" role was further emphasized.<sup>121</sup>

During 1723-1735, the strengthening of ideological control was accompanied by the reinforcement of the personal rule of the emperor. Facing the problem of factionalism after his enthronement, the emperor intentionally employed the system of secret palace memorials as a tool to crush antagonistic forces and reinvigorate the bureaucracy. Originating in

<sup>118</sup> *Shizong Xianhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vols. 7, *juan* 4, Yongzheng year 1, month 2, p. 100. Recently, the historical discourse of chaste widowhood in Chinese tradition has drawn the historians' attention. For the discussion, see Mark Elvin, "Female Virtue and the State in China," *Past and Present*, 104 (August 1984): 111-152 and Susan Mann, "Widows in the Kinship, Class, and Community Structure of Qing Dynasty China," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 46.1 (Feb., 1987): 37-56.

<sup>119</sup> *Shizong Xianhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vols. 7, *juan* 16, Yongzheng year 2, month 2, pp. 265-267. Also see Wang Ermin 王爾敏, "Qing ting *Shengyu guangxun* zhi ban xing ji minjian zhi xuan jiang shiyi" 清廷《聖諭廣訓》之頒行及民間之宣講拾遺, *Guoli zhongyan yanjiuyuan jindai shi yanjiusuo jikan* 國立中央研究院近代史研究所集刊, 22.2 (June 1983): 257-276.

<sup>120</sup> Huang Pei, *Autocracy at Work*, pp. 197-204.

<sup>121</sup> Yinzhen, *Shizong Xianhuangdi yuzhi wenji* 世宗憲皇帝御製文集, in *Yingyin Wenyuange siku quanshu*, vol. 1300, p. 90.



the Chinese dynastic device for supervising the bureaucrats, the system was introduced by Kangxi but completely institutionalized and comprehensively applied by Yongzheng.<sup>122</sup> Like his father, Yongzheng used this system extensively to obtain the information necessary for decision-making and checking the activities and performance of the central and local officials. Nevertheless, apart from this, he also used it to fortify his power and undermine the influence of the censors at policy-deliberative level, as their authority of criticizing policies and impeaching officials were diluted by the memorialists. To diminish the function of the censorial system, which might hinder imperial power, and avoid the factional practices of the censors, in 1723 the emperor incorporated the Six Offices of Scrutiny into the Censorate, in which the supervising secretaries and the censors were put under severe central surveillance. Meanwhile, while the authority of the Censorate in monitoring local administration was increased, the function of its officials in criticizing imperial policies was weakened due to their increased workload.<sup>123</sup> In order to free himself from institutional checks and balances, the emperor relied heavily on his self-appointed inner-court committees and the Grand Council, which was established in the mid-Yongzheng period, thus, by-passing the role of the outer courts in the process of policy formulation.<sup>124</sup> According to this practice, the bureaucracy became nothing more than an administrative body whose brief role was to carry out the orders of the ruler. The authority of the

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<sup>122</sup> Silas Wu, *Communication and Imperial control in China*, p. 1; Yang Qiqiao, *Yongzheng di ji qi mizhe zhidu yanjiu*, p. 289; and, Zhuang jifa, *Qingdai zouzhe zhidu*, pp. 37-41.

<sup>123</sup> Huang Pei, *Autocracy at Work*, p. 117-119 and Feng Erkang, *Yongzheng zhuan*, pp. 243-250.

<sup>124</sup> For a detail discussion on the development and the functions of the Yongzheng inner court, see Beatrice Bartlett, *Monarchs and Ministers: The Grand Council in Mid-Ch'ing China, 1723-1820* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 13-134; Huang Pei, "The Grand Council of the Ch'ing Dynasty: A Historiographical Study," *London School of Oriental and African Studies Bulletin*, 48.3 (1985): 502-515; and, Huang, *Autocracy at Work*, pp. 136-161.

government was highly concentrated in the hands of the throne. Through the secret palace memorial system, the weakening of the censorate, and the establishment of the inner-court committees, the autocratic machinery reached its apogee of power.

In spite of his "dictatorship," Yongzheng's contributions to the flourishing of the dynasty are generally acknowledged by historians. In his thirteen-year reign, the emperor proved himself a capable ruler, in particular, he successfully solved the problem of administrative malfunction which had emerged since the late Kangxi period. During the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the Qing government suffered from the problem of financial deficits and official peculation as a consequence of Kangxi's tolerant attitude toward corrupt officials and his lax supervision of the bureaucratic administration.<sup>125</sup> Realizing the seriousness of the problem, upon assuming power in 1723 Yongzheng immediately changed the previous government policy and set up an ad hoc committee to investigate carefully the accounts of government departments at all levels.<sup>126</sup> Throughout the investigation, the emperor always kept a close eye on all cases and constantly gave instructions according to the real situation. Within three years, most of the government deficits were made up and those officials concerned were penalized.<sup>127</sup> At the same time, seeing insufficient revenues as one of the major causes leading to corruption, the emperor, with the intention of preventing officials from engaging in malfeasance, decided to reform the local fiscal administration and improve

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<sup>125</sup> Zhaolian, *Xiaoting zalu*, juan 1, p. 9. It seems that Kangxi had learnt about the problem in his late years but he did not realize its seriousness. See *Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu*, *Qing shilu*, vol. 6, juan 282, Kangxi year 57, month 11, p. 755. For the figures of the provincial peculation, see Zhuang Jifa, *Qingshizong yu fuyi de gaige* 清世宗與賦役制度的改革 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju 臺灣學生書局, 1985), pp. 158-159.

<sup>126</sup> *Shizong Xianhuangdi shilu*, *Qing shilu*, vol. 7, juan 2, Kangxi year 61, month 12, pp. 57-59.

<sup>127</sup> Madeleine Zelin, *The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in Eighteenth-Century Ch'ing China* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and Oxford: University of California Press,



the incomes of local officials to meet their daily expenditures. Under this policy, part of the government revenue from the meltage fee or *huohao* 火耗, an additional charge on tax-payers for the inevitable loss of silver in casting, was put aside to found a special fund, the stipends or allowances for “cultivation of incorruptibility” (*yanglian yin* 養廉銀), to ensure the living standards of the local officials.<sup>128</sup> Although recently some historians have queried the effectiveness of the *yanglian yin* in eliminating corruption,<sup>129</sup> Yongzheng’s reform of the local administration was, to a large extent, a remarkable contribution to the improvement of administrative efficiency in the Qing period and provided an efficient government for the early Qianlong era.

In 1735, when Qianlong succeeded his father as emperor, he enjoyed the substantial achievements of his predecessors. In the early eighteenth century, the Qing empire was a prosperous state administered by a powerful central government and its people lived in a peaceful environment and enjoyed remarkable economic growth.<sup>130</sup> The monarch had been well educated in the Confucian tradition from the age of six *sui*. He began classes in Chinese classics and history at the age of nine *sui* and by thirteen *sui*, he had read and memorized the *Four Books* and *Five*

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1984), pp. 78-82 and Feng Erkang, *Yongzheng zhuan*, pp. 139-147.

<sup>128</sup> For a study of *yanglian yin*, see Saeki Tomi 佐伯富, “Shindai Yōsei chō ni okeru yōrengin no kenkyū — chihō zaisei no seiritsu o megutte” 清代雍正朝における養廉銀の研究——地方財政の成立をめぐって, *Tōyōshi kenkyū* 東洋史研究, 29.1 (June 1970): 30-60; 29.2-3 (Dec. 1970): 56-117; 30.4 (March 1972): 55-92; Madeleine Zelin, *The Magistrate’s Tael*, 88-115, 190-201; Zhuang Jifa, *Qingshizong yu fuyi de gaige*, pp. 185-231; and, Xue Ruilu 薛瑞錄, “Qingdai yanglian yin zhidu jian lun” 清代養廉銀制度簡論, *Qingshi lun cong* 清史論叢, 5 (1984): 139-157.

<sup>129</sup> Huang Chengju 黃乘鉅, “Guanyu Yongzheng nian jian yanlian yin zhidu de ruogan wenti — — yu Zuo Bofu boshi shangque 關於雍正年間養廉銀制度的若干問題——與佐伯富博士商榷, *Qingshi luncong* 清史論叢, 6 (1985), pp. 88-103 and Wang Rongsheng 王戎笙, *Qingdai quan shi* 清代全史, vol. 4 (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe 遼寧人民出版社, 1991), p. 59.

<sup>130</sup> Susan Naquin and Evelyn S. Rawski, *Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century* (New



*Classics*. Later, his reading was extended to cover most of the best-known writings on Neo-Confucianism and histories.<sup>131</sup> This thorough training in Chinese scholarship gave him ample knowledge of Chinese culture and helped him formulate his cultural policy after ascending to the throne. Like his father and grandfather, Emperor Qianlong was fully aware of the significance of ideological control to the security of the empire and he directed particular attention to the role of history in moral education. In 1772, he proclaimed the compilation of the *Siku quanshu* 四庫全書 (Complete library of the four treasuries).<sup>132</sup> The huge project, coupled with a strict censorship of any anti-Manchu references, not only represented a revival of the hallowed Chinese tradition of centralized imperial book collecting but also clearly reflected the emperor's ambitious intention of directing ideological trends.<sup>133</sup> In the process of compiling *Siku*, the question of how to handle the writings of late-Ming loyalists, which inevitably involved an evaluation of these figures and their history, became one of the core issues confronting the throne.

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Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987), pp. 97-106.

<sup>131</sup> Harold Kahn, *Monarchy in the Emperor's Eyes: Image and Reality in the Ch'ien-lung Reign* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 115-132.

<sup>132</sup> For the details of the project, see Kent Guy, *The Emperor's Four Treasuries: Scholars and the State in the Late Ch'ien-lung Era* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1987); Guo Bogong 郭伯恭, *Siku quan shu zuanxiu kao* 四庫全書纂修考 (Beiping: Guoli Beiping yanjiuyuan shixue yanjiushi 國立北平研究院史學研究室, 1937, repr. ed., Shanghai: Shanghai shudian 上海書店, 1992); Huang Aiping 黃愛平, *Siku quanshu zuanxiu yanjiu* 四庫全書纂修研究 (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue chubanshe 中國人民大學出版社, 1989); and, Zhou Jiming 周積明, *Wenhua shiye xia de Siku quanshu zongmu* 文化視野下的四庫全書總目 (Nanning: Guangxi renmin chubanshe 廣西人民出版社, 1991).

<sup>133</sup> This is also reflected in the literary inquisition of the Qianlong period. Luther Goodrich, *The Literary Inquisition of Ch'ien-Lung* (New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1966), pp. 45-52.

## 2. The Early-Qing Discourse on Loyalty

The drastic shift of the Mandate of Heaven in the seventeenth-century China provoked an identity crisis among the Chinese literati and forced them to reconsider their socio-political role in an era of dynastic change. Under the influence of Neo-Confucianism, since the Song dynasty (960-1279), the principle of loyalty which emphasized officials' absolute submission to the throne had gradually come to dominate intellectual discourse in relation to emperor-minister relationship.<sup>1</sup> As a result of imperial indoctrination, the demand upon the ruled to observe the principle of loyalty was further intensified and it became an orthodox ideology governing the behavior of scholar-officials during the Ming.<sup>2</sup> Notwithstanding late-Ming criticisms of the political misrule resulting from despotism,<sup>3</sup> it was generally believed that loyalty, as one of the important Confucian virtues, was the most essential moral quality of an official.<sup>4</sup> It

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<sup>1</sup> For a discussion on the changing concept of loyalty of the Song, see Wang Gung-wu. "Feng Tao: An Essay on Confucian Loyalty," in *Confucianism and Chinese Civilization*, Arthur F. Wright ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 188-210. Also see Kwang-ching Liu, "Socioethics as Orthodoxy: A Perspective," in Kwang-ching Liu ed., *Orthodoxy in Late Imperial China* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 90-100 and Richard Davis, *Wind Against the Mountain: The Crisis of Politics and Culture in Thirteenth-Century China* (Cambridge, M.A. and London: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1996), pp. 5-25.

<sup>2</sup> *Mingshi*, juan 289, p. 7407 and Abe Takeo 安部健夫, *Shindai shi no kenkyū* 清代史の研究 (Tokyo: Sōbunsha 創文社, 1971), pp. 48-51.

<sup>3</sup> *Wanli dichao* 萬曆邸鈔 (reprinted, Yangzhou: Jiangsu guangling guji keyinshe 江蘇廣陵古籍刻印社, 1991), vol. 3, juan 6, Wanli year 45, month 10, pp. 2383-2388 and *Wanli qijuzhu* 萬曆起居注 (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe 北京大學出版社, 1988), vol. 9, Wanli year 36, month 7, pp. 86-89, 947-950.

<sup>4</sup> Ian McMorran has classified traditional Chinese loyalism into two categories, "absolute loyalism" and "rational loyalism." The former stressed the absolute supremacy of the ruler and the total submission of his subjects; the latter advanced a "conditional" ruler-ruled relation based on the correct principles of government. He further points out that as a result of indoctrination, the idea of absolute loyalism dominated Chinese thought in seventeenth-century China in spite of the widespread criticism of the late-Ming misrule. See Momulun 麥穆倫 (McMorran), "Ming-Qing dingge zhi ji zhongjun kao" 明清鼎革

was not until the downfall of the Ming order in 1644 that this Confucian faith shared by the Chinese, in particular by the Chinese literati, underwent a severe ordeal.

During the conquest period, Neo-Confucian teachings of loyalty were tested by the challenges of social disintegration and alien invasion. Faced with ceaseless Southern Ming factionalism and successive Manchu military victories, many Chinese literati found themselves in an acute dilemma of conflicting values: should they uphold Confucian principles and cleave to the disintegrating empire at any cost or collaborate with the invading alien dynasty and thereby help avoid unnecessary bloodshed and help bring an end to the disorder of the late Ming? Making a decision was no easy task and either choice required an ethical justification, which would reflect one's social responsibilities and moral obligation. The political choices faced by the literati during this dynastic transition thus elicited a discourse on the personal ethics of being a scholar-official, especially in relation to loyalism. Within this discourse, the statements of three social groups are noteworthy, namely the collaborators, the Ming loyalists, and the Qing subjects. Their statements not only account for complex interweave resulting in the formation of the Qing concept of loyalty but also reflect the dialectic relationship between individuals and their historical context.

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之際忠君考, trans. Cheng Wei 程薇, in *Faguo Hanxue* 法國漢學, Vol. 1, eds. Denys Lombard and Li Xueqin 李學勤 (Beijing: Qinghua daxue chubanshe 清華大學出版社, 1996), pp. 46-56. As Chen Hanming 陳寒鳴 observes, the influence of absolute loyalism on the late-Ming politics was fully reflected in the Donglin 東林 movement. Criticizing administrative abuse the Donglin elite blamed the eunuch faction in the court instead of the emperor and, faced with political persecution, most of them were prepared to die out of cause of loyalty for the throne. See Chen's analysis in *Zhongguo zhengzhi sixiang shi: Sui Tang Song Yuan Ming Qing juan*, pp. 597-598.



## The Collaborators and Early-Qing Public Opinion

Consideration of the large number of Ming scholar-officials who submitted to the Manchus during the conquest period of 1644-1662 has recently led historians to note the discrepancy between theoretical ideal and historical reality in an epoch of general crisis.<sup>5</sup> According to the Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucian teachings, the monarch-minister relationship that stresses the unquestioning loyalty of the latter to the former is the chief component of the “Three Cardinal Bonds” (*san gang* 三綱) and “Five Human Relationships” (*wu chang* 五常) which embody the “Heavenly Principles” (*tianli* 天理), and under no circumstances should these supposedly fixed relationship be ignored.<sup>6</sup> Ironically, in contrast to this doctrine of loyalism, when Li Zicheng seized Beijing in April 1644, most of the Ming officials in the northern capital surrendered themselves to the rebels and even took office in the new court.<sup>7</sup> As soon as the Manchus established the Qing dynasty after defeating Li in the same year and conquered the south in the following two decades, the vast majority of the

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<sup>5</sup> Hilary J. Beattie, “The Alternative to Resistance: The Case of T’ung-ch’eng, Anhwei,” in *From Ming to Ch’ing*, pp. 239-276; Frederic Wakeman, *The Great Enterprise*, pp. 267-290; 415-447; 640-646; Wakeman, “Localism and Loyalism during the Ch’ing Conquest of Kiangnan: The Tragedy of Chiang-yin,” pp. 43-85; Ho Koon-piu, “Should We Die as Martyrs to the Ming Cause?—Scholar-officials’ Views on Martyrdom during the Ming-Qing Transition,” *Oriens Extremus* 37.2 (1994): 123-151; and Ho, *Sheng yu si: Mingji shidafu de jueze* 生與死：明季士大夫的抉擇 (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi 聯經出版事業公司, 1997).

<sup>6</sup> Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032-1085) and Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033-1107), *Er Cheng ji* 二程集 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981), *Yishu* 遺書, vol. 1, *juan* 2a, p. 43 and Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200), *Zhuji yulei* 朱子語類, Li Jingde 黎靖德 ed. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1986), vol. 2, *juan* 24, pp. 599-600.

<sup>7</sup> According to Ji Liuqi, of those scholar-officials who were in Beijing, twenty committed suicide while about four thousands surrendered. See *Mingji beilue*, *juan* 20, p. 472, pp. 473-475, 481-482; *juan* 21a, pp. 503-548; and *juan* 22, pp. 598-641. Also see Wu Han 吳晗, comp., *Chaoxian Li chao shilu zhongde Zhongguo shiliao* 朝鮮李朝實錄中的中國史料 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1980), vol. 9, pp. 3735-3737.

social elite chose to accept and collaborate with the alien regime.<sup>8</sup> The political realignment of these former Ming subjects considerably shaped the history of the Ming-Qing transition and remains an interesting topic for the study of early-Qing thought.

Wan Sitong 萬斯同 (1638-1702), a prominent early-Qing historian, was disappointed by the fact that in spite of a long period of government indoctrination, the moral consciousness of the literati in the late Ming was deeply affected by the social environment and when in dire straits, it was extremely difficult to expect the majority to observe moral principles.<sup>9</sup> For those Chinese who experienced the historical catastrophes caused by wars and rebellions, the mid-seventeenth century was indeed a period in which “the heavens split and the earth cracked open.”<sup>10</sup> The upheaval not only destroyed public order but also resulted in a moral disintegration in the society. In the face of human disaster, the orthodox Neo-Confucian ideology of loyalty eventually lost its dominance. It is understandable that in response to the Manchu advance, individual survival, personal career opportunities, and family safety were factors affecting the political choices of the collaborators.<sup>11</sup> However, it is an

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<sup>8</sup> As Martin Martino, the Italian Jesuit who visited China in the mid-seventeenth century, observes, the Chinese in the south did not at first refuse to cooperate with the Manchu regime, the local resistance movement later being incited by the government hair-cutting order. See *Bellum Tartaricum, or the Conquest of the Great and Most Renowned Empire of China*, p. 127.

<sup>9</sup> *Shiyuan wenji* 石園文集, in *Siming congshu di si ji* 四明叢書第四集, Zhang Shouyong 張壽鏞 (1876-1945), comps. (*Siming Zhangshi Yueyuan kanben* 四明張氏約園刊本, 1936), *juan* 5, pp. 3b-4a.

<sup>10</sup> The Chinese terms *tian beng di lie* 天崩地裂, *tian beng di xian* 天崩地陷, and *tian beng di jie* 天崩地解 were widely employed by early-Qing writers to describe the social disintegration during the Ming-Qing transition. Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (1619-1692), *Wang Chuanshan shi wen ji* 王船山詩文集 (Hong Kong: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1974), vol. 1, *wenji* 文集, *juan* 2, 28. Huang Zongxi, *Mingru xue'an*, in *Huang Zongxi quanji*, 黃宗羲全集, Wu Guang 吳光 et al. eds., vol. 8 (Hangzhou 杭州: Zhejiang Guji chubanshe 浙江古籍出版社, 1992), *juan* 60, p.838.

<sup>11</sup> For example, in defense of his decision to surrender to the rebels in 1644, Gong Dingzi

oversimplification to conclude that their collaboration was nothing more than a pursuit of self-interest.

The rationale for the collaboration of Han Chinese with the Manchus was complicated. In defense of their decision to surrender to the Qing in 1645, Zhao Zhilong 趙之龍 (d. 1654), the Southern Ming count, and his colleagues in Nanjing argued the following:

Are there any of our governors-general who are not loyalists and filial sons? [Yet, we] know that this [the collapse of the Ming dynasty] is Heaven's Will and nothing can be done about it. Surrendering to those who have the Mandate of Heaven to save millions of lives [from wars] is what benevolent gentlemen with lofty ideals should do and what great men consider when making their choices.<sup>12</sup>

Regardless of whether these were the true motives behind the collective action of Zhao and his followers, to a certain extent, "following Heaven's Will" and "working for the best interests of the people" provided sound arguments for the Han Chinese to justify their compromise. These rationalizations implied that in a time of cataclysm, the welfare of the people should always be placed ahead of any political principle. A number of research findings point out that in most cases the political choices of the collaborators were a mixture of private and public considerations.<sup>13</sup> At least, apart from self-interest, one of their concerns was how to save the society from violent wars. Disappointed in the corrupt Southern Ming regimes and their unruly forces, many local elite came to believe that collaboration with the new authorities was the only way to end the calamity

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龔鼎孳 (1616-1673) said that he originally planned to die for the Ming cause but his concubine did not allow him to do so. *Mingji beilüe*, *juan* 22, p. 631.

<sup>12</sup> Li Tiangen 李天根, *Juehuo lu* 燭火錄 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji chubanshe 浙江古籍出版社, 1984), vol. 2, *juan* 10, p. 478.

<sup>13</sup> Frederic Wakeman, *The Great Enterprise*, pp. 595-598, p. 604. The conquest history of Jiangyin region may serve as a case study. See Frederic Wakeman, "Localism and Loyalism during the Ch'ing Conquest of Kiangnan: The Tragedy of Chiang-yin," pp. 43-85; Hilary J. Beattie, "The Alternative to Resistance: The Case of T'ung-ch'eng, Anhwei," pp. 239-276.



and quickly restore social order.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, from a culturalist perspective, some true believers in Confucianism might also have regarded their service to the newly-founded polity to be a means to educate the “barbarians” into developing an appreciation for Confucian values and thereby facilitate in converting the alien rulers to the Chinese way of rule.<sup>15</sup>

Although later, following the high Qing, the collaborators were generally criticized, or even condemned, for their disloyalty to the Ming, it is a misconception that their attitude of compromise had garnered little support from the public at that time.<sup>16</sup> On the contrary, as we are going to discuss, the available materials indicate that during this turbulent period, collaboration, as a way to avoid wars and disorder, was an acceptable option, which was tolerated and even endorsed by the society at large. In addition

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<sup>14</sup> Ji Liuqi, *Mingji nanlüe*, juan 4, pp. 231-232.

<sup>15</sup> Ho Koon-piu: “Lun Ming yimin zhi chuchu” 論明遺民之出處, in *Mingmo Qingchu xueshu sixiang yanjiu* 明末清初學術思想研究 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju 臺灣學生書局, 1991), pp. 90-95. As John Langlois points out, the Chinese elite in early Qing found in culturalism a justification for serving the alien regime. See Langlois, “Chinese Culturalism and the Yüan Analogy: Seventeenth-Century Perspectives,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 40 (1980): 355-398. The Chinese elite’s acceptance of the Mongol rule in China during 1279-1368 may provide useful analogies to the understanding of the Qing case. For a discussions of the Yuan case, see John Langlois, “Political Thought in China under Mongol Rule,” in *China under Mongol Rule*, John D. Langlois, Jr. ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 137-185; Wang Mingsun 王明蓀, *Yuan dai de shiren yu zhengzhi* 元代的士人與政治 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju 臺灣學生書局, 1992), pp. 275-294; 309-322; Xiao Gongqin 蕭功秦, “Lixue yu Yuan dai zhengzhi” 理學與元代政治, in *Xiao Gongqin ji* 蕭功秦集 (Harbin: Heilongjiang chubanshe 黑龍江出版社, 1995), pp. 437-458; and, Yao Shuyi 么書儀, *Yuan dai wenren xintai* 元代文人心態 (Beijing: Wenhua yishu chubanshe 文化藝術出版社, 1993), pp. 13-101.

<sup>16</sup> After the Qianlong period, Chinese historians, influenced by the official interpretation of the conquest history, were convinced by the affirmation that political realignment in the dynastic transition was an immoral action condemned by the public. Even in the twentieth century, the Marxist-nationalist historians also tend to adopt such a viewpoint. Xie Guozhen’s 謝國楨 (1901-1982) *Nanming shilüe* 南明史略 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe 上海人民出版社, 1957) is a typical example. For a criticism of this approach, see Lynn Struve, “Southern Ming History in Twentieth-Century China,” unpublished conference paper, in the “International Conference on the History of the Ming-Ch’ing Period,” Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1985, pp. 1-67.

to the huge number of collaborators in the conquest period, the contemporaries' admiration for some collaborators' contributions to social welfare also refuted the post-Qianlong perception that all collaborators in the dynastic transition were generally condemned by the public for their "shameless deeds." For instance, Qiu Junsun 丘俊孫 (1606-1686), who as county magistrate negotiated with the Qing troops and saved people of Luhe county, Jiangsu, from a massacre after their surrender,<sup>17</sup> and Wang Zhonghui 王仲樞 (1599-1667), who successfully saved Gaotang county, Shandong, from war,<sup>18</sup> were highly honored for their wisdom and benevolence. Nevertheless, according to the epitaphs and biographies written by their contemporaries, Qiu and other former Ming officials like Zhu Jiazheng 朱嘉徵 (1602-1684) and Fang Rujing 方如京 were admired by the public for their outstanding local services during the Qing.<sup>19</sup>

The close association between some collaborators and the Ming loyalists further indicates that during the dynastic transition, people tended to take a sympathetic and relatively less dogmatic perspective in considering the moral deeds of those former Ming officials who involuntarily collaborated with the Qing government under political pressure. The post-1644 social networks of Qian Qianyi 錢謙益 (1582-1664) and Wu Weiye provide two valuable case studies which reveal the attitudes of early-Qing literati toward these collaborators.

Qian Qianyi was a controversial figure who began his official career under the Ming and became an influential scholar-official in the mid-seventeenth century. When the Qing armies entered Nanjing in 1645, he

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<sup>17</sup> Huang Zongxi, *Huang Zongxi quanji* vol. 10 (1993), pp. 253-255. According to Huang, Wang retired from office after 1644.

<sup>18</sup> Huang Zongxi, *Huang Zongxi quanji* vol. 10, pp. 258-259.

<sup>19</sup> Huang Zongxi, *Huang Zongxi quanji* vol. 10, pp. 412-415 and Wei Xiangshu, *Hansongtang quanji*, juan 8, pp. 413-415.



surrendered himself to the Manchus and served the new regime in Beijing during 1646-1647.<sup>20</sup> It was believed that his compromise might enable him “to defend fellow literati suspected of loyalist activities.”<sup>21</sup> Qian’s service in the Qing court was short-lived and after his submission, he retained certain connections with the resistance movement. Resigning from office, he retired to his home county, Changchu, Jiangsu, but soon was accused of assisting the resistance movement and was subsequently imprisoned in 1648.<sup>22</sup> Due to a lack of evidence, he was released from prison in the same year. This period of incarceration did not prevent him from keeping in touch with the Ming loyalists and he maintained these relationships until his death.<sup>23</sup> Consequently, despite his taint of collaboration,<sup>24</sup> Qian did not fail to win the friendship of men of moral integrity, including Huang Zongxi and Gui Zhuang 歸莊 (1613-1673), who were the eminent loyalists of the time.<sup>25</sup>

Wu Weiye was best known for his paintings and poems. He was a

<sup>20</sup> L. C. Goodrich and J. C. Yang, “Ch’ien Ch’ien-i,” in *Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period (1644-1912)*, vol. 1, pp. 148-150 and He Zhiqing 赫治清, “Qian Qianyi” in *Qingdai renwu zhuangao* 清代人物傳稿, shangbian 上編, vol. 6, He Lingxiu 何齡修 and Zhang Jiefu 張捷夫 eds. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1991), pp. 210-224.

<sup>21</sup> Wakeman, *The Great Enterprise*, vol. 1, pp. 595-596.

<sup>22</sup> Batai et al. comps., *Shizu Zhanghuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 3, juan 38, Shunzhi year 5, month 4, p. 307.

<sup>23</sup> The available sources concerning Qian’s involvement in the resistance movement are very limited. Yet, according to the investigation of Chen Yinke 陳寅恪 (1890-1969), Qian was involved in anti-Qing activities in South China during the late 1640s and early 1650s. See Chen, *Liu Rushi biezhuàn* 柳如是別傳 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe 上海古籍出版社, 1980), vol. 3, pp. 882-1197.

<sup>24</sup> Wakeman asserts that by 1646, “Qian Qianyi’s reputation for personal compromise was notorious.” (Wakeman, *The Great Enterprise*, vol. 2, p. 718.) This assertion is subject to debate. According to the research findings of Xie Zhengguang 謝正光, in spite of the criticism of his collaboration, Qian in fact retained his reputation in the society before the Kangxi period. See Xie, “Tanglun Qingchu shiwen dui Qian Qianyi pingjia zhi zhuanbian” 探論清初詩文對錢謙益評價之轉變, *Journal of the Institute of Chinese Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong*, 21 (1990): 261-270.

<sup>25</sup> Huang Zongxi, *Huang Zongxi quanji*, vol. 1 (1985), pp. 374-375 and Gui Zhuang, *Gui Zhuang ji* 歸莊集 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe 上海古籍出版社, 1982), vol. 2,



leader of the late-Ming literati and one of the founders of the literati grouping called the Fushe 復社 (Restoration Society).<sup>26</sup> Being a Ming official, he planned to take his own life when the Ming house fell in 1644 but was prevented from doing so by his mother. Owing to official pressure from Beijing, according to his own words, he took office under the Qing against his own will during 1654-1657.<sup>27</sup> In 1657, on the occasion of his mother's death, he took the opportunity to resign and return home.<sup>28</sup> As his later writings show, Wu deeply regretted having served the Qing and condemned himself for failing to uphold the principle of loyalty.<sup>29</sup> Yet, his short-term service in the new court did little to influence to his friendship with Ming loyalists like Tan Qian 談遷 (1594-1658), and the Buddhist monk Jiqi 繼起 (Li Hongchu 李洪儲, 1604-1672).<sup>30</sup> His confessional

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juan 8, pp. 470-472.

<sup>26</sup> For the political activities of Fushe, see Xie Guozhen, *Ming-Qing zhi ji dang she yundong kao* 明清之際黨社運動考 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1982), pp. 119-152 and William Atwell, "From Education to Politics: The Fushe," in *The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism*, Wm. Theodore de Bary ed. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1975), 333-365. The Fushe was highly related to the late-Ming Donglin 東林 movement. For a study of the Donglin movement, see Xie Guozhen, *Ming-Qing zhi ji dang she yundong kao* and Busch, Heinrich, "The Tung-lin Academy and Its Political and Philosophical Significance," *Monumenta Serica*, 14 (1949-1955): 1-163; and, Charles Hucker, *The Ming Dynasty: Its Origins and Evolving Institutions* (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan, 1978), pp. 132-162.

<sup>27</sup> Wu Weiye, *Wu Meicun quanji* 吳梅村全集 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe 上海古籍出版社, 1990), vol. 3, juan 57, p. 1132. To some historians, Wu's account was just a "after-the-fact rationalization." See Sun Kekuan 孫克寬, "Wu Meicun beixing qianhou zhi" 吳梅村北行前後詩, in *Guoli zhongyang tushuguan guankan* 國立中央圖書館館刊, 7.1 (March 1974): 3-13 and Wakeman, *The Great Enterprise*, pp. 934-942.

<sup>28</sup> Tu Lien-che, "Wu Wei-yeh," in *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912)*, vols. 2, pp. 882-883 and He lingxiu, *Qingdai renwu zhuangao, shangbian*, vol. 6, pp. 233-243.

<sup>29</sup> Wu Weiye, *Wu Meicun quanji*, vol. 1, juan 10, p. 260; juan 15, p. 398; juan 16, p. 428; vol. 2, juan 20, p. 531; juan 22, p. 585; vol. 3, and, juan 57, p. 1132.

<sup>30</sup> Feng Qiyong 馮其庸 and Ye Junyuan 葉君遠, *Wu Meicun nianpu* 吳梅村年譜 (Jiangsu guji chubanshe 江蘇古籍出版社, 1990), pp. 278-547 and Tan Qian, *Beiyou lu* 北游錄 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1960), *jiyou* 紀郵, pp. 59-129; *jiwen* 紀文, pp. 269-271. According to Quan Zuwang 全祖望 (1705-1755), Li Hongchu became a Buddhist monk in 1633 but he was associated with the resistance movement in Zhejiang during the Ming-Qing transition. Quan, *Jiqiting ji* 結埼亭集 (Taibei: Huashi Chubanshe

poetry also moved the literati of his time.<sup>31</sup>

From the cases of Wu and Qian, it would appear that during the Shunzhi and early Kangxi periods, instead of rigidly applying the Neo-Confucian moral principles, early-Qing scholars tended to adopt a humanistic approach in tackling the vexatious issue of loyalty. Of course, despite the public sympathy for their difficult situation, those former Ming officials who served in the Qing court could not escape from being commented on and pilloried by the moralists of betraying the previous dynasty.<sup>32</sup> Therefore, it is not surprising to find that the collaborators were usually ashamed of having served two dynasties.<sup>33</sup> Later the political realignment of these “former ministers” (*jiuchen* 舊臣) was also regarded unacceptable according to Qing state orthodoxy based on Neo-Confucian ethics though their collaboration had contributed significantly to the victory of the Manchus and the legitimacy of Qing rule, and during the dynastic transition had been recognized by the conquerors as an act according to “Heaven’s Will” (*tianming* 天命).<sup>34</sup> Needless to say, when the Qing empire had completed its military conquest of China and moral restoration became central to the social agenda in the late seventeenth century, the collaborators’ justifications for serving two dynasties no longer merited

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華世出版社, 1977), vol. 1, *juan* 14, pp. 176-177.

<sup>31</sup> Feng Qiyong and Ye Junyuan, *Wu Meicun nianpu*, pp. 542-545.

<sup>32</sup> Wang Yingkui 王應奎 (1683-1759/1760), *Liunan xubi* 柳南續筆 in *Liunan suibi* 柳南隨筆 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1983), *juan* 2, p. 165 and Gong Wei 龔煒 (b. 1704), *Chaolin biji* 巢林筆談 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1981), *juan* 3, p. 76.

<sup>33</sup> For example, in early-Qing factionalism, the collaborators’ personal histories always provided their political opponents with a handle against them. See *Shizu Zhanghuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 3, *juan* 20, Shunzhi year 2, month 8, pp. 176-177. According to Zhao Yi 趙翼 (1727-1814), some collaborators tended to avoid mentioning their early life under the Ming. Zhao, *Yanpu zaji* 簞曝雜記 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1982), *juan* 2, p. 39.

<sup>34</sup> *Shizu Zhanghuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 3, *juan* 17, Shunzhi year 2, month 6, p. 150, 155. The Qing government’s attitude toward the collaborators will be discussed in the later chapters.



imperial recognition or popular support.

### The Ming Loyalists and Their Reflections upon Loyalism

Surrounded by a huge number of collaborators, Ming loyalists were obviously a political minority. They formed only a small proportion of the Han Chinese population.<sup>35</sup> As Lynn Struve suggests, the term “Ming loyalist” should apply only to those who “pointedly altered his or her life patterns and goals to demonstrate unalterable personal identification with the fallen order.”<sup>36</sup> By this definition, not all anti-Qing activists can be classified into this category. At least, those political opportunists who joined the resistance movement out of personal ambition should be excluded.<sup>37</sup>

Unlike the collaborators, the staunch loyalists insisted upon the principle of loyalty in the historical tragedy of the Ming demise.<sup>38</sup> They

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<sup>35</sup> Although the exact number of Ming loyalists may never be known, the available sources do provide some clues. According to the records of the *Qinding shengchao xunjie zhuchen lu* (Shuhede 舒赫德 [1710-1777] et al. comps., Qianlong edition, repr. Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe 成文出版社, 1969) and the *Ming yimin zhuanji suooyin* 明遺民傳記索引 (Xie Zhengguang ed., Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe 上海古籍出版社, 1992), the number of Ming martyrs was about three thousand seven hundred while the number of Ming *yimin* was about two thousand. Also see Ho Koon-piu, *Sheng yu si: Mingji shidafu de jueze*, pp. 15-28.

<sup>36</sup> Lynn Struve, “Ambivalence and Action: Some Frustrated Scholars of the K’ang-hsi Period,” in *From Ming to Ch’ing*, p. 327.

<sup>37</sup> The available sources indicate that some of the anti-Qing activists took part in the resistance movement due to political ambition and personal interest rather than loyalism. See the biographies of “Twice-serving Ministers” and “Traitors” compiled by Xu Zi 徐鼎 (1810-1862) in *Xiaotian jizhuan* 小腆紀傳 (Taipei: Taiwan Xuesheng shuju 臺灣學生書局, 1977), *juan* 63-64, pp. 711-753.

<sup>38</sup> Chen Zilong 陳子龍 (1608-1647), *Chen Zilong wenji* 陳子龍文集 (Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe 華東師範大學出版社, 1988), *juan* 9, pp. 490-495; Zhang Jiayu 張家玉 (1615-1647), *Zhang Jiayu ji* 張家玉集 (Guangzhou: Guangdong Gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe 廣東高等教育出版社, 1992), *juan* 3, pp. 88-90; and, Zhang



firmly refused to give up their pro-Ming stance in spite of the fact that their desperate struggle for restoring the dynasty proved fruitless because it could neither prevent the Ming empire from disintegrating nor could they save themselves from a tragic fate.<sup>39</sup> Apart from those participating in the Ming restoration movement, a number of loyalists offered their resistance in the form of martyrdom for the Ming cause<sup>40</sup> or by withdrawing from active public in order to avoid collaboration with the conquerors.<sup>41</sup> Despite employing different ways to defend the same principle, all of them paid a high price for their Confucian faith. During 1645-1662, many loyalist activists involved in anti-Manchu activities were arrested and executed by the Qing. Those who were lucky enough to escape death or imprisonment fled their home counties. Moreover, when the Southern Ming forces were finally crushed and the Qing rule was consolidated, to express their unshakable loyalty to the preceding dynasty and to signify a form of passive resistance to alien domination, the Ming survivors, who were usually known

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Huangyan 張煌言 (1620-1664), *Zhang Cangshui ji* 張蒼水集 (Shanghai: Guji chubanshe 古籍出版社, 1985), p. 2, 34, 50.

<sup>39</sup> For an analysis of responses of the diehard Ming loyalists to alien invasion, see my article "Kangkai fu si yi, conrong jiu yi nan--lun Nanming jianchi kang Qing zhuchen de jueze" 慷慨赴死易, 從容就義難——論南明堅持抗清諸臣的抉擇, *Chinese Culture Quarterly*, 6.3 (December 1994): 61-76. The resistance movements in central China may serve as case studies of their activities. See Jerry Dennerline, *The Chia-ting Loyalists: Confucian Leadership and Social Change in Seventeenth-Century China*. (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 342-343 and Ono Kazuko 小野和子, "Zhedong no rejisutansu" 浙東のレシ"スタンス, in *Minmatsu Shinsho no shakai to bunka* 明末清初の社會と文化, Ono Kazuko ed. (Kyoto: Kyōtō daigaku jinbun kagaku kenkyūjo 京都大學人文科學研究所, 1996), pp. 61-104.

<sup>40</sup> According to *Qinding shengchao xunjie zhuchen lu*, apart from those who were captured and executed by the Qing government, most of these people committed suicide when the Qing troops moved southward.

<sup>41</sup> Quan Zuwang, *Jieqiting ji, waibian* 外編, vol. 2, *juan* 8, p. 757. In his study of the eremites in the Yuan dynasty (1279-1368), Frederick Mote asserts that there were two kinds of Confucian eremitism in Chinese tradition: "compulsory" and "voluntary." The former was imposed as a moral duty, in the name of loyalty, on the survivors of a fallen dynasty while the latter was an individual decision due to political or personal reasons. See "Confucian Eremitism in the Yüan Period," in *The Confucian Persuasion*, Arthur F. Wright ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 208-209.

as the Ming “remnants” or *yimin* 遺民,<sup>42</sup> had no option but to renounce their former gentry status and official careers. Refusing any possibility of compromise or cooperation with the newly-established authorities, some became peasants, pedlars, or medicine men while others chose to live as Taoist eremites or Buddhist monks in order to escape harassment by the new regime.<sup>43</sup>

In memory of the history of resistance and its martyrs, many loyalists in their retirement began to recount Southern Ming events based on their personal experiences and other available sources. From the mid-seventeenth century until the second decade of the eighteenth century, except for the eight-year Oboi regency of 1661-1669, which represented the most extreme expression of Manchu-oriented rule, the Qing government adopted a lenient state policy toward these writings on Southern Ming history.<sup>44</sup> This provided a fairly open atmosphere and favorable conditions for the development of private historiography regarding the Ming-Qing transition. As a result, a number of primary accounts were compiled in the form of “rustic history” (*yeshi* 野史) or “scholarly jottings” (*biji* 筆記).<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> In the seventeenth century, the term *yimin* denoted those loyalists who remained loyal to the fallen dynasty. For the origin and development of the term, see Ho Koon-piu, “Lun Ming *yimin* zhi chuchu,” in *Mingmo Qingchu xueshu sixiang yanjiu*, note 2, pp. 102-105.

<sup>43</sup> Shao Tingcai, *Sifutang wenji* 思復堂文集 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji chubanshe 浙江古籍出版社, 1987), *juan* 3, pp. 211-212; Chen Yuan 陳垣, *Mingji dian qian fojiao kao* 明季滇黔佛教考 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1962), pp. 200-262; and, Wakeman, *The Great Enterprise*, pp. 674-680. According to Wei Zuhui 韋祖輝, some loyalists even fled mainland China and took refuge in Korea and Japan. See Wei, “Ming *yimin* dong du shu lue 明遺民東渡述略, *Mingshi yanjiu luncong* 明史研究論叢, 1 (1982): 152-172. For the Biographies of Ming *yimin*, see *Ming Yiminlu huiji* 明遺民錄彙輯, comp. Xie Zhengguang and Fan Jinmin 范金民 (Nanjing: Nanjing daxue chubanshe 南京大學出版社, 1995). For a case study of the life and thought of the Ming *yimin* after the resistance movement, see Ho Koon-piu: “Lun Ming *yimin* zhi chuchu,” in *Mingmo Qingchu xueshu sixiang yanjiu*, pp. 53-124.

<sup>44</sup> Lynn Struve, “Southern Ming History and Southern Ming Historiography,” unpublished conference paper, in the “International Conference on Southern Ming Historiography,” Shanghai, 1991, pp. 4-5.

<sup>45</sup> A number of accounts of Southern Ming are extant. A considerable number of these



Influenced by the personal sentiments of the authors, these writings intentionally conveyed a sense of deep sorrow for the dynastic change and considerable respect for the resistance activists despite their eventual failure.<sup>46</sup> In some senses, the memory of the Ming martyrs and the glorification of their moral deeds also connoted a strong message of self-recognition, that is the authors' self-affirmation of their own strenuous efforts in carrying out a mission to defend Confucian virtues during this "period of darkness."<sup>47</sup>

Loyalist studies of Southern Ming history included their reflections on the causes of the Ming collapse and the Qing success. In examining the events of the past, they could not avoid such critical questions as: "Why did the resistance movement of 1644-1662 fail despite the wholehearted support of the loyalists?" "Who should be held responsible for the disasters?" and, more importantly, "Why did the Ming empire lose the Mandate of Heaven?" As a result of their deep reflection, they were forced to conclude that late-Ming politics was indeed a conglomeration of court factionalism and administrative abuse, which eventually led to the fall of Beijing and the total failure of the Southern Ming resistance. Although "pernicious cliques" (*nidang* 逆黨) in the late Ming were usually blamed for demolishing the

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come from *yimin*. See Xie Guozhen, *Zengding wan Ming shiji kao* 增訂晚明史籍考 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe 上海古籍出版社, 1981). Also see Xie, *Ming-Qing biji tancong* 明清筆記談叢 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1962) and Lynn Struve, "Uses of History in Traditional Chinese Society: The Southern Ming in Ch'ing Historiography," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Michigan, 1974.

<sup>46</sup> Zha Jizuo 查繼佐 (1601-1676), *Zuiwei lu* 罪惟錄 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji chubanshe 浙江古籍出版社, 1986), *liezhuan* 列傳, *juan* 9, p. 1466.

<sup>47</sup> For instance, Qu Dajun 屈大均 (1630-1696) was proud of his association with the Ming martyrs in Guangdong. Qu, *Huang Ming sichao chengren lu* 皇明四朝成仁錄, in *Guangdong conshu di er ji* 廣東業書第二集, Ye Gongchuo 葉恭綽 (1880-1968), comp. (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan 商務印書館, 1947), vol. 6, *juan* 8, 294b-295a and vol. 7, *juan* 10, 361b-362a. Also see Ou Chu 歐初 and Wang Guichen 王貴忱 eds., *Qu Dajun quanji* 屈大均全集 (Beijing, Renmin wenxue chubanshe 人民文學出版社, 1996), vol. 3, pp. 157-159.



political order of the dynasty and corrupting the people's morals, the loyalists were also frustrated by the weak and incapable imperial rulership which directly gave rise to political chaos and opportunism. Thus, a complex sense of both love and hatred characterized their narratives of this history. We would suggest that the writings of Huang Zongxi and Wang Fuzhi reflect well the prevailing sentiments shared by most of the loyalist scholars.

Huang Zongxi was a native of Yuyao, Zhejiang. He was the son of Huang Zunsu 黃尊素 (1584-1626), a victim of late-Ming political factionalism who was framed by his opponents and died in prison in 1626,<sup>48</sup> and the student of Liu Zongzhou 劉宗周 (1578-1645), a noted and respected Neo-Confucian scholar, who committed suicide by fasting to death after the Qing troops occupied Nanjing.<sup>49</sup> Under the influence of both his father and teacher, Huang took part in the resistance activities of Nanjing and Zhejiang during 1645-1649 but was deeply frustrated by the grim reality of the situation. As an active member of the highly-politicized literati society Fushe, he could not free himself from the factional politics of the Hongguang court in Nanjing. Soon, when Ruan Dacheng 阮大鍼 (1578-1646), the follower of the eunuch clique and political opponent of the Fushe, came to power in 1645, Huang was persecuted for his anti-Ruan stance and forced to flee for refuge. After the fall of Nanjing, he joined the Southern Ming Lu court in Zhejiang and served as the vice-president of the Censorate for three years. Realizing the hopelessness of the resistance movement and worried about the safety of his mother following the promulgation of a Qing order to arrest Ming loyalists and their families, Huang decided to abandon his political activities and retired to his home

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<sup>48</sup> *Huang Zongxi quanji*, vol. 1, pp. 410-414 and *Mingshi*, juan 245, pp. 6360-6364.

<sup>49</sup> *Mingshi*, juan 255, pp. 6573-6592 and Earl Swisher, "Liu Tsung-chou," in *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912)*, vol. 1, pp.532-533.

county when the Lu regime came to an end in 1649.<sup>50</sup>

During his retirement, Huang devoted much of his time to the study of Ming history and thought, compiling a large number of books on these topics. Among these were three works concerning the Southern Ming history, namely *Copies of the Veritable Records of the Hongguang [Reign]* (*Hongguang shilu chao* 弘光實錄鈔, 1658),<sup>51</sup> *Records of the Peripatetic Courts* (*Xingchao lu* 行朝錄, ca. 1683),<sup>52</sup> and *Record of Thought about Past Acquaintances* (*Sijiu lu* 思舊錄, 1692 or 1693).<sup>53</sup> These works aimed at preserving a reliable account of the history of the resistance. They clearly reflected the author's ambivalence in evaluating the performance of the Southern Ming regimes. On the one hand, Huang, from a pro-Ming perspective, had no doubt about the political legitimacy of the "peripatetic courts," though under the attack and pursuit of the Qing forces, they were short-lived and their activities confined to southeast China.<sup>54</sup> On the other hand, however, he could not deny that from its inception, the resistance movement was bound to fail due to its coherent corruption and the conflicts among its political factions.<sup>55</sup> While Huang greatly acknowledged the Southern Ming Longwu Emperor (Zhu Yujian 朱聿鍵, 1623-1662, r. 1645-1646) for his brilliance and respected the Ming

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<sup>50</sup> Quan Zuwang, *Jieqiting ji*, vol. 1, *juan* 11, pp. 131-141; Tu Lien-che, "Huang Tsung-hsi," in *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912)*, vol. 1, pp. 351-354; and, Chen Zuwu, "Huang Zongxi," in *Qingdai renwu zhuangao, shangbian*, vol. 2, He lingxiu and Zhang Jiefu eds. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), pp. 376-386.

<sup>51</sup> *Huang Zongxi quanji*, vol. 2, pp. 1-110. For the discussion on the writing date of this work, see Wu Guang's article in the same volume, pp. 550-554, and his *Huang Zongxi zhuzuo hui kao* 黃宗羲著作彙考 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju 臺灣學生書局, 1990), pp. 89-92.

<sup>52</sup> *Huang Zongxi quanji*, vol. 2, pp. 111-208. Also see Wu's discussion in the same volume, pp. 554-573, and *Huang Zongxi zhuzuo hui kao*, pp. 93-114.

<sup>53</sup> *Huang Zongxi quanji*, vol. 1, pp. 338-396. Also see Wu's discussion in the same volume, pp. 437-441, and *Huang Zongxi zhuzuo hui kao*, pp. 79-88.

<sup>54</sup> *Xingchao lu*, *juan* 2, in *Huang Zongxi quanji*, vol. 2, p. 125. Huang's pro-Ming perspective is obviously evinced in his using the Southern Ming chronology.

martyrs for their courage and selflessness in fulfilling their commitments to the defunct dynasty, he also bitterly reproached traitors to the cause for their shameful behavior and severely criticized the Hongguang Emperor (Zhu Yousong 朱由崧, 1607-1646, r. 1644-1645) for his depraved and dissolute life.<sup>56</sup>

Wang Fuzhi descended from a respectable family of scholars in Hengyang, Hunan. He obtained the degree of *juren* 舉人 in 1642, two years before Beijing fell to the rebels. Hopeful of restoring the Ming, he raised an army in Hengshan, Hunan, in late 1648 but was soon defeated by the Qing forces. He then joined the Ming remnants in Guangdong and Guangxi provinces and was appointed a junior official in the Yongli court for several months. Shortly thereafter, Wang's efforts were frustrated by court factionalism and he came to realize that the situation was far from what he had hope for. Faced with the witch-hunt launched by his political opponents and disappointed by court politics, in 1650, he decided to withdraw from the anti-Qing movement and lived as a hermit in his native place.<sup>57</sup>

In the latter part of his life, Wang pursued his studies and wrote several books on Chinese philosophy and history. Most of these were not published until the late nineteenth century. Among them, a history entitled *Veritable Records of the Yongli [Reign]* or *Yongli shilu* 永曆實錄 and presented in an annals-biography (*ji zhuan* 紀傳) style was compiled

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<sup>55</sup> *Hongguang shilu chao*, preface, in *Huang Zongxi quanji*, vol. 2, pp. 1-2.

<sup>56</sup> *Hongguang shilu chao*, preface, in *Huang Zongxi quanji*, vol. 2, pp. 1-2; *Xingchao lu*, in *Huang Zongxi quanji*, vol. 2, *juan* 1, p. 121; *juan* 3, p. 131; and, *juan* 5, p. 168.

<sup>57</sup> S. H. Ch'i, "Wang Fu-chih," in *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912)*, vol. 2, pp. 817-819; Chen Zuwu 陳祖武, "Wang Fuzhi," in *Qingdai renwu zhuangao, shangbian*, vol. 6, pp. 267-279 and, Ian McMorran, "The Patriot and the Partisans: Wang Fu-chih's Involvement in the Politics of the Yung-li Court," in *From Ming to Ch'ing*, pp. 133-166.



between 1673 and 1678.<sup>58</sup> The sources of this work were the author's personal experiences and materials he collected during his service in the court.<sup>59</sup> The *Veritable Records* was dedicated to the memory of Prince Gui 桂 (the Yongli Emperor) and the anti-Qing activists at the Yongli court. Like the writings of Huang Zongxi, Wang's accounts co-mingled strong emotions of lament and indignation. By using the Yongli reign title in his chronology, Wang implied that the Southern Ming, rather than the Qing, was the legitimate government of China. This was consistent with the author's radical political stance, an uncompromising ethnocentrism opposed to any form of alien rule.<sup>60</sup> Nonetheless, although insisting upon the legitimacy of Yongli, he could not see any hope for its success. While praising his upright colleagues who devoted their lives to saving the dynasty,<sup>61</sup> Wang unsparingly condemned the corrupt cliques at court, who he indicated should be blamed for the political deterioration suffered during the Yongli reign and the total collapse of the resistance movement in south China.<sup>62</sup>

Compared with the writings of Huang and Wang, the criticisms of the Southern Ming regimes by Zhang Dai 張岱 (1579-1684?) were much more radical. Zhang was a loyalist historian who served the Lu regime for two or three months in 1645. Losing his confidence in the Southern Ming regime, he abandoned his family properties in Shanyin, Zhejiang, and took to the mountains as a hermit.<sup>63</sup> Severely censuring Prince Fu 福 (the

<sup>58</sup> *Yongli shilu*, edited and annotated by Ou Jianhong 歐建鴻, Chen Zhisen 陳植森 and Wang Chenmu 王晨牧 (Changsha: Yuelu shushe 岳麓書社, 1982), editors' preface, pp. 1-2.

<sup>59</sup> Xie Guozhen, *Zengding wan Ming shiji kao*, pp. 527-537.

<sup>60</sup> Wang, *Du Tongjian lun* 讀通鑑論 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1975), vol. 2, *juan* 14, pp. 431-432; *juan* 16, pp. 539-540; vol. 3; and, *juan* 26, p. 919.

<sup>61</sup> *Yongli shilu*, *juan* 22-23, pp. 192-204.

<sup>62</sup> *Yongli shilu*, *juan* 24-26, pp. 205-223.

<sup>63</sup> Zhang was the descendant of an eminent Shaoxing lineage. Before 1644, he enjoyed an

Hongguang Emperor) for his profligacy and other princes for their incompetent leadership, Zhang in a famous work entitled *Continuation of the Writings Stored in a Stone Case* (*Shiguishu houji* 石匱書後集) reached the sad conclusion that the Ming dynasty fell in 1644 due to its loss of Heaven's blessing. He further affirmed that in spite of their desperate struggle, the Southern Ming courts were doomed to failure and none of them could claim to be a legitimate regime.<sup>64</sup>

Notwithstanding their passion for the previous dynasty, loyalist criticisms of the Ming house extended from the weak Southern Ming leaderships to the autocratic Ming institutions and included the sweeping condemnation of Ming despotism, which was considered to be the historical root of the socio-political chaos following the Wanli 萬曆 period (1573-1619).<sup>65</sup> The abhorrence of autocratic rule was fully reflected in Huang Zongxi's critical work, the *Waiting for the Dawn* (*Mingyi daifang lu* 明夷待訪錄).<sup>66</sup> In his discussion of the basic principles of humane governance,

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extravagant life. Yet, after the fall of the Ming house, he became a hermit. He devoted the later part of his life to writing history of the Ming. See Zhang, *Langhuan wenji* 琅環文集 (Changsha: Yuelu shushe 岳麓書社, 1985), *juan* 1, pp. 17-18; *juan* 4, pp. 154-167; and, *juan* 5, pp. 199-201. Also see Fang Chao-ying, "Chang Tai," in *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912)*, vol. pp. 53-54, and Lü Yingfan 呂英凡, "Zhang Dai," in *Qingdai renwu zhuangao, shangbian*, vol. 5, Wang Sizhi 王思治 eds. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1988), pp. 321-325.

<sup>64</sup> Zhang Dai, *Shiguishu houji* 石匱書後集 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1959), *juan* 5, pp. 49-63. Also see Zhang's *Langhuan wenji*, *juan* 3, pp. 151-152.

<sup>65</sup> Over the past decades, early-Qing criticisms of late-Ming despotism have been much discussed by historians. See for example, Hsiao Kung-ch'üan 蕭公權 (1887-1981), *Zhongguo zhengzhi sixiang shi* 中國政治思想史 (Taipei: Zhongguo wenhua daxue chubanshu 中國文化大學出版部, 1980), vol. 2, pp. 604-631, and William T. de Bary, "Chinese Despotism and the Confucian Ideal: A Seventeenth-Century View," in *Chinese Thought and Institutions*, John K. Fairbank ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 163-203. See also de Bary, "Introduction," in *Waiting for the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince — Huang Tsung-hsi's Ming-i Tai-fang lu* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 1-85.

<sup>66</sup> According to Wu Guang, this work was finished in 1663 and was originally named *Dai fan lu*. See Wu's investigation in *Huang Zongxi quanji*, vol. 1, pp. 422-427. See also Wu, *Huang Zongxi zhuzuo hui kao*, pp. 1-10.



Huang, drawing arguments from the ancient Confucian principle that “all the world’s goods are shared” (*tianxia wei gong* 天下爲公) and “the people are more important than the ruler” (*min gui jun qing* 民貴君輕),<sup>67</sup> indirectly criticized the Ming autocrats:

In ancient times all-under-Heaven was considered the master, and the prince the servant. The prince spent his life working for all-under-Heaven. But now the prince is the master, and all-under-Heaven is but the servant. Because of the prince, no one can find peace and happiness anywhere. In order to get whatever he wants, he maims and slaughters all-under-Heaven and breaks up their families — all for the aggrandizement of his personal fortune. Without the least feeling of pity, the prince says, “I’m just establishing an estate for my descendants.” Yet when he has established it, the prince still extracts the very marrow from people’s bones, and takes away their sons and daughters to serve his own debauchery. It seems entirely proper to him. It is, he says, the interest on his estate. Thus the one who does the greatest harm in the world is the prince.<sup>68</sup>

After a comprehensive examination of the Ming political system, Huang says in his concluding remarks that “The origin of misrule under the Ming lay in the abolition of the prime ministership by [the founder] Gao Huangdi 高皇帝 (Taizu 太祖, Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋, 1328-1398, *r.* 1368-1398).”<sup>69</sup> The abolition of the prime ministership in 1380, marked the beginning of the Ming autocracy, placing as it did the power of government

<sup>67</sup> As Hsiao Kung-ch’üan has noted that Huang was inspired by the ancient Confucian ideas of the *Mencius* (*Mengzi* 孟子) and *The Book of Documents* (*Shu jing*). See Hsiao, *Zhongguo zhengzhi sixiang shi*, vol. 2, p. 607.

<sup>68</sup> Huang Zongxi, *Mingyi daifang lu*, in *Huang Zongxi quanji*, vol. 1, “Yuan jun” 原君, pp. 2-3. The English translations are cited from William T. de Bary with modification. See de Bary, *Waiting for the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince*, p. 92.

<sup>69</sup> Huang Zongxi, *Mingyi daifang lu*, “Zhi xiang” 置相, p. 8 and de Bary, *Waiting for the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince*, p. 100. Lynn Struve, in her study of Huang Zongxi’s thought, argues that Huang’s ideas were mainly the intellectual legacy of the ample late-Ming thought. See Struve, “*Mingyi daifang lu yu Mingru xue ‘an de zai pingjia*” 《明夷待訪錄》與《明儒學案》的再評價, trans. Teng Fu 滕復, in *Huang Zongxi lun: guoji Huang Zongxi xueshu taolunhui lunwenji* 黃宗義論：國際黃宗義學術討論會論文集, Wu Guang ed. (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji chubanshe 浙江古籍出版社, 1987), pp. 288-293. Also see Ono Kazuko, *Minki tōsha kō: Tōrintō to Fukusha* 明季黨社考：東林黨と復社 (Tokyo: Dōmyōsha 同盟舎, 1996), pp. 291-298.



decision-making solely in the hands of the emperor.<sup>70</sup> This over-concentration of power gave the eunuchs, who increasingly gained access to the imperial house, an opportunity to seize absolute authority in periods of weak emperorship and allowed them to make use of their power to develop their connections with court factions.<sup>71</sup>

This condemnation of despotism naturally led to a reconsideration of the ruler-minister relationship and challenged the Cheng-Zhu doctrine of absolute loyalism. Huang, attempting to redefine the role of a minister, further argued that

The reason for ministership lies in the fact that the world is too big for one man to govern so governance must be divided up among officials. Therefore, when one goes forth to serve, it is for all-under-Heaven, not for the prince; and it is for all the people, not for one family. When one acts for the sake of all-under-Heaven and its people, one cannot agree to do anything contrary to the Way even if the prince explicitly forces one to do so... And if it is not in keeping with the true Way, one should not even present oneself to the court — much less sacrifice one's life for the ruler. To act solely for the prince and his dynasty, and attempt to anticipate the prince's unexpressed whims or cravings is only what a eunuch or palace maid will do. "When the prince brings death and destruction upon himself, if one follows and does the same, one simply does what a mistress or some such favorite will do." That is the difference between one who is a true minister and one who is not... Whether there is peace or disorder in the world does not depend on the rise or fall of dynasty, but on the happiness or distress of the people... If those who act as ministers ignore the "plight of the people," then even if they should succeed in assisting their prince's rise to power or follow him to final ruin, they will still be in

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<sup>70</sup>Shen Shixing 申時行 (1535-1614) et al. comps., *Ming Huidian* 明會典 (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan 商務印書館, 1936, repr. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1989), *juan* 2, p. 3.

<sup>71</sup>Huang, *Mingyi daifang lu*, "Zhi xiang," pp. 8-9 and "Yanchen" 奄臣, pp. 44-46. Obviously, Huang's views had affected his student Wan Sitong and when Wan participated in the official Ming history project, these opinions were duly included in the *Mingshi*. See *Mingshi*, *juan* 72, pp. 1729-1730. Of course, modern historians may not agree with Huang's analysis. Henry Tsai, taking an institutional approach, argues that from its beginning, eunuchism was intentionally established as part of Ming monarchic absolutism and, in fact, the Ming eunuchs were both pawns and victims of that system. Tsai, *The Eunuchs in the Ming Dynasty* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), pp.221-230.

violation of the true Way of the Minister.<sup>72</sup>

In other words, Ming despotism was an outcome of the ruler's selfish motives and insatiable desire for power, which were opposed to fundamental Confucian principles of rulership. Demand upon ministers to give their absolute loyalty to the private interests of the ruler was, therefore, also a violation of Confucian ethics. To Huang, the proper relationship between the ruler and his ministers should be one established on a solid foundation of a reasonable division of labor and fair sharing of responsibilities. Loyalty, in this sense, was an ethic concept that denotes the moral quality of an official in discharging his duties according to a reinterpretation of Confucian principles of ministership, which was different from the prevailing orthodox Cheng-Zhu doctrine.<sup>73</sup>

Huang's ideas were largely shared by his *yimin* circle of friends, such as Gu Yanwu 顧炎武 (1613-1682), who also wrote extensively on government and economics.<sup>74</sup> In 1676, when Gu read the manuscript of *Waiting for the Dawn*, he agreed with Huang's critical perspective and considered the book an excellent guide for governance.<sup>75</sup> In his discussion of traditional dynastic changes, Gu also attempted to distinguish "the fall of

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<sup>72</sup> Huang, *Mingyi daifang lu*, "Yuanchen" 原臣, pp. 4-5 and de Bary, *Waiting for the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince*, pp. 94-95.

<sup>73</sup> The rejection of absolute loyalism could also be found in the writings of other *yimin*. For example, Fu Shan 傅山 (1607-1684) advances that belief the world is not the private property of the ruler. Besides, Fu suggests that a literatus should choose his own master and take office only when his political ideals can be implemented. See *Fu Shan quanshu* 傅山全書 (Taiyuan: Shanxi renmin chubanshe 山西人民出版社, 1991), vol. 1, *juan* 38, p. 724 and vol. 2, *juan* 44, p. 915.

<sup>74</sup> Gu was also an eminent *yimin* in the early Qing. For details of his biography, see Peterson, "The Life of Ku Yen-wu (1613-1682)," parts I & II, *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 28 (1968): 114-156; 29 (1969): 201-247; Fang Chao-ying, "Ku Yen-wu," in *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912)*, vol. 1, pp. 421-426; and, Chen Zuwu, "Gu Yanwu," in *Qingdai renwu zhuangao, shangbian*, vol. 2, pp. 352-364.

<sup>75</sup> Zhang Mu 張穆 (1805-1849), *Gu Tinglin xiansheng nianpu* 顧亭林先生年譜, in *Gu Tinglin xiansheng nianpu huibian* 顧亭林先生年譜彙編 (Hong Kong: Chongwen shudian 崇文書店, 1975), *juan* 3, p. 258.



a dynasty" (*wang guo* 亡國) from "the fall of all-under-Heaven" (*wang tianxia* 亡天下). He advanced the view that the former was only the business of the ruler and ministers concerned, and had nothing to do with the public. The latter, however, was a public affair, relating as it did to the survival of human civilization and the welfare of all people.<sup>76</sup> To him, the perpetual transmission of Chinese culture and the livelihood of all-under-Heaven were much more important than the rise or fall of a dynasty. They should be the chief concern of literati.<sup>77</sup>

From the angle of intellectual history, the historical significance of these loyalists' reflection upon loyalism came from their consensus on the general interests of the people. It allowed the loyalists a relatively rational approach to the consideration of a political legitimacy based on culturalism. To a certain extent, it also offered an ethical justification for their later reconciliation with the new court in the mid-Kangxi period. Of course, loyalists' criticisms of Ming despotism and its baneful influence on late-Ming politics did not necessarily imply their open departure from a pro-Ming political stance. Nor did these critiques indicate their liberation from the orthodox Cheng-Zhu ideology of absolute loyalism. In fact, it is a misunderstanding that anti-despotic ideas had a substantial impact on the social behavior of the *yimin* during this time. At least, as their deeds show, most of them, even Huang Zongxi and Gu Yanwu, who are regarded as being the most "progressive" thinkers of the time, were, in practice, bound by a strong passion for the previous dynasty and conformed to the

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<sup>76</sup> Gu, *Yuanchaoben rizhi lu* 原抄本日知錄 (Taipei: Wenshizhe chubanshe 文史哲出版社, 1979), *juan* 17, p. 379. For a study of Gu's political ideas, see Ku Wei-ying. "Ku Yen-wu's Ideal of the Emperor: A Cultural Giant and Political Dwarf," in *Imperial Rulership and Cultural Change in Traditional China*, Frederick P. Brandauer and Chün-chieh Huang eds. (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1994), pp. 230-247.

<sup>77</sup> *Gu Tinglin shi wen ji* 顧亭林詩文集 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1983), *wenji* 文集, *juan* 3, pp. 48-49 and *yuji* 餘集, pp. 166-167.



traditional stereotype of a loyalist.<sup>78</sup>

In the early Qing, the misfortune of the Ming *yimin* elicited the sympathy of the people and their moral courage was admired by their contemporaries as an embodiment of Confucian virtue.<sup>79</sup> Because of their moral probity, they enjoyed high prestige in the society despite their avowed withdrawal from public life. For those *yimin* who devoted their reclusive lives to study and teaching, their distinguished academic achievements also added to their fame as eminent scholars. For example, Sun Qifeng 孫奇逢 (1585-1675), Huang Zongxi, and Li Yong 李顥 (1627-1705), the so-called “three great masters” of early-Qing thought, were well known for both their integrity and scholarship.<sup>80</sup> To many Chinese, the *yimin* were the transmitters as well as defenders of Confucian culture and its traditional values. This social image gave the *yimin* a stereotyped role and put an additional moral burden on them.<sup>81</sup> Being conscious of their moral obligations and social image, they became intensely cautious about the social consequences of their deeds and worried about being unable to live up to social expectations. Given this, it was hardly possible for them to make any open compromise with the Qing court, for such an action might raise popular doubts as to their moral integrity as well as incurring the risk of ruining their good name. Such misgivings were evinced in Gu Yanwu’s

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<sup>78</sup> For the Ming *yimin*, the legendary personages Bo Yi 伯夷 and Shu Qi 叔齊, the Shang 商 (ca. 1600-1123 B.C.) subjects who chose to starve themselves to death rather than eat the food of the Zhou 周 dynasty (ca. 1122-256 B.C.), were model loyalists. See Huang Zongxi, *Huang Zongxi quanji*, vol. 10, p. 566, 568. For the biographies of Bo Yi and Shu Qi, see Sima Qian 司馬遷 (ca. 145-86 B.C.), *Shi ji* 史記 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1959), vol. 7, *juan* 61, pp. 2121-2129.

<sup>79</sup> Shao Tingcai, *Sifutang wenji*, *juan* 3, pp. 211-212.

<sup>80</sup> Sun Jing'an 孫靜庵, *Ming Yimin lu* 明遺民錄 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji chubanshe 浙江古籍出版社, 1985), *juan* 15, pp. 116-117 and *Ming Yiminlu huiji*, vol. 1, p. 265.

<sup>81</sup> Ye Mengzhu 葉夢珠, an early-Qing scholar in Shanghai, has given a valuable account of how social expectation shaped the social behaviors of intellectuals during this time. Ye, *Yueshi bian* 閱世編 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe 上海古籍出版社, 1981), *juan* 4, pp. 83-84.

advice to his best friend Li Yindu 李因篤 (1631-1692), who was recommended by the Qing officials to the emperor in 1678.<sup>82</sup> In a letter to Li, Gu reminded Li of his *yimin* status and warned him that the acceptance of a government position at court would cause irreparable damage to his reputation.<sup>83</sup>

The hostile attitude of *yimin* toward the alien regime was, however, softened by the cultural policy of the Kangxi period. During the Kangxi reign, the burgeoning reputation of the *yimin* aroused imperial concern. Having attempted to cultivate its popularity after the military victory over the Southern Ming in 1662 and the fall of Manchu conservatism in 1669, the Qing government gradually adopted a lenient policy toward Ming loyalists and repeatedly attempted to absorb them into the bureaucracy.<sup>84</sup> In 1678, three years before the suppression of the Three Feudatories Rebellion, the Kangxi Emperor ordered an examination for those of “broad learning and vast erudition” (*boxue hongci* 博學鴻詞) be conducted and, in the following year, he announced the reopening of the Ming History Office (*Mingshi guan* 明史館).<sup>85</sup> Both measures aimed at attracting the eremites

<sup>82</sup> Wu Huaqing 吳懷慶 (d. 1928), *Guanzhong san Li nianpu* 關中三李年譜 (Xi'an: Shaanxi shifan daxue chubanshe 陝西師範大學出版社, 1992), *juan* 7, pp. 346-347. Also see Zhao Kan 趙侃, “Li Yindu,” in *Qingdai renwu zhuangao, shangbian*, vol. 5, pp. 305-311.

<sup>83</sup> *Gu Tinglin shi wen ji, wenji*, *juan* 4, pp. 75-76. As Gu's other writings show, he believed that a former official should not take office under the new dynasty. See Gu, *Yuanchaoben rizhi lu*, *juan* 17, pp. 387-388, 410-411.

<sup>84</sup> *Qingshi gao*, vol. 12, *juan* 109, p. 3183.

<sup>85</sup> Maqi et al. comp., *Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 4, *juan* 71, Kangxi year 17, month 1, p. 910, *juan* 80, Kangxi year 18, month 3, p. 1023. The *Mingshi* Office was first established in 1645 but, at that time, the Qing government was preoccupied with other domestic affairs and paid little attention to the compilation of the Ming history. See *Shizu Zhanhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 3, *juan* 16, Shunzhi year 2, month 5, pp. 141-142. Li Chin-hua 李晉華, *Mingshi zuanxiu kao* 明史纂修考 (Peiping [Beijing]: Yenching Journal of Chinese Studies Monograph Series No. 3, 1933). As Yang Lien-sheng (1914-1991) observes, the compilation of a history of the preceding dynasty had two propaganda uses. Firstly, it announced the end of the former dynasty and the orthodox line of succession of the new dynasty. Secondly, it attracted the loyalists of the fallen



into government service. Although only a few celebrated loyalist scholars responded to these recruitment efforts and the majority of the best-known *yimin* rejected the government's enticements,<sup>86</sup> the emperor's friendly gesture did mollify to an extent the Han Chinese and further pacify the anti-Qing sentiment of the *yimin*.<sup>87</sup>

The Kangxi period marked a turning point in the history of Manchu-Han reconciliation. Under the leadership of a tireless emperor, the government had greatly impressed the Han literati by its socio-cultural achievements. The suppression of the Three Feudatories and the consolidation of Qing rule in 1681 brought a long period of peace to the mainland. Post-war economic development took place and the livelihood of ordinary people was much improved. Witnessing this rapid social recovery and cultural advancement, the *yimin* could not deny the contributions made by the alien regime, especially when they compared

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dynasty into government service because "the compilation of a good history was considered the duty of such a loyalist." See Yang, "The Organization of Chinese Official Historiography: Principles and Methods of the Standard Histories from the T'ang through the Ming Dynasty," in *Historians of China and Japan*, William G. Beasley and Edwin G. Pulleyblank eds. (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 48.

<sup>86</sup> For a study of the Kangxi *Boxue hongci*, see Hellmut Wilhelm, "The Po-hsueh Hung-ju Examination of 1679," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 71 (1951): 60-76, and Yang Haiying 楊海英, "Kangxi Boxue hongru kao" 康熙博學鴻儒考, *Lishi dang'an* 歷史檔案, 1996.1 (Feb. 1996): 97-102.

<sup>87</sup> This was evinced by Huang Zongxi's and Gu Yanwu's attitude toward the official *Mingshi* project. Despite having refused direct participation, Huang encouraged his favorite student Wan Sitong to work for the project and sent his third son Huang Baijia 黃百家 (1643-1709) to assist Wan. Moreover, Huang also showed his support by providing sources and advice regarding the compilation to Wan and the *Mingshi* editors. *Huang Zongxi quanji*, vol. 11 (1993), p. 290, pp. 68-70 and vol. 10, pp. 205-206, 211-215, 529-544. Also see Huang Binghou 黃炳堃 (1815-1893), *Huang Lizhou xiansheng nianpu* 黃梨州先生年譜, in *Huang Zongxi quanji*, vol. 12 (1994), p. 47. In the case of Gu Yanwu, his nephews Xu Qianxue 徐乾學 (1631-1694) and Xu Yuanwen 徐元文 (1634-1691) came to hold high positions in the *Mingshi* Office and his disciple Pan Lei 潘耒 (1646-1708), having passed the *boxue hongci* examination, also took part in the *Mingshi* project. In response to the inquiries of the Xu brothers, Pan, and other *Mingshi* editors, Gu provided some sources and made suggestions for the compilation of the history. See *Gu Tinglin shi wen ji, wenji*, juan 3, pp. 51-57, juan 4, pp. 79-80.



Qing achievements with the late-Ming administrative abuses and factionalism they had experienced.<sup>88</sup> The flourishing empire also challenged the ethnocentric prejudice of the diehard Ming remnants. Moved by the “sage-emperor” and his “rule of virtue,” many *yimin* in the Kangxi period underwent a psychological struggle and gradually gave tacit consent to the legitimacy of Qing rule in spite of intentionally keeping a distance from the government.<sup>89</sup> Therefore, by the late seventeenth century, their abstention from the Qing government should not be simply considered as being either a denial of Manchu legitimacy or a passive protest against alien rule.<sup>90</sup> The political compromises of Ming loyalists inevitably required them to reinterpret their moral obligations to the defunct dynasty and to redefine their relationship with the new power-holder. To strike a balance between insisting on their *yimin* status and accepting Qing legitimacy, they finally came to the solution that they would keep

<sup>88</sup> For example, in 1690, Huang Zongxi was impressed by the Qing government’s efficiency in sending relief to flood victims in Zhejiang. *Huang Zongxi quanji*, vol. 10, pp. 136-138.

<sup>89</sup> Qian Mu 錢穆 (1895-1990), *Zhongguo jin sanbai nian xueshu shi* 中國近三百年學術史 (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan 商務印書館, 1937), vol. 1, preface, p. 1; Ho Koon-piu, “Ming yimin dui chuchu zhi jueze yu huiying — Chen Que ge’an yanjiu” 明遺民對出處之抉擇與回應——陳確個案研究, in *Ming-Qing renwu yu zhushu* 明清人物與著述 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Educational Publishing Co., 1996), 95-140; Wang Sizhi 王思治 and Liu Fengyun, “Lun Qingchu ‘yimin’ fan Qing taidu de zhuanbian” 論清初“遺民”反清態度的轉變, *Shehui kexue zhanxian* 社會科學戰線, 1989.1 (Jan. 1989): 128-137; and, Zhou, Xuejun 周學軍, “Ming-Qing Jiangnan rushi qunti de lishi biandong” 明清江南儒士群體的歷史變動, *Lishi yanjiu* 歷史研究, 1993.1 (Feb. 1993): 83.

<sup>90</sup> According to the studies of Willard Peterson, in some cases the early-Qing eremites refused to serve the new dynasty simply because their parents had died for the Ming cause and thus their primary justification for abstention from the Qing government was “filial piety rather than loyalty to a ruling house.” Peterson, “The Life of Ku Yen-wu (1613-1682),” part I, p. 144. To a certain extent, this assertion can also be extended to the Ming loyalists and explain their eremitism while accepting the Qing legitimacy. I have discussed this point in an article entitled “Lun Huang Zongxi de ‘jun chen zhi yi’ guannian ——jian ping suowei Huang shi ‘wanjie ke ji’ shuo” 論黃宗羲的“君臣之義”觀念——兼評所謂黃氏“晚節可譏”說, in Wu Guang, Ji Xueyuan 季學原, and Zhu Huancan 諸煥燦 eds., *Huang Lizhou sanbainian ji* 黃梨洲三百年祭 (Beijing: Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe 當代中國出版社, 1997, pp. 135-150. Also see Ho Koon-piu, *Sheng yu si: Mingji shidafu de jueze*, pp. 71-96.

themselves away from government office but allow, or even encourage, their descendants to take official careers in the Qing bureaucracy to serve the public.<sup>91</sup> By then, as Huang Zongxi argued, the Ming *yimin* asserted that their moral obligations to the defunct dynasty should be restricted to not taking official positions under the new order.<sup>92</sup>

The Ming loyalist struggle for self-identity in the second half of the seventeenth century reinforced the Cheng-Zhu teachings on loyalty. Despite their criticism of late-Ming politics and Ming despotism, most of the *yimin* throughout their lives did comply with the Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucian principles of emperor-minister relationship. Their tacit consent to Qing legitimacy was accompanied by a presupposition that they would “not serve the new dynasty.” If their anti-despotic ideas had challenged the orthodox doctrine of absolute loyalism, it was only on the theatrical level, and it had little influence in practice.

## The Qing Subjects and the Formation of a Shared Qing Perspective on Loyalty

The life experience of the educated Han Chinese who reached their

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<sup>91</sup> According to Chen Que 陳確 (1604-1677) and Dai Mingshi 戴名世 (1653-1713), after 1644, although the Ming remnants insisted on their *yimin* status, many of their descendants participated in civil examinations under the new dynasty. Chen, *Chen Que ji* 陳確集 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1979), vol. 1, *Wenji* 文集, *juan* 6, p. 172 and Dai, *Dai Minshi ji* 戴名世集, Wang Shumin 王樹民 ed. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1986), *juan* 7, p. 209. A number of materials indicate that from the mid-Kangxi period onward, increasing numbers of *yimin* adopted a supportive attitude toward their children taking office in the Qing bureaucracy. As Qian Mu and Ho Koon-piu have noticed, many *yimin* did not in fact disagree with their sons serving the Qing. See Qian, *Zhongguo jin sanbai nian xueshu shi*, vol. 1, preface, p. 1 and Ho, “Lun Ming *yimin* zidi zhi chu shi” 論明遺民子弟之出試, in *Mingmo Qingchu xueshu sixiang yanjiu*, pp. 125-167.

<sup>92</sup> Huang Zongxi *quanji*, vol. 10, p. 411.



majority under the Qing rule was different from that of their predecessors. For them, the Manchus were legitimate rulers rather than invaders. They saw themselves as Qing subjects and did not feel they owed anything to the Ming. Although they were living under alien rule, by identifying with the prevalent culture, they had no difficulty in justifying their participation in the Manchu government, which had adopted a policy of Sinification before its troops advancing through the Great Wall in 1644, becoming fully Sinicized during the Kangxi reign.<sup>93</sup> Encouraged by Kangxi cultural policy, many Chinese literati then took part in the civil examinations and accepted office in the government just as their predecessors had done under the Ming.

For some historians, 1644, the year that the Ming house in Beijing collapsed, was a watershed that delineated the difference between Ming and Qing subjects: those who reached their majority before 1644 were to be regarded as Ming subjects (or Ming *yimin* under the Qing) whilst those after 1644 were Qing subjects.<sup>94</sup> Nonetheless, such an assertion is problematic insofar as it fails to explain the political identity of two particular categories of historical figure. On the one hand, there were resistance activists who reached their majority during the transitional period of 1644-1662. They considered themselves Ming subjects and were regarded by their contemporaries as Ming loyalists. Xia Wanchun 夏完淳 (1631-1647), who joined the resistance movement at the age of 15 *sui* in 1645, was one of such figures.<sup>95</sup> On the other hand, for those Han Chinese who reached

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<sup>93</sup> Kai-wing Chow, *The Rise of Confucian Ritualism in Late Imperial China: Ethics, Classic, and Lineage Discourse* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 45.

<sup>94</sup> Willard Peterson, "The Life of Ku Yen-wu (1613-1682)," part I, p. 144 and Chun-shu Chang and Hsüeh-lun Chang, "K'ung Shang-Jen and his *T'ao-Hua Shan*: A Dramatist's Reflections on the Ming-Ch'ing Dynastic Transition," *The Journal of the Institute of Chinese Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong*, 9.2 (1978): 315.

<sup>95</sup> When Xia was captured by the Qing in 1647, he refused to surrender and was executed. Xia's loyalist attitude was obvious in his poems. See *Xia Wanchun ji jianjiao* 夏完淳集



their maturity in the Ming but had not served under Ming, they experienced no particular guilt identifying with the Qing after 1644. Wei Xiangshu's 魏象樞 (1617-1687) participation in the Qing government may serve to illustrate this point. Wei earned his *juren* degree at the age of 26 *sui* in 1642, two years before the fall of the Ming, although he was unable to attend the *jinshi* examination in Beijing in 1643 due to the death of his father. In 1645, a year after the establishment of the Qing dynasty, he took the examination and received his *jinshi* degree. In the later years of his life, Wei recorded these details in his chronological autobiography without any hint of ambivalence. Furthermore, throughout his life, Wei was appreciated by the contemporaries for his integrity and contributions to the suppression of the Three Feudatories Rebellion. Nobody ever questioned whether he was right in serving the Qing.<sup>96</sup>

The career paths of many other well-known Qing officials such as Wei Yijie 魏裔介 (1616-1686),<sup>97</sup> Shi Runzhang 施閏章 (1618-1683),<sup>98</sup> Wang Wan 汪琬 (1624-1691),<sup>99</sup> Zhu Zhixi 朱之錫 (1624-1666),<sup>100</sup> and

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箋校, annotated by Bai Jian 白堅 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe 上海古籍出版社, 1991), esp. *juan* 1, pp. 1-2; *juan* 4, p. 171, 174, 178, 198; and, *juan* 5, p. 235, 238. For a biography of Xia, see Lin Yongkuang 林永匡, "Xia Wanchun," in *Qingdai renwu zhuangao*, He Lingxiu and Zhang Jiefu eds. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), pp. 238-243.

<sup>96</sup> *Hansongtang laoren nianpu* 寒松老人年譜, in *Hansongtang quanji* 寒松堂全集 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1996), appendix, pp. 683-684. Also see Qian Yiji 錢儀吉 (1783-1850) comp., *Beizhuan ji* 碑傳集 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1993), vol. 1, *juan* 8, pp. 186-194; M. Jean Gates, "Wei Hsiang-shu," in *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912)*, vol. 2, pp. 848-849; and, Wang Zhengyao 王政堯, "Wei Xiangshu," in *Qingdai renwu zhuangao, shangbian*, vol. 5, pp. 191-199.

<sup>97</sup> See Qian Yiji, *Beizhuan ji*, vol. 1, *juan* 11, pp. 245-252; Fang Chao-ying, "Wei I-chieh," in *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912)*, vol. 2, pp. 849-850; and, Wang Zhengyao, "Wei Yijie," in *Qingdai renwu zhuangao, shangbian*, vol. 1, Wang Sizhi ed. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), pp. 165-172.

<sup>98</sup> Qian Yiji, *Beizhuan ji*, vol. 4, *juan* 43, pp. 1179-1187; C. Martin Wilbur, "Shih Jun-chang," in *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912)*, vol. 2, p. 651; and, Wu Boya, "Shi Runzhang," in *Qingdai renwu zhuangao, shangbian*, vol. 6, pp. 261-266.

<sup>99</sup> Qian Yiji, *Beizhuan ji*, vol. 4, *juan* 45, pp. 1261-1266; Fang Chao-ying, "Wang Wan," in *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912)*, vol. 2, pp. 840-841; and, Zhang Xiaohu 張曉虎, "Wang Wan," in *Qingdai renwu zhuangao, shangbian*, vol. 1, pp. 206-

Tang Bin 湯斌 (1627-1687),<sup>101</sup> who were born in the 1610s and 1620s, also provide similar counterevidence against the assertion that the year 1644 can be taken as a significant cut off date. Their service under the Qing court was never criticized as being a betrayal of the previous dynasty. These cases strongly suggest that, in the second half of the seventeenth century, at least to the public, the dominant factor determining one's status as either a Ming or Qing subject was whether one had taken office under the Ming, rather than one's date of birth. In other words, it was felt that those who had not served the Ming government had no obligation to be loyal to the Ming dynasty.

In contrast to the Ming subjects who suffered the social chaos due to the tumultuous demise of the Ming house, the Qing intellectuals enjoyed, and in fact appreciated, a better life resulting from the newly flourishing socio-economic conditions together with the stable political situation offered by Qing rule.<sup>102</sup> The prosperous environment and their fortunate experiences of peace shaped significantly their interpretation of the conquest history. Being Qing subjects, they generally shared a pro-Qing political stance and saw the Ming-Qing dynastic change as an inevitable shift of Heaven's Will, something that occurred with considerable frequency

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<sup>100</sup> Qian Yiji, *Beizhuan ji*, vol. 7, *juan* 76, pp. 2177-2180; E. S. Larsen, "Chu Chih-hsi," in *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912)*, vol. 1, pp. 178-179; and, He Ping 何平, "Zhu Zhixi," in *Qingdai renwu zhuangao, shangbian*, vol. 8, eds. Wang Sizhi and Li Hongbin 李鴻彬 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1995), pp. 277-281.

<sup>101</sup> Qian Yiji, *Beizhuan ji*, vol. 2, *juan* 16, pp. 447-475; Fang Chao-ying, "T'ang Pin," in *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912)*, vol. 2, pp. 709-710; and, Zhang Xiaohu, "Tang Bin," in *Qingdai renwu zhuangao, shangbian*, vol. 5, pp. 209-217.

<sup>102</sup> This is evinced by many writings of the early-Qing literati. In fact, not only those who had a successful official career admired the exploits of the empire. Even those who were frustrated in officialdom also acknowledged the contributions of the Qing regime to a stable and prosperous society. For instance, Quan Zuwang, who left officialdom in 1737 when he failed to get a place in the Hanlin Academy, wrote several poems in 1749-1751 to glorify the early-Qing history. Quan, *Jieqiting ji*, vol. 1, *juan* 1, pp. 1-20.



in Chinese history.<sup>103</sup> However, educated under Confucianism and moved by the romance of the resistance movement, which was colored by many heroic deeds, they also acknowledged the Ming loyalists, especially the late-Ming martyrs, for their courage and integrity in insisting on the Confucian ideal during the “dark period” of the late Ming.<sup>104</sup> It was particularly ambivalent for those descendants of the resistance activists, who honored their predecessors for loyalty to the Ming while they themselves attended civil service examinations and took office under the alien reign.<sup>105</sup> Consequently, since the founding of the Qing dynasty, among the Chinese literati, there had been a general psychological discomfort generated by the hidden tension between a desire to recognize the Qing legitimacy and sympathize with the late-Ming loyalists. The disagreement between political and cultural identities required reconciliation and eventually created a discourse on how to interpret the deeds of the Ming martyrs from a perspective of the Qing subjects.

Although the compilation of the official *Ming History* project

<sup>103</sup> Gu Yingtai 谷應泰 (1620-1690). *Mingshi jishi benmo* 明史紀事本末 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1977), vol. 1, author's preface, p. 1; Xu Bingyi 徐秉義 (1633-1711), *Mingmo zhonglie jishi* 明末忠烈紀實 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang Guji chubanshe 浙江古籍出版社, 1987), *fanli* 凡例, p. 1; Wen Ruilin 溫睿臨 (1705 *juren*), *Nanjiang yishi* 南疆逸史 (Hong Kong: Chongwen shudian 崇文書店, 1971), author's preface, pp. 1-2; Quan Zuwang, *Jieqiting ji*, vol. 1, *juan* 29, p. 374; *waibian*, *juan* 25, p. 998; and, Wang You dian 汪有典 (d. 1868), *Quan Ming zhongyi biezhuàn* 全明忠義別傳 (1868 ed., Repr. Jiangsu guangling guji keyin she 江蘇廣陵古籍刻印社, 1991), *juan* 5, p. 25a-b; *juan* 26, p. 21a.

<sup>104</sup> In Quan Zuwang's words, the deeds of the Ming martyrs were the embodiment of the Confucian “righteousness of the cosmos” (*tiandi jian zhe zhengji* 天地間之正氣). Quan, *Jieqiting ji*, vol. 1, *juan* 23, p. 282.

<sup>105</sup> The Xu brothers, Xu Qianxue, Xu Bingyi, and Xu Yuanwen, were typical examples. Their father had served the Southern Ming regime in Nanjiang in 1645 and they were also the nephews of Gu Yanwu, the best-known Ming *yimin* in early Qing. See Qian Yiji, *Beizhuan ji*, vol. 1, *juan* 12, pp. 300-324 and, vol. 2, *juan* 20, pp. 682-692. See also Tu Lien-che, “Hsü Ch'ien-hsüeh,” *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912)*, vol. 1, pp. 310-312; Li Man-kuei, “Hsü Yüan-wen,” *ibid.*, p. 327; Liu Jianxin 劉健新, “Xu Qianxue,” in *Qingdai renwu zhuangao, shangbian*, vol. 8, pp. 149-163; and, Wang Hongjun 王宏鈞, “Xu Yuanwen,” *ibid.*, vol. 5, pp. 149-157.



began in 1645, the second year of the Shunzhi reign, the conquest history was a taboo to many Chinese scholar-officials in the early Qing because any expression of sympathy for the resistance movement might be taken to imply a *de facto* recognition of the “rebellious” stance. Thus one could easily lay oneself open to factional attack and, more importantly, arouse imperial suspicion. In 1658, Gu Yingtai published his *Narratives of Ming history from beginning to end* (*Mingshi jishi benmo*). It was one of the earliest writings by a Qing historian on the history of the Ming dynasty. Three years later, Gu was impeached by the censor Dong Wenji 董文驤 for his account of the peasant rebellions of 1644 and accused of ignoring the Manchu contribution to the suppression of Li Zicheng. As Dong’s impeachment was not supported by adequate evidence, following an investigation, the Shunzhi Emperor dismissed the charge against Gu.<sup>106</sup> In 1663, under the Oboi regency, a period during which the new government adopted harsh measures against all anti-Manchu ideas and activities, another case regarding the writing of Ming history broke into the open. A work entitled *A Brief Compiled History of the Ming* (*Mingshi jilüe* 明史輯略), initiated by Zhu Guozhen 朱國禎 (1557-1632) and revised under the name of Zhuang Tinglong 莊廷鑑 (d. ca. 1660) with additional materials covering the late- and Southern Ming, was printed in 1660 by the Zhuang family. By using the Southern Ming reign titles in its chronology, referring to the Manchu emperors by their personal names, and depicting the pre-1644 Manchus as but one tribes under Ming rule, the book was taken as obviously treasonable by the new dynasty. When the case was reported to the court by the opportunist Wu Zhirong 吳之榮, a former magistrate of Kui’an who had failed to levy blackmail on the Zhuang family, all those involved in the compilation and printing of the book, together with their

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<sup>106</sup> Li Xinda 李新達, “Gu Yingtai,” in *Qingdai renwu zhuangao, shangbian*, vol. 6, p.

family members, were arrested and sentenced to death or exile.<sup>107</sup> The cases of Gu and Zhuang were reminders to late seventeenth-century Chinese literati, in particular those in the Court, of the sensitivity of the conquest history, which should be handled with special care.

To avoid imperial suspicion of their motives, from the beginning of the Qing, the scholar-officials who called for an official recognition of the activities of the Southern Ming martyrs emphasized the moral education dimension of the issue. In his 1655 memorial concerning the compilation of the Ming biographies of the official *Ming History*, Tang Bin affirmed that the resistance loyalists had demonstrated how ministers should behave in conditions of extreme difficulty, thereby establishing models of behavior for the public. He argued that despite their uncompromising attitude toward "Heaven's Will," these loyalists were different from rebels from among the Qing population for, being Ming subjects, the former had a moral obligation to defend this fallen dynasty. To Tang, the Southern Ming martyrs, along with the late-Ming martyrs who died for the imperial house during the peasant rebellions in or before 1644, had performed their duty according to Confucian teachings of loyalty. Drawing examples from the standard histories, Tang pointed out that it was a traditional practice in Chinese history that when a new dynasty compiled the history of the previous dynasty, biographies of the former resistance activists would also be included, regardless of the political attitudes of these figures. Therefore, he argued, the Office of Ming History should not hesitate in recording the

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<sup>107</sup> Gu Yanwu, *Gu Tinglin shi wen ji*, juan 5, pp. 114-116 and Jie An 節庵, *Zhuangshi shi'an benmo* 莊氏史案本末 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji shudian 上海古籍書店, 1983). Also see L.C. Goodrich, "Chuang T'ing-lung," in *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912)*, vol. 1, pp. 205-206 and, Zhang Jiefu, "Zhuang Tinglong," in *Qingdai renwu zhuangao, shangbian*, vol. 4, He Lingxiu and Zhang Jiefu eds. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1987), pp. 352-357.

words and deeds of Southern Ming loyalists.<sup>108</sup>

After 1669, under Kangxi's cultural policy, in which moral restoration became a significant government task, Tang's arguments were further developed by Han scholar-officials who took part in compiling official Ming history. In discussions as to how Southern Ming loyalists should be dealt with, Xu Qianxue, nephew of the famous *yimin* Gu Yanwu and one of the officers-in-charge of the Ming History Office in the Kangxi period, said:

The resistance diehards opposed to the Zhou were loyal to the Shang [dynasty]. So, when the Yuan 元 dynasty [1260-1368] recounted events of the Song, [Song loyalist] ministers like Zhang Shijie 張世傑 [d. 1279], Lu Xiufu 陸秀夫 [1238-1279], Wen Tianxiang 文天祥 [1236-1283], and Xie Fangde 謝枋得 [1226-1289] were admired; when [the Ming dynasty] compiled history of the Yuan, [Yuan loyalists like] Yu Que 余闕 [1303-1358], Fu Shou 福壽 [d. 1356], Shimo Yisun 石抹宜孫 [d. 1359], and Puyan Buhua 普顏不花 [1295-1358] were praised. Facing the advances of the [Qing] armies, the subjects of the Ming dared to resist. It may be said that they were ignorant of Heaven's Will. Yet, each man has his own allegiance and should fulfil his own duty just those diehards [of the Shang] did in ancient times...<sup>109</sup>

In other words, from the angle of moral education, moral quality instead of political stance was the most important criterion which determined whether a historical figure should be included in the standard history. Therefore, Xu suggested to the emperor that the *Ming History* include the biographical memoirs of the late-Ming loyalists and that the virtues of these former officials be fully recognized by the government. Xu's proposal won the support of his colleagues in the Ming History Office. Peng Sunyu 彭孫遹 (1631-1700), who participated in the *Ming History* project after his success

<sup>108</sup> Qinchuan jushi 琴川居士 ed., *Huang Qing mingchen zouyi* 皇清名臣奏議 (Beijing: Ducheng guoshiguan 都城國史館, repr. Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe 文海出版社, 1967) vol. 2, *juan* 9, pp. 918-921 and, *Qingshi liezhuan*, vol. 2, *juan* 8, p. 518.

<sup>109</sup> Xu Qianxue, *Danyuan wenji* 憺園文集 (1697 ed. Repr, Taipei: Hanhua wenhua shiye, 漢華文化事業, 1971), vol. 2, *juan* 10, pp. 524-525. Also see *juan* 14, pp. 727-728.



in the *boxue hongci* examination,<sup>110</sup> shared these views and went a step further by advocating that these biographies in the *Ming History* should be put under a separated category entitled “the loyal and righteous” or *zhongyi* 忠義 so as to highlight the moral achievements of the loyalists.<sup>111</sup> Wang Hongxu 王鴻緒 (1645-1723), who was in charge of the Ming History Office for more than ten years (1694-1709) and continued his work on Ming history after his dismissal in 1709,<sup>112</sup> even suggested that to promote moral education among the people and to demonstrate the government’s support for Confucian values, the heroic deeds of the late-Ming loyalists should be mentioned not only in the biographies concerned but also in the basic annals of the *Ming History*.<sup>113</sup>

This ethical perspective provided solid ground for the Qing scholars to justify their interests in the study of late-Ming figures and acted as an encouragement for them to work on the topic. When Xu Bingyi, a member of the famous Xu clan in Kunshan, Jiangsu, was absent from office during 1682-1694, he devoted much of his time to collecting historical materials relating to the Ming martyrs.<sup>114</sup> Like his elder brother Xu Qianxue and younger brother Xu Yuanwen, Bingyi had served in the Ming History Office for several years and, during this time, he developed a keen interest in the topic. In 1694, after twenty years of hard work, he completed a collection of biographies of the seventeenth-century Ming martyrs entitled the *True*

<sup>110</sup> Tu Lien-che, “P’eng Sun-yü,” in *Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period (1644-1912)*, vol. 2, p. 616.

<sup>111</sup> Peng Sunyu, *Songguitang quanji* 松桂堂全集, in *Yingyin Wenyuange siku quanshu*, vol. 1317, *juan* 35, p. 270.

<sup>112</sup> Qian Yiji, *Beizhuan ji*, vol. 2, *juan* 21, pp. 705-710 and Tu Lien-che, “Wang Hung-hsü,” in *Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period (1644-1912)*, vol. 2, p. 826 and, Wang Aiping, “Wang Hongxu,” in *Qingdai renwu zhuangao, shangbian*, vol. 8, pp. 164-169.

<sup>113</sup> Liu Chenggan 劉承幹 (1882-1963) comp., *Mingshi li’an* 明史例案 (Printed 1915), *juan* 2, pp. 30b-31b.

<sup>114</sup> Zhu Xizu 朱希祖 (1879-1944), *Mingji shiliao tiba* 明季史料題跋 (Taipei: Dahua yinshuguan 大華印書館, 1968), p. 82.

*Accounts of the Late-Ming Martyrs*, (*Mingmo zhonglie jishi* 明末忠烈紀實). As Xu stated in the “explanatory preface” (*fanli*), the main objective of this book was to give a comprehensive and reliable account of the historical figures who died as martyrs to the Ming cause and prevent their deeds from being forgotten by the people.<sup>115</sup> The order of the biographies was carefully considered. Over five hundred records of male martyrs are arranged into eighteen *juan* according to the period of martyrdom while hundreds of biographical sketches of the female martyrs are incorporated in the last two *juan* along with geographical references. For the narrative itself, special emphasis is put on the moral courage of these late-Ming or Southern Ming figures, whose deeds were considered to be embodiments of the Confucian virtues of loyalty.<sup>116</sup> Obviously, to Xu, remembering the Ming loyalists did not imply any recognition of the rightness of their political stance but rather identification of their Confucian values, the “Three Cardinal Bonds and Five Constant Virtues” (*san gang wu chang* 三綱五常), that they had defended.

Apart from the Chinese elite in the court, those Qing historians who were outside the literary circle of the upper social stratum also attempted to recount Southern Ming history from an ethical perspective. Among them, Wen Ruilin’s work entitled *Neglected History of the Southern Frontiers* (*Nanjiang yishi*) and Quan Zuwang’s writings of Southern Ming biographical epitaphs are excellent examples that demonstrate how the history of the mid-seventeenth century was depoliticized in the early eighteenth-century.

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<sup>115</sup> Xu, *Mingmo zhonglie jishi*, *fanli*, p. 1.

<sup>116</sup> In the arrangement of the biographies, Xu might have been inspired by the *Xuejiaoting zhengqi ji* 雪交亭正氣集, a collection of biographies of Ming martyrs compiled by the Zhejiang Ming *yimin* Gao Yutai 高宇泰. In Gao’s book, biographies are arranged in an order according to the periods of martyrdom with references to the Southern Ming regimes. See Gao, *Xuejiaoting zhengqi ji*, in *Taiwan wenxian congkan* 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Taipei:

Wen Ruilin was a native of Wucheng, Zhejiang. Some members of the Wen clan had resisted the Manchu invasion and committed suicide during the conquest period. Shortly after, when Qing rule was consolidated, the Wen family immediately gave up identifying with the fallen dynasty and sent its children to attend the new local examinations. Obtaining his *juren* degree in 1705, Wen was unable to rise through the civil examination and never obtained any prestigious position in officialdom.<sup>117</sup> Wen's interest in Southern Ming history was stimulated by his mentor Wan Sitong, who worked for the official Ming history project during 1679-1702 but consistently refused to accept any official position.<sup>118</sup> Through his involvement in the Ming History Office for more than twenty years, Wan Sitong came to realize that events of the Southern Ming regimes would be greatly neglected in the official *Ming History* due to the political consideration of the Qing house. In order to preserve a reliable history of the Southern Ming, Wan suggested that Wen might work on this topic and produce an unofficial history of the regimes. As Wen recalled, at the beginning, he was worried that such a history would be prohibited by the authorities because it would inevitably involve sensitive narratives of the resistance activities against the Qing. Yet, Wan Sitong argued:

What era is without the rise and fall of states? Each man has his own allegiance. Whenever a new dynasty emerges, there can be no anger at this; men must follow their convictions... When our [Qing] dynasty first established its rule, it began by praising those ministers who had died loyally for their state [under attack by rebels] to arouse public emulation. There simply was no time to pay attention to those who were not included in the commendation. They could at one and the same time be praised [for their loyalty to their cause] and executed [for resisting the Qing]. What's more, when the History Office was opened, it was ordered that various private accounts be sent to the [Rites] Ministry and that none be disapproved because they violated prohibitions. What harm could there

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Taiwan Yinhang 臺灣銀行, 1970).

<sup>117</sup> Lynn Struve, "Uses of History in Traditional Chinese Society," pp. 38-58.

<sup>118</sup> Chen Xunci 陳訓慈 (1901-1991) and Fang Zuyou 方祖猷, *Wan Sitong nianpu* 萬斯同年譜 (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1991), pp. 127-219.



be in collecting and editing them?<sup>119</sup>

Wen Ruilin was convinced by Wan Sitong's arguments and began actual writing shortly after Wan's death in 1702. The completion date of the work is not clear but evidence indicates that the draft was circulated in Zhejiang in 1738 and more materials were added in the following years.<sup>120</sup>

Although in his writings Wen Ruilin used Southern Ming reign names for dating and referred to the princes by their imperial titles, he, unlike the *yimin* historians, did not see this as some *de facto* recognition of Southern Ming legitimacy. He argued:

In the ancient histories, those accounts of the emperors are called "basic annals" [*benji* 本紀] and those of the ministers the "biographies" [*liezhuan* 列傳]. A basic annal gives a summary of government orders of a period while a biography only records [the deeds] of a person and the events concerned. Basic annals are distinguished [from biographies]. Yet, the revered Court Historian [Taishi gong 太史公, i.e. Sima Qian] gives his account of Xiang Yu 項羽 [233 B.C.-202 B.C.] as a basic annal. It is because he [Xiang] gave commands [to all-under-Heaven] during the time and many [historical] events are recounted in detail there. Now, although the three rulers of Nanjing [the Hongguang emperor], Fujian [the Longwu emperor], and Guangdong [the Yongli emperor] did not have good endings, they were emperors over their territories and set the rules of governance. It is reasonable to record them in basic annals. If [the Qing official interpretation that the Ming ended at] Huaizong 懷宗 [the Chongzhen Emperor] is strictly adhered to, there will be no record in the biographies, let alone the basic annals. This is not the normal practice in writing the history of an era. Therefore, there are "brief annals" in the first [three] *juan* [of this book]. They are not called "basic annals" thus avoiding giving any offense to our [Qing] dynasty. They are "brief" annals because the available materials are not adequate to provide greater detail.<sup>121</sup>

As the title *Neglected History of the Southern Frontiers* reflects, the author was taking a Qing perspective in his writing. In the preface, Wen explained his stance clearly in a question-and-answer form

<sup>119</sup> Wen Ruilin, *Nanjiang yishi, fanli*, p. 3. The English translations are cited from Lynn Struve with modifications, see Struve, "Uses of History in Traditional Chinese Society," pp. 44-45.

<sup>120</sup> Struve, "Uses of History in Traditional Chinese Society," pp. 47-48.

<sup>121</sup> Wen, *Nanjiang yishi, fanli*, p. 4.

Why is this called *Neglected History of the Southern Frontiers*? It is an account of the events under the three [political] entities, the Hongguang, the Longwu, and the Yongli. Why not use “courts” [in the book title]? [It is because they did] not constitute courts. Why is it called “Southern Frontiers?” Their rule was restricted to the South and [they] never reached the North.<sup>122</sup>

To Wen, the main reason for writing the history was to examine the causes of the rise and fall of the Southern Ming regimes and to praise and blame (*bao bian*) the figures based on their deeds. Stressing the educational functions of history, he believed that by expressing admiration for the loyalists and condemning the traitors, his work would promote Confucian ethics in society at large.<sup>123</sup>

Quan Zuwang was a descendant of Ming loyalists. According to Quan, members of his family had participated in anti-Qing activities in Zhejiang during 1644-1645 and they maintained close relations with the resistance activists until 1662. When the resistance movement was suppressed, they became *yimin* under the Qing.<sup>124</sup> Like many other descendants of *yimin*, Quan participated in the Qing examinations and obtained his *jinshi* degree in 1736.<sup>125</sup> His intensive research and writing on Ming loyalists can be traced back to the year 1738, when he was mustered out of the Hanlin Academy and quit Beijing for Zhejiang.<sup>126</sup> After returning home, he devoted much of his time to researching on the local history of Zhejiang in the transitional period and relied on writing epitaphs of the Ming loyalists for much of his income. Since the year of

<sup>122</sup> Wen, *Nanjiang yishi*, preface, p. 1.

<sup>123</sup> Wen, *Nanjiang yishi*, preface, p. 2.

<sup>124</sup> Quan Zuwang, *Jiqiting ji*, vol. 2, *waibian*, *juan* 8, pp. 758-759 and, Quan Zuwang, ed. *Xu Yongshang qijiu shi* 續甬上耆舊詩 (Siming wenxianshe 四明文獻社, 1918), vol. 8, *juan* 24, p. 1a-2a.

<sup>125</sup> Zhu Baojiong 朱保炯 and Xie Peilin 謝沛霖, *Ming-Qing jinshi timing beilu suoyin* 明清進士題名碑錄索引 (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji chubanshe 上海古籍出版社, 1989), vol. 3, p. 2705 and, Jiang Tianshu 蔣天樞 (1903-1988), *Quan Xieshan nianpu* 全謝山年譜 (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan 商務印書館, 1932), p. 57.

<sup>126</sup> Jiang Tianshu, *Quan Xieshan nianpu*, pp. 67-71.

1744 would be the hundredth anniversary of the 1644 events, many descendants of late-Ming loyalists were preparing for commemoration activities and asked Quan to write epitaphs for their ancestors. In response to these requests, he wrote a great number of accurate and sympathetic biographies of the historical figures who were prominent in the local and regional resistance movements.<sup>127</sup>

In his writings, Quan revealed not only a considerable level of professionalism but also a passionate sincerity in searching for the moral principles related to human relationships (*renlun* 人倫) through the study of history, which is a responsibility of historians and more than just a personal interest or a way of making a living. In evaluating the Southern Ming figures, he intentionally attempted to employ an ethical principle, which can be summarized as one of “not serving two dynasties,” to erase the tension caused by the pro-Ming/pro-Qing political conflict. To Quan, the term “loyalist” simply denotes a person who “would not serve two dynasties” (*bushi erxing* 不事二姓).<sup>128</sup> He argued that if one who had served the former dynasty insisted on the principle of not transferring their loyalty after the dynastic change, one could be regarded as a loyalist no matter whether one was a martyr or *yimin*.<sup>129</sup> To the contrary, if one violated this principle, one should be considered a renegade and condemned by the public.<sup>130</sup> Pursuing to this principles in evaluating historical figures, Quan even criticized Huang Zongxi, the Ming *yimin* who was highly respected by the Qing intelligentsia, for his *Waiting for the Dawn* as the Chinese term

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<sup>127</sup> Jiang Tianshu, “Quan Xieshan xiaansheng zhushu kao” 全謝山先生著述考, *Guoli Beiping tushuguan guankan* 國立北平圖書館館刊, 7.1 (Feb. 1933): 31-49 and 7.2 (March 1933): 36-67.

<sup>128</sup> Quan, *Jieqiting ji*, vol. 2, *waibian*, *juan* 42, p. 1300.

<sup>129</sup> Quan, *Jieqiting ji*, vol. 1, 103.

<sup>130</sup> Quan, *Jieqiting ji*, vol. 2, *waibian*, *juan* 12, pp. 825-828; *juan* 33, pp. 1137-1138; and, *juan* 42, p. 1301.



“*daifang*” could be interpreted as “waiting for the visit of a new ruler.”<sup>131</sup>

In defense of the anti-Qing attitude of the loyalists, Quan repeated the Qing scholars’ assertion that “The diehards opposed to the Zhou were the loyalists of the Shang dynasty.” He further argued that though the loyalists might be arrested and executed for their anti-government activities, grave offenses in the eyes of the newly established authorities, their moral courage should be admired nevertheless. As the embodiment of Confucian virtues, their loyalist deeds should be made known to the public, he argued, and recorded in history.<sup>132</sup>

The principle of loyalism that Quan advanced was closely related to his idea of history. Educated in the Confucian tradition, Quan believed that the meaning of history lay in its educational function.<sup>133</sup> Moral education, to him meant the teaching and learning of the Confucian ethics and the art of maintaining the five human relationships (*wu lun*) in society, in particular the relationship between monarch and official, as well as that between father and son. Therefore, in his study of history, he paid special attention to the issues concerning loyalty and filial piety, which, to him, were the concrete moral achievements of human beings and the essence of Chinese culture. According to Quan, it is the historians’ responsibility to accurately preserve accounts of those who put these Confucian moral principles into practice.

It is also worth noting that by taking a culturalist approach and

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<sup>131</sup> Quan, *Jieqiting ji*, vol. 1, *juan* 22, p. 267.

<sup>132</sup> Quan, *Jieqiting ji*, vol. 1, *juan* 8, p. 106. I have discuss this point in my articles “Cultural Legacy and Historiography: The Case of Quan Zuwang (1705-1755).” *Chinese Culture*, 34.4 (December 1993): 15-26 and “Quan Zuwang ji qi Nanming renwu chuan” 全祖望及其南明人物傳 (Quan Zuwang and his Southern Ming Biographies), in *Lun Zhedong xueshu* 論浙東學術 (On Eastern Zhejiang Scholarship), Fang Zuyou 方祖猷 and Jin Tao 金濤 eds. (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe 中國社會科學出版社, 1995), pp. 424-431.

<sup>133</sup> Quan, *Jieqiting ji*, vol. 2, *waibian*, *juan* 12, p. 818.

emphasizing the significance of loyalism, Quan did not find it difficult to reject the ethnocentric claim made against the alien rule of the Manchus. This is evinced in his comments on Xu Heng's 許衡 (1209-1281) and Liu Yin's 劉因 (1240-1293) political identities with the Mongol Yuan dynasty. Examining the lives of Xu and Liu, Quan said:

Xu Wenzheng 許文正 [Heng] and Liu Wenjing 劉文靖 [Yin] were two great Confucians of north [China] in the Yuan time... These two masters were never Song subjects, [thus] for them to serve under the Yuan in no way harmed [their good name].<sup>134</sup>

Xu took a government position under the alien regime but Liu did not.<sup>135</sup>

To Quan, it was simply a matter of personal choice. Liu elected to live as a hermit because he had no confidence in Yuan politics and his decision did not involve any ethnic consideration. In response to the ethnocentric criticisms of Xu, who was a Han Chinese but accepted the Mongol offer, Quan argued:

Xu Wenzheng and [Liu] Wenjing were people of the Yuan dynasty. Why shouldn't they serve the Yuan government? The criticisms based on making distinctions between barbarians and Han Chinese [*yixia zhi shuo* 夷夏之說] ignores the relationship between the monarch and his officials [which is] imposed by Heaven [*tian zuo zhi jun zhi yi* 天作之君之義]! How could a Yuan subject give loyalty to the Song? This is arrant nonsense!<sup>136</sup>

These arguments can be considered as a projection of Quan's own pro-Qing political stance.<sup>137</sup> To a certain extent, they also indicate that, by the early-eighteenth century, given the political conditions of alien rule, Han literati were attempting to bypass the sensitive topics of ethnicity in their

<sup>134</sup> Quan, *Jieqiting ji*, vol. 2, *waibian*, *juan* 33, p. 1128.

<sup>135</sup> For the biographies of Xu Heng and Liu Yin, see Song, Lian 宋濂 (1310-1381) et al. comps., *Yuanshi* 元史 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1976), vol. 12, *juan* 158, pp. 3716-3730; and vol. 13, *juan* 1701, pp. 4007-4010.

<sup>136</sup> Quan, *Jieqiting ji*, vol. 2, *waibian*, *juan* 33, p. 1129.

<sup>137</sup> In the past decades, many Chinese historians tended to consider Quan's sympathy with the late-Ming loyalists as an expression of his anti-Qing attitude. This is a misconception. For the analysis, see my article "Quan Zuwang 'su fu minzu qijie' shuo pingyi" 全祖望“素負民族氣節”說平議, *Jiuzhou xuekan* 九州學刊, 5.1 (July 1992): 41-52.

discourse on loyalty.

### **The ideas of loyalty in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries**

The changing concept of loyalty in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries demonstrates the dialectic relationship between individuals and their time. The fall and restoration of orthodox Neo-Confucianism during this period were not simply the result of government fiat but the result of complex interactions among social groups in a given environment.

The dynastic change in mid-seventeenth-century China had shaken the social foundations of Neo-Confucian ideology. In a period of political and social turmoil, pragmatism became a governing principle of social action and government policy. To many Han Chinese, collaboration with the Manchus was the sole, rational alternative to disorder. To reduce resistance and to seek support from the social elite during the process of the subjugation of China, the Manchu conquerors also rewarded former Ming officials for their collaboration. Consequently, in the first decades of the Qing, the Cheng-Zhu teachings of loyalty failed temporarily to gain imperial support and lost their dominance in the living culture. Although the promotion of loyalty and filial piety was an avowed state policy of the new dynasty, it was only a cultural tactic employed to pacify the conquered Han Chinese.<sup>138</sup> It seemed inconsistent that the newly-established Qing

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<sup>138</sup> In fact, before advancing across the Great Wall, the Manchus had adopted a policy of encouraging the Chinese to submit themselves to the Manchus. See, for example, Ledehong et al. comps., *Taizu gaohuangdi shilu* 太祖高皇帝實錄, in *Qing shilu*, (Beijing:



government, on the one hand, praised the Ming martyrs of 1644 for insisting on remaining loyal to the Ming but, on the other hand, called on Ming officials to surrender.<sup>139</sup> To both the Manchu conquerors and their Chinese collaborators, political realignment was an act of “obeying Heaven’s Will.”<sup>140</sup>

Unlike collaborators, Ming loyalists were true believers in Neo-Confucian loyalism. Apart from those who sacrificed their lives for the Ming dynasty during the conquest period, the survivors did not give up their Confucian principles under the aliens. Nonetheless, the post-1644 socio-economic environment and the examination of the causes of the Ming fall gradually softened their anti-Qing attitude. The emphasis on the “welfare of the people” finally made them give tacit consent to the legitimacy of Qing rule, even while it still remained unacceptable for former Ming officials to serve the new regime.

To scholars of Chinese intellectual history, one of the characteristics of late seventeenth-century thought was the rise of “anti-despotic ideas” among such prominent thinkers as Huang Zongxi.<sup>141</sup> In

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Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1986), vol. 1, *juan* 5, Tianming year 3, month 4, p. 70; year 6, month 3, *juan* 7, p. 102; Tuhai 圖海 (d. 1682) et al. comps., *Taizong wenhuangdi shilu* 太宗文皇帝實錄, in *Qing shilu*, (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1985), vol. 2. Tiancong year 1, month 5, *juan* 3, p. 48; year 3, month 10, *juan* 5, pp. 76-80; year 4, month 4, *juan* 6, 95; year 5, month 9, p. *juan* 9, p. 135; intercalary month 11, *juan* 10, p. 146; year 7, month 6, *juan* 14, p. 192; p. 194; year 8, month 4, *juan* 18, p. 238; Zongde year 1, month 11, *juan* 32, p. 404; year 2, month 7, *juan* 37, pp. 486-487; year 3, month 4, *juan* 41, p. 541; and, year 3, month 7, *juan* 42, p. 505.

<sup>139</sup> For example, in the first year of the Shunzhi reign, several edicts were issued praising the 1644 Ming martyrs and appealing to the Ming officials. See *Shizu Zhanghuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 3, *juan* 5, Shunzhi year 1, month 5, p. 57; pp. 59-60; *juan* 6, month 7, p. 66; *juan* 11, month 10, p. 103 and, and, *juan* 11, month 11, p. 106.

<sup>140</sup> *Shizu Zhanghuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 3, *juan* 5, Shunzhi year 1, month 10, p. 103 and Ji Liuqi, *Mingji nanlüe*, *juan* 2, pp. 141-142.

<sup>141</sup> See William T. de Bary, *The Liberal Tradition in China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), pp. 67-90 and, Yamanoi Yu 山井湧, *Min-Shin shisōshi no kenkyū* 明清思想史の研究 (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai 東京大學出版會, 1980), pp. 250-266.

fact, Huang's advocacy of humane governance, especially his critique of Chinese despotism, presented a critical challenge to dogmatic Cheng-Zhu ideology. However, the historical influence of such anti-despotic ideas should not be exaggerated. Initially, the circulation of Huang's *Waiting for the Dawn* was restricted to the circle of *yimin* in certain regions and it only became widely known in the late Qing and early Republican periods.<sup>142</sup> Moreover, bounded by the heavy burden of defending Confucian culture and its traditional values in practice, most *yimin* could hardly be expected to free themselves from the doctrine of absolute loyalism.

The cultural policy of the Kangxi Emperor after 1669 marked the restoration of Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucian ideology in Chinese historiography. Official praise for the martyrdom of Fan Chengmo 范承謨 (1624-1676) and Ma Xiongzheng 馬雄鎮 (1634-1677), the Qing martyrs who died in the Three Feudatories Rebellion, confirmed the government's full-blown recognition of the Cheng-Zhu teachings of loyalty.<sup>143</sup> The state policy of promoting loyalty and filial piety was then implemented after the consolidation of Qing rule. Imperial attempts to employ Confucianism as a means of ideological control were further developed during the Yongzheng reign and this later became a principal guideline for official cultural activities in the Qianlong era.

It was the adoption of Neo-Confucianism that helped the Manchus foster the legitimacy of their rule and win the political fealty of their Han subjects. To those Han Chinese who grew up under the Qing, the early

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<sup>142</sup> According to Wu Guang, Huang Zongxi's *Daifang lu* was published in the Qianlong period but it was widely circulated only after the late nineteenth century. See Wu, *Huang Zongxi quanji*, vol. 2, pp. 423-427. Also see his *Huang Zongxi zhuzuo hui kao*, pp. 1-10.

<sup>143</sup> See *Shengzu Renhuangdi yuzhi wenji*, in *Yingyin Wenyuange siku quanshu*, vol. 1298, *chujì* 初集, *juan* 22, 205-206 and, vol. 1299, *siji* 四集, *juan* 22, p. 541. Also see *Qingshi liezhuan*, vol. 2, *juan* 6, pp. 380-385 and, *Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 4, *juan* 81, Kangxi year 18, month 6, p.1036.

history of the dynasty evinced the fact that the Mandate of the Heaven was in favor of the Qing. Despite their sympathy for Ming loyalists, they had not served the Ming and so were not obliged to take the political stance of the Ming *yimin*. In order to solve the conflict between an appreciation for Ming loyalists and the recognition of Qing legitimacy, Qing scholars attempted to employ an ethical perspective in evaluating the deeds of Ming loyalists. From Tang Bin to Quan Zuwang, it is obvious that a shared Qing interpretation of Southern Ming history based on the Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucian doctrine of loyalty gradually evolved.

Comparatively speaking, depoliticization and moralization were two noticeable characteristics that distinguished the discourse of Qing subjects from that of the Ming *yimin*. To the latter, the significance of the resistance history was both political and ethical but to the former, it was only ethical and had nothing to do with politics. The Qing scholars tried to bypass sensitive pro-Ming/pro-Qing political disputes and emphasized instead the personal moral commitment of late-Ming figures as well as the embodiment of the Confucian cultural values in their deeds. As part of the tradition, the Han elite never tired of using history to advance what they thought were an ideal social order and moral behavior. In glorifying the Southern Ming heroes, they argued that admiration for the deeds of the loyalists would promote moral education in society. And, given these circumstances, there was a general demand in society for an official recognition of the deeds of the Southern Ming loyalists.



### 3. The Compilation of the *Qinding Shengchao Xianfa Zhuchou Lu*

As chapter two shows, the shared Qing perspective among the literati developed in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries brought out a noticeable discrepancy between official and popular views on the resistant history of 1644-1662. Shortly after his enthronement in 1733, in formulating the state cultural policy Emperor Qianlong could easily sense the literati's general demand for the change of official attitude toward Southern Ming loyalists. Unlike his father and grandfather who saw the demand as a challenge to the legitimacy of Qing rule, the emperor found it a valuable source to support the promotion of orthodox ideology. The change of imperial attitude resulted in the compilation of official biographies of Ming martyrs.

## PART II: OFFICIAL PROJECTS

### The Edict of 1766 and Its Historical Significance

In 1766, the Historiography Bureau finished the biography of Hong Chengchou 洪承畴 (1593-1665), the former Ming minister and governor-general who collaborated with the Manchus in 1642 and helped the Qing regime conquer south China during 1644-1660.<sup>1</sup> The biography was submitted to the throne in the same year. Going through the narratives of

<sup>1</sup> The extant manuscripts of Hong's biography are now kept in the First Historical Archives of China, Beijing. They are the earliest Qianlong drafts available in China. See the "Qianlong ding'an" 雍正降旨, *Qianlong 全集* (全集) no. 11, Zhuan 傳 129, in *Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'an jian* 中國第一歷史檔案館藏. For the recent writings on the Biography of Hong, see Pang Chao-ying, "Hong Ch'eng-chou," in *Chinese Culture of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912)*, vol. 1, pp. 358-260; Li Daxin, "Hong Cheng-chou," in *Qingdai renwu zhuanqao, zhongguo*, vol. 2, pp. 299-312; Wang Hongzhi 王弘志, *Hong Chengchou shuo* 洪承畴傳 (Beijing: Hongxi chubanshe 紅溪出版社, 1991); and Li Xinda, *Hong Chengchou zhuan* (Chengdu: Sichuan Renmin chubanshe 四川人民出版社, 1991).

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Ming-Qing events in Hong's biography, Emperor Qianlong was not completely satisfied with the work. He disagreed with some of the compilers' viewpoints and decided to set two significant rules to guide future official writings on the history of the conquest period. On July 2 of the same year, he ordered that the Southern Ming princes and their regimes hereafter not be labeled with the derogatory term *wei* 偽, which means "illicit" or "heterodox," and that those Southern Ming officials such as Huang Daozhou 黃道周 (1585-1646) and Shi Kefa 史可法 (1602-1645) who had resisted the conquest not be condemned as rebels in spite of their anti-Qing words and deeds.

In defense of his decisions, the emperor affirmed that the Hongguang, Longwu, and Yongli courts should be distinguished from the late-Ming rebellious forces because the former were headed by princes of the Ming royal lineage while the latter by bandits or adventurers. It was inappropriate to treat descendants of the Ming house as rebels though they no longer maintained the Mandate of Heaven. Recognizing the moral courage of the Southern Ming martyrs, he further asserted that these historical figures were Ming loyalists who performed their responsibilities of defending the fallen dynasty. Even from a Qing perspective, their insistence on the Confucian principle of loyalty had to be acknowledged. To explain the previous Qing condemnations of the Southern Ming regimes and their followers, the emperor pointed out that those were necessary expediency used by the new government in wartime in order to accelerate the unification of the newly established empire. Based on these arguments, he came to a conclusion that when all-under-Heaven had been unified for more than a hundred years, such temporary measures should be abolished and the deeds of the historical figures concerned should be impartially



reevaluated.<sup>2</sup>

The imperial edict of 1766 marked a watershed between early and mid-Qing official attitudes toward Southern Ming loyalists. Before the edict, the Qing authorities upheld a policy of denigrating the resistance history of 1644-1662 and considered all participants in the anti-Qing movement as rebels acting against Heaven's Will.<sup>3</sup> During the Shunzhi and Kangxi eras, in which the official *Ming History* was being compiled, many Han Chinese scholar-officials had repeatedly suggested that the government openly recognize and praise the virtues of the Southern Ming martyrs. Their ethical arguments did not convince the alien rulers.<sup>4</sup> Even in the early Qianlong period, following the policy of his ancestors, the emperor also tended to omit resistance history from any official account of the previous dynasty.<sup>5</sup> Consequently, for a long period of time, there was an obvious discrepancy between government policy and the prevailing ideas of the Han Chinese literati in the evaluation of the deeds of the resistance activists of 1644-1662.

As an outcome of strategic consideration, the early-Qing policy of refusing legitimacy to the history of resistance is understandable. In the first three decades of the new dynasty, the alien authorities were distressed

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<sup>2</sup> Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan, comp., *Qianlong chao shangyu dang* 乾隆朝上諭檔, (Beijing: Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan 1991), vol. 4, pp. 896-897; Qinggui 慶桂 (1735-1816) et al. comps., *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu* 高宗純皇帝實錄 in *Qing shilu* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1985-1986), vol. 18, Qianlong year 31, month 5, p. 373.

<sup>3</sup> This policy was first employed by Regent Dorgon and reflected in his letter to Shi kefa in 1644. Batai et al. comps., *Shizu Zhanghuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 3, juan 6, Shunzhi year 1, month 7, pp. 71-72.

<sup>4</sup> Qinchuan jushi ed., *Huang Qing mingchen zouyi*, vol. 2, juan 9, pp. 918-921; *Qingshi liezhuan*, vol. 2, juan 8, p. 518; Xu Qianxue, *Danyuan wenji*, vol. 2, juan 10, pp. 524-525; juan 14, pp. 727-728; Peng Sunyu, *Songguitang quanji*, in *Yingyin Wenyuange siku quanshu*, vol. 1317, juan 35, p. 270.

<sup>5</sup> Ho Koon-piu, "Qing Gaozong dui Nanming lishi diwei de chuli" 清高宗對南明歷史地位的處理, *Xin Shixue* 新史學, 7.1 (March 1996): 2-13. Also see Ho's "Qingchu sanchao dui Nanming lishi diwei de chuli" 清初三朝對南明歷史地位的處理, *Mindai shi*

by the resistance activities of Ming remnants in the southwest and coastal regions. As evidence shows, some local gentry and literati in these regions were associated with the resistance activists.<sup>6</sup> In a tense political situation, the new government was highly sensitive to any ideas that might arouse anti-Qing sentiment and jeopardize social stability. From 1644 onward, in order to pacify the Han Chinese, the Qing house had openly paid its respect to Emperor Chongzhen, the Ming emperor who committed suicide after the fall of Beijing in 1644, and enshrined the Ming ministers who died loyally for their dynasty in resisting the late-Ming peasant rebellions.

Nevertheless, the Manchu emperors were very reluctant to acknowledge the martyrdom of Southern Ming loyalists. To a large extent, the unequal treatments of these two categories of loyalists disclosed the rulers' apprehension: any official expression of sympathy with those who resisted the Qing might bring the public a false message that the government was going to compromise with rebellious activities under the name of Ming restoration.

From a cultural perspective, the early-Qing official attitude toward Southern Ming loyalists also declared the Manchus' determination to defend their legitimate status in the Chinese tradition of dynastic succession.<sup>7</sup>

Since the Qing dynasty was founded in Beijing in 1644, the Manchu rulers had constantly proclaimed that they were now the only legitimate sovereigns

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*kenkyū* 明代史研究, 23 (April 1995): 23-34.

<sup>6</sup> Quan Zuwang, *Jiqiting ji*, vol. 2, *waibian*, *juan* 6, pp. 716-718; *juan* 10, pp. 781-792.

<sup>7</sup> As Chan Hok-lam points out, the traditional political theories of legitimacy in imperial China emphasized the "correct succession" or *zhengtong* 正統 of rulers and dynasties. When a new dynasty was established, the founder would officially proclaim the shift of Mandate of Heaven from the previous dynasty to the present dynasty. This emphasis on political linkage with the past was strengthened under the influence of the Neo-Confucian idea of "transmission of the Way" or *daotong* after the Song dynasty. See Chan, *Legitimation in Imperial China: Discussion under the Jurchen-Chin Dynasty (1115-1234)* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1984), esp. pp. 19-48.

in the Chinese world and the Southern Ming regimes were illegitimate. According to the imperial version, the Ming dynasty lost the Mandate of Heaven and was crushed by the rebel Li Zicheng in 1644. Chosen by Heaven, the Manchus then defeated Li, took China directly from the hands of bandits and saved the Han Chinese from wars and disasters.<sup>8</sup> This interpretation of the conquest history became a state policy and remained unchanged until the mid-Qianlong era. The literary inquisitions of the works of Dai Mingshi in 1711 and Lü Liuliang in 1728 clearly demonstrated that under no circumstances, would the government tolerate any challenge to the imperial proclamation of its 1644-1662 legitimacy.

In response to the demand of the Han Chinese scholar-officials, Emperor Kangxi had agreed in 1680 to incorporate the Hongguang and Yongli histories as appendices of the basic annals in the official *Ming History*.<sup>9</sup> Yet, when the case of *Nanshan ji* broke into the open in 1711, he immediately changed his mind. Existing sources indicate that one of the offences of Dai Mingshi, author of the *Nanshan ji*, was his dissenting opinion upon *zhengtong*, or the “legitimate dynastic succession,” of the Ming-Qing transition. In contrast to the official view, Dai advanced that in the conquest era, the Southern Ming, rather than the Qing, was the legitimate successor of the Ming.<sup>10</sup> The case alerted the emperor to the fact that in defiance of the repeated injunctions of the government, some of his Han subjects still considered the first decade of Qing rule illegitimate. Enraged

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<sup>8</sup> Shizu Zhanghuangdi shilu, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 3, juan 6, Shunzhi year 1, month 7, p. 71.

<sup>9</sup> Ho Koon-piu, “Qingchu sanchao dui Nanming lishi diwei de chuli,” pp. 26-27.

<sup>10</sup> Ho Koon-piu, *Dai Mingshi yanjiu*, pp. 253-310. For Dai’s opinion concerning the legitimate rule of the conquest period, see *Dai Minshi ji*, juan 1, pp. 2-3.



at Dai's disloyalty and in an attempt to strengthen ideological control, he soon decided to resume the early-Qing policy of depreciating the resistance history and deprive the Southern Ming regimes of their historical positions in the official *Ming History*. During his thirteen-year reign, Emperor Yongzheng ruled the country with a strong hand and suppressed all heterodox ideas. The Lü Liuliang and Zeng Jing case of 1728 also reminded him of potential anti-Qing elements in society and reinforced his defensive attitude toward the Manchu-Han ethnic issues of the conquest period.

As Kangxi and Yongzheng interpreted the Southern Ming resistance as rebellion, naturally they would not acknowledge those figures who served the "rebellious" entities. Therefore, it is not surprising that during the first hundred years of the dynasty, despite promoting Neo-Confucian ideology, the government did not accept the ethical perspective on resistance history that was popular among Han scholars and firmly refused to recognize the virtue of the historical figures concerned. It was not until the edict of 1766, a century after the demise of the last Southern Ming regime, that the Qing government made concession to the constant demand of the literati for an official rehabilitation of the Southern Ming martyrs. The Qianlong edict thus marked an end of the Qing imperial condemnation against the resistance activists of the transitional period.

## Qianlong's Reinterpretation of the Conquest History

In the first three decades of his reign, Emperor Qianlong basically insisted on the early-Qing official policy in tackling the history of the conquest period. Notwithstanding his dissatisfaction with the quality of the official *Ming History*, he did not find it necessary to reexamine the previous imperial interpretation of late-Ming events.<sup>11</sup> This was evinced in the 1739-1746 Ming history project, the *Outline-Type History of the Ming Dynasty* (originally named as *Mingshi gangmu* 明史綱目, *Mingji gangmu* 明紀綱目, or *Mingjian gangmu* 明鑑綱目), in which the resistance history, together with the sensitive materials regarding early Ming-Manchu relationship, was intentionally excluded from the work.<sup>12</sup> It was during the compilation of the *Comprehensive Mirror of Successive Reigns, Imperially Annotated [by Qianlong]* (*Yupi lidai tongjian jilan* 御批歷代通鑑輯覽), a general history of China, that the emperor began to consider seriously an official reexamination of the Southern Ming history based on Neo-

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<sup>11</sup> The emperor's dissatisfaction with the official *Ming History* was reflected in the preface of the *Yuding zichi tongjian gangmu sanbian* 御定資治通鑑綱目三編. See Zhang Tingyu et al. comps., *Yuding zichi tongjian gangmu sanbian*, in *Yingyin Wenyuange siku quanshu*, vol. 340, prefaces, pp. 2-4. Also see Hongli (Emperor Qianlong), *Qing Gaozong (Qianlong) yuzhi shiwen quanji* 清高宗 (乾隆) 御製詩文全集 (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue chubanshe 中國人民大學出版社, 1993), vol. 10, *Yuzhiwen chuji* 御製文初集, juan 10, p. 397.

<sup>12</sup> The work was revised during 1775-1782 and renamed as *The Second Continuation of the Outline Mirror for Aid in Government, Authorized by the Emperor* (*Yuding zichi tongjian gangmu sanbian*). The original work was not available after the Qianlong period. Yet, even in the revised version, there is no narrative of the Longwu and Yongli event, and evidently, the brief accounts of the Hongguang regime were added after 1755. See *Yuding zichi tongjian gangmu sanbian*, vol. 340, juan 40, pp. 765-801. For a study of the compilations of the *Mingshi gangmu* and *Yuding zichi tongjian gangmu sanbian*, see Ho Koon-piu, "Qing Gaozong gangmuti shiji bianzuan kao" 清高宗綱目體史籍編纂考, in

Confucianism.<sup>13</sup>

The imperial reevaluation of Southern Ming figures in the mid-eighteenth century can be explained by the economic, social, and cultural developments in the Qianlong reign. Unlike his ancestors, Kangxi and Yongzheng, who reigned in a situation of social discontent or political factionalism, Emperor Qianlong presided over a period of political stability and economic prosperity. With a series of military accomplishments in the western territories during 1730s-1760s, the strength of the empire reached its peak by the mid-Qianlong era.<sup>14</sup> The stable and prosperous society provided a favorable environment for cultural bloom and consequently, aroused the emperor to a careful consideration of the government's role in the cultural development of the empire. In the process, his attention was drawn particularly to the government's active participation in cultural affairs and the formulation of an appropriate policy. As part of his cultural policy, Qianlong's new interpretation of the conquest history, in some senses, reveals his vaulting ambition to seek cultural hegemony through official

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*Ming-Qing renwu yu zhushu*, pp. 245-256; 272-276.

<sup>13</sup> The exact date of compilation of the work is unclear. *Siku quanshu zongmu* says that it was initiated in 1767 (vol. 1, *juan* 47, p. 430) but *Guochao gongshi xubian* 國朝宮史續編 places it in 1768 (Qinggui 慶桂 [1735-1816] et al. comps., Beijing: Beijing guji chubanshe 北京古籍出版社, 1994, *juan* 89, p. 864). Obviously, both of these dates are incorrect as the earliest sources regarding the compilation can be traced back to 1759. (See *Qingshi liezhuan*, vol. 18, *juan* 71, pp. 5832-5833.) According to Ho Koon-piu, the period of compilation was around 1759-1768. See Ho, "Qing Gaozong gangmuti shiji bianzuan kao," pp. 258-266. Also see Qiao Zhizhong 喬治忠, *Qingchao guanfang shixue yanjiu* 清朝官方史學研究 (Taipei: Wenjin chubanshe 文津出版社, 1994), pp. 305-307.

<sup>14</sup> Albert Feuerwerker, *State and Society in Eighteenth-Century China: The Ch'ing Empire in Its Glory* (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan, 1976), pp. 77-94. For a study of the Qianlong military accomplishments in the western territories, see Zhuang Jifa, *Qing Gaozong shiquan wugong yanjiu* 清高宗十全武功研究 (Taipei: Guoli gugong bowuyuan 國立故宮博物院, 1982), esp. pp. 23-59; 65-104.



historiography. It also reflects his deliberate attempt to manipulate the intellectual discourse on Chinese culture and Confucian values.<sup>15</sup>

As many historians note, apart from other cultural activities, Emperor Qianlong during his reign had made considerable effort to employ history as an effective means of ideological control.<sup>16</sup> Since his enthronement, he had energetically initiated several projects of official histories<sup>17</sup> and tried very hard to establish his supreme authority in the field.<sup>18</sup> Educated under the Confucian orthodoxy, the emperor thoroughly understood the political function of history and was well aware of the Chinese tradition of making use of history as a tool of commentary on contemporary politics. Since ancient time, the Confucian historiography, which emphasizes the ethical “praise and blame” or *bao bian* on the deeds of historical figures, had gradually been developed as a sharpened weapon of political criticism. Living in the tradition, Chinese literati was never tired of “using the past to allude the present” (*jie gu yu jin* 借古喻今), in which they could indirectly express their opinions on current issues.<sup>19</sup> In the

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<sup>15</sup> Emperor Qianlong's attempt to establish his cultural hegemony was also evinced in the compilation of the *Siku quanshu* and the literary inquisitions. See Kent Guy, *The Emperor's Four Treasuries: Scholars and the State in the Late Ch'ien-lung Era* and Luther Goodrich, *The Literary Inquisition of Ch'ien-Lung*.

<sup>16</sup> Ho Koon-piu, “Qing Gaozong dui Nanming lishi diwei de chuli,” pp. 1-27; “Qing Gaozong gangmuti shiji bianzuan kao,” pp. 241-280; Qiao Zhizhong, *Qingchao guanfang shixue yanjiu*, pp. 273-291; Ye Gaoshu, “Qianlong shidai guanxiu shishu de jiaohua gongneng -- jian lun Qianlong huangdi tongyu Hanren de celue” 乾隆時代官修史書的教化功能——兼論乾隆皇帝統御漢人的策略, *Guoli Taiwan shifan daxue lishi xuebao* 國立臺灣師範大學歷史學報, 22 (June 1994): 171-199; Qiao Zhizhong, *Qingchao guanfang shixue yanjiu*, pp. 289-290.

<sup>17</sup> Qiao Zhizhong, *Qingchao guanfang shixue yanjiu*, pp. 68-72.

<sup>18</sup> Ho Koon-piu, “Lun Qing Gaozong ziwo chuixu de lishi panguan xingxiang” 論清高宗自我吹噓的歷史判官形象, in *Ming-Qing renwu yu zhushu*, pp. 146-182.

<sup>19</sup> The Qing historian Wan Sitong had explained the practical uses of history to statecraft in a letter to his nephew Wan Yan 萬言 (1637-1705), which, to a large extent, represented

emperor's eyes, these uncontrolled criticisms of government and its policies by drawing analogies from history were undoubtedly a challenge to the absolute power of the throne. Therefore, he intended to monopolize the authority of "praise and blame" through the compilation of official histories and establish orthodox interpretations of important historical events according to the interests of the Qing house. As Confucius said, "When right principles [of governance] prevail in the empire, there will be no discussions [on politics] among the common people" (*tianxia youdao, ze shuren buyi* 天下有道, 則庶人不議).<sup>20</sup> Mencius also asserted that in a time of peace and order, it should be the emperor who controls the writing of history.<sup>21</sup> With references to these Confucian ideas, Qianlong could find no difficulty in rationalizing his attempt in the era of great peace and prosperity. From this perspective, the mid-Qianlong reevaluation of the Southern Ming figures could be regarded as a means employed by the emperor to demonstrate his impartiality in exercising the power of being a supreme judge of Chinese history and thus, to conclude the long-period discourse on the resistance history as well.<sup>22</sup>

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the popular view of the Confucian historians in early Qing. See Wan, *Shiyuan wenji*, *juan* 7, pp. 435-437.

<sup>20</sup> Yang Bojun 楊伯峻 (1909-1992), *Lun yu yizhu* 論語譯注 (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1958), 16.2, p. 181. The English Translations are cited from James Legge (1814-1897) with modification. Legge, *The Chinese-English Four Books*, revised and annotated by Liu Zhongde 劉重德 and Luo Zhiye 羅志野 (Zhangsha: Hunan chubanshe 湖南出版社, 1992), p. 219.

<sup>21</sup> The exact words in Mencius are "*chunqiu, tianzi zhi shi ye*" 春秋, 天子之事也. Yang Bojun, *Mengzi yizhu* 孟子譯注 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1960), vol. 1, 6.9, p. 155.

<sup>22</sup> The emperor's intention was evinced in his later edicts, in which he repeatedly emphasized that his interpretation of the late-Ming history was "perfectly impartial and absolute correct" (*da gong zhi zheng* 大公至正). *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 8, p. 86; pp. 468-469; vol. 10, p. 805; vol. 11, pp. 461-462. Also see *Gaozong*

In a broad sense, the reevaluation could also be viewed as Qianlong's continued effort to win public admiration for his Confucian emperorship. Inspired by his grandfather Kangxi and father Yongzheng, Emperor Qianlong was consciously trying to attain a unity of both political authority and ethical truth in ruling the empire. To prove himself a Confucian emperor who embodied the Confucian tradition of governance and that of the Way, Kangxi had devoted much of his leisure time to the study of Chinese classics and worked very hard to perform his duties according to the Confucian Way. Although Yongzheng could hardly be considered a true believer of Confucianism, he had taken a religious approach to make himself the promoter and defender of Confucian orthodoxy.<sup>23</sup> Comparatively speaking, Qianlong did not have a keen interest in Chinese Classics and metaphysics.<sup>24</sup> In pursuit of a self-image of being a sage-emperor, he turned to the study of history, in which Confucius and Zhu Xi, the Confucian sages, were acknowledged for their remarkable achievements of making it an efficient tool of moral education. The Qianlong governance was indeed a mixture of Confucianism and Legalism.<sup>25</sup> However, the emperor claimed himself a Confucian ruler and

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*Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 21, *juan* 983, Qianlong year 40, month 5, pp. 120-121; *juan* 987, year 40, month 7, p. 177; *juan* 996, year 40, month 11, p. 317; *juan* 1021, year 41, month 11, p. 684; vol. 23, *juan* 1142, year 46, month 10, p. 294, 309, 310 and, *juan* 1168, year 47, month 11, p. 666.

<sup>23</sup> For the discussion of Kangxi's and Yongzheng's approaches to unifying the traditions of governance and the Way, please refer to chapter one of the thesis. Also see Huang Chin-shing, "Qingchu zhengquan yishi xingtai zhi tanjiu: zhengzhi de daotong hua," pp. 97-109; and *Philosophy, Philology and Politics in Eighteenth-century China*, pp. 148-155.

<sup>24</sup> Harold Kahn, *Monarchy in the Emperor's Eyes*, pp. 120-125.

<sup>25</sup> In his study of the *Leshantang quanji* 樂善堂全集, Qianlong's early writings on emperorship, Chun-shu Chang has pointed out that although Qianlong advanced a Confucian way of governance, little of this ideal was put into practice and some of the emperor's rulings even violated what he had postulated. Chang, "Emperorship in



did not hesitate to perform as a Confucian teacher to his subjects. Through his comments on the historical events as well as the figures concerned, he taught his subjects what social order and moral behavior should be. Under this context, the recognition of the heroic and moving deeds of Southern Ming martyrs not only offered the emperor valuable sources for moral education but also helped him show his kindheartedness, which provided strong ground of arguments for the proclamation of his Neo-Confucian rule.

It should be noted that Qianlong's acknowledgement of Southern Ming martyrdom did not imply his departure from the previous Manchu political stance of maintaining the legitimacy of Qing rule from 1644. On the contrary, the edict of 1766 indicates that the emperor had adopted a new tactic in invalidating some Han scholars' arguments that challenged the Manchu proclamation. By emphasizing the self-sacrifice of Southern Ming loyalists who kept their Confucian faith in extreme difficulty, it hinted that the anti-Qing movement was doomed to failure in spite of the wholehearted support of the loyalists. To Qianlong, the fruitless struggle of the loyalists gave strong evidence to support the imperial affirmation that the rise of Manchus was "Heaven's Will."<sup>26</sup> The emperor stood firm in defending

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Eighteenth-Century China," *The Journal of the Institute of Chinese Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong*, 7.2 (1974): 552-557. By comparing the different editions of the *Leshantang quanji*, Gao Xiang affirms that since his enthronement, Qianlong had gradually given up the Confucian ideal of emperorship and in the later part of his reign, legal punishment became an important means to maintain his authority. Gao, *Kang Yong Qian san di tongzhi sixiang yanjiu*, pp. 303-304.

<sup>26</sup> This intention of the emperor was further evinced in his later policy toward Ming literati criticisms of the late-Ming administrative abuses. In 1779 and 1781, Qianlong ordered the compilations of the *Memorials of the Late-Ming* (*Mingji zoushu* 明季奏疏) and *Memorials of prominent officials of the Ming* (*Ming mingchen zouyi* 明名臣奏議). A number of memorials criticizing the late-Ming politics were collected and published. According to the emperor, one of the aims of these works was to make the causes of the

early Qing legitimacy. Although later he had made a small concession to the literati by granting a position to the Hongguang regime in official histories, he had never stopped attacking Prince Fu for his profligacy and condemning the court factionalism of 1644-1645.<sup>27</sup> Furthermore, in his discussion on the historical positions of other Southern Ming regimes, Qianlong had made a deliberate attempt to dissociate their royal lineage from the discourse on legitimate dynastic succession. He argued that from any point of view, Princes Longwu and Yongli did not qualify to be called emperors because their rule was short-lived and confined to certain regions of South China as a result of Qing advances.<sup>28</sup> Therefore, he maintained, there should be no doubt that during the Ming-Qing transition, the Mandate of Heaven was on the Manchu side and the Qing dynasty was the only *zhengtong* regime in the Chinese world.

Stressing the moral aspect of Southern Ming martyrdom, the 1766 edict laid an ideological foundation for the later official approach to the resistance history and signaled the beginning of a new government policy toward the evaluation of Ming-Qing historical figures. After that, an atmosphere for a full-scale official revaluation of late-Ming loyalists was

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Ming demise known to the public. See Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan 中國第一歷史檔案館 comp., *Zuanxiu Siku quanshu dang'an* 纂修四庫全書檔案 (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji chubanshe 上海古籍出版社, 1997), vol. 1, pp. 1005-1007; vol. 2, pp. 1428-1439.

<sup>27</sup> In the edict of 1766, Qianlong insisted on the previous Manchu assertion that the Ming rule ended in 1644. Later, he had made a concession to grant a position the Hongguang regime in the appendixes of the *Yupi lidai tongjian jilan*, allowing it share the legitimacy with the Qing for the period of 1644-1645. Consequently, the date of the Ming collapse was then said to be in 1645, one year longer than that in the official *Ming History*.

Fuheng 傅恒 (d. 1770) et al. comps., *Yupi lidai tongjian jilan*, in *Yingyin Wenyuange siku quanshu*, vol. 339, *juan* 116, p.735.

<sup>28</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 4, pp. 896-897; *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu* in *Qing shilu*, vol.18, Qianlong year 31, month 5, p. 373.

gradually developed. It was in this situation that the project entitled *Records of All Officials [and Subjects] Who Died out of Loyalty to the Fallen Dynasty*, [Authorized by the Emperor [Qianlong] (Qinding shengchao xunjie zhuchen lu)](hereafter cited as *Zhuchen lu*) was initiated in 1776.<sup>29</sup>

### The Initiation of the *Zhuchen Lu* and the Stated Aims of the Project

The initiation of the *Zhuchen lu* was a direct result of the emperor's expressions of approval for Ming martyrs in 1775-1776. On December 17, 1775, nearly a decade after the imperial recognition of the virtues of Southern Ming loyalists, Emperor Qianlong instructed the compilers of the *Yupi lidai tongjian jilan* to add histories of the Longwu and Yongli reigns as appendices of the work.<sup>30</sup> Repeating most of his arguments of 1766, the emperor reaffirmed his post-1766 interpretation of the conquest history. Based on this interpretation, he further ordered that except those who were

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<sup>29</sup> Presently, there are at least two Qianlong editions available. Apart from the cited edition, also see *Yingyin Wenyuange siku quanshu*, vol. 456. There is also a 1792 edition, which is available in the Palace Museum, Taipei. See Gugong bowuyuan 故宮博物院 comp., *Gugong suo cang dianbenshu mu* 故宮所藏殿本書目 (Beiping [Beijing]: Gugong Bowuyuan Tushuguan 故宮博物院圖書館, 1933), *juan* 2, p. 4a; Guoli Gugong bowuyuan 國立故宮博物院 comp., *Guoli gugong bowuyuan shanben jiuji zongmu* 國立故宮博物院善本舊籍總目 (Taipei: Guoli gugong bowuyuan, 1983), vol. 1, p. 308. The Qianlong edition is republished in the *Taiwan wenxian congkan*, no. 132 (Taipei: Taiwan Yinhang 臺灣銀行, 1971), in which *juan* 12 (the *Jingnan* section) is deleted.

<sup>30</sup> According to Qiao Zhizhong, the *Yupi lidai tongjian jilan* was compiled during 1759-1768. Qiao, *Qingchao guanfang shixue yanjiu*, pp. 305-307. The 1768 edition is 116 *juan*. The *Siku* and later editions are 120 *juan* as the Southern Ming narratives are added as appendixes. See Gugong bowuyuan and Liaoning sheng tushuguan comp., *Qingdai neifu ke shu mulu jieti*, pp. 89-90.



members of late-Ming cliques or who had previously taken part in rebellions against the late Ming, the Hongguang, Longwu, and Yongli followers should not be condemned and that their moral deeds also be recorded in the appendices.<sup>31</sup> The edict became a prelude of imperial commendation for Southern Ming martyrdom. On December 31, the emperor issued another edict that openly acknowledged Southern Ming martyrs for their loyalty to their dynasty. In the edict, he announced that honorable posthumous titles would then be granted to those late-Ming officials who died for the Ming cause. In explaining his decision, the emperor said,

To praise and reward loyalists is to promote loyalty. Yet, in the previous dynastic transitions [in Chinese history, the new dynasties] seldom praised the [loyalist] officials of the former regimes. It was our Shizu Zhanghuangdi [Shunzhi Emperor] who bestowed honorable posthumous titles upon the twenty late-Ming martyrs like Fan Jingwen 范景文 [1587-1644] when the [Qing] dynasty was founded... At that time, only this small number of martyrs were [officially] praised because [the government] could solely rely on the hearsay and had no time to conduct comprehensive investigation [into the late-Ming martyrdom]. With the passing of time, many past events became known and final conclusion had been reached. Now, [most deeds of the loyalists] can be found in the *Ming History*. As to the case of Shi Kefa, who insisted on loyalty, propped up the perilous situation and at the end took his own life as a martyr. Others such as Liu Zongzhou and Huang Daozhou, who had the courage to tell the truth in court and did not compromise with villains, gave up their lives for the dynasty in the critical situation. All of them deserved to be regarded as perfect men of the time and should be admired. Many others sacrificed their lives defending their cities, died in battles, or were captured and executed. They faced death without fear ... and discharged their duties faithfully. How can [their loyal deeds] be ignored! These figures should be picked out from the histories [the *Ming Shi* and *Yupi lidai tongjian jilan*] and be

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<sup>31</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 8, pp. 77-78; *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 21, juan 995, Qianlong year 40, intercalary month 10, pp. 300-301.

given posthumous titles as recognition [of their loyalty.]<sup>32</sup>

In addition, despite the precedents that official posthumous titles would only be given to those figures with senior official ranks, the throne ordered the enshrinement of the common people who sacrificed themselves for the fallen dynasty during the Ming-Qing transition.<sup>33</sup> In spite of their not being eligible for receiving any posthumous title, these figures would be enshrined in the temples for loyalists in their home counties for public worship as a kind of commendation. Following the edict, an ad hoc group headed by Shuhede and Yu Minzhong 于敏中 (1714-1780) was established to work on the details. Thus, the imperial policy of commending Southern Ming martyrs was implemented.

Two months later, a third edict was issued, in which the emperor ordered an extension of the official commendation to incorporate those Ming ministers who died in the resistance against the *coup d'état* of Zhu Di 朱棣 (Emperor Yongle 永樂, 1360-1424, r. 1403-1424) in the *Jingnan Incident* (*Jingnan zhi bian* 靖難之變, 1399-1403). In the edict, he stated that although Zhu Di took power in 1403, his enthronement was nothing more than a usurpation and the resistance to him was righteous. To Qianlong, the loyalists' refusal to collaborate with the usurper under the threat of death demonstrated their noble quality and moral courage though some of these martyrs were pedants and their impractical political proposals were partly responsible for the outbreak of the *coup d'état*. Their

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<sup>32</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 8, pp. 86-87; *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 21, *juan* 996, Qianlong year 40, month 11, pp. 316-317.

<sup>33</sup> According to Wang Shizhen 王士禎 (1634-1711), in early Qing, posthumous title would be only granted to senior ministers. See Wang, *Chibei outan* 池北偶談 (Beijing:

martyrdom was the embodiment of the Confucian ideal of ministership — loyalty. The emperor said that he was moved by the deeds of these *Jingnan* victims, who suffered from the calamity of family extermination due to upholding an uncompromising attitude, and regretted to see that their moral deeds were ignored during the Ming time as a result of government suppression. Therefore, he decided to bestow posthumous titles on them so as to honor their conscientious acts of observing the Neo-Confucian teachings of loyalty.<sup>34</sup>

The edict initiating the project of the *Zhuchen lu* was issued on March 27, 1776, in which the ad hoc group submitted their proposed list of titles to be commended to the throne after a three-month investigation into the martyrdom of the *Jingnan* and late-Ming loyalists from the official *Ming History*, *Yupi lidai tongjian jilan*, *Gazetteer of the Great Unified Qing Empire* (*Da Qing yitongzhi* 大清一統志), and local gazetteers.<sup>35</sup> Adopting the proposal, Qianlong resolved to carry out a project to keep a comprehensive record of the Ming martyrdom so as to make the moral courage of these loyalists known to the public and in the future.<sup>36</sup> As a result of the edict, the compilation of the project began.

According to the emperor's proclamation, the motives behind the

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Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1982), vol. 1, *juan* 1, p. 25; *juan* 2, p. 48.

<sup>34</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 8, pp. 128-129; *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 21, *juan* 1000, Qianlong 41, month 1, pp. 385-386; *Qing Gaozong (Qianlong) yuzhi shiwen quanji*, vol. 6, *Yuzhishi siji* 御製詩四集, *juan* 33, pp. 805-806.

<sup>35</sup> *Siku quanshu zongmu* says the project was initiated in 1776 but *Guochao gongshi xubian* says it was 1775. Obviously, the latter mix up the date of commendation with the date of the project. See *Siku quanshu zongmu*, vol. 1, *juan* 58, p. 526; *Guochao gongshi xubian*, *juan* 90, p. 878.

<sup>36</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 8, pp. 142-143; *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 21, *juan* 1002, Qianlong 41, month 2, p. 418.



project were both political and ethical. First, it was intended to glorify the Ming martyrs so as to encourage those who took office to follow suit

in insisting on the principle of loyalty. In addition, it was also believed that the imperial redress for the resistance activists would “foster the cardinal principles and constant virtues” (*fuzhi gangchang* 扶植綱常) to maintain a harmonious social order. Qianlong was confident that the official admiration of their deaths, together with the compilation of the *Zhuchen lu*, would clearly demonstrate his “perfect impartiality and absolute correctness” in examining the conquest history and evaluating the historical figures concerned. He believed that this would also establish an official guideline for the future writing of the history.<sup>37</sup>

To a certain extent, the compilation of the *Zhuchen lu* represented an imperial endorsement of the early-Qing historians’ ethical interpretation of the resistance history as well as a government concession to the popular demand of the Han Chinese literati for an imperial reevaluation of Southern Ming figures. In fact, the emperor adopted in his edicts most of the arguments put forth by the Qing scholars in the previous discourses on loyalty, in particular the ideas of those scholar-officials who had worked for the official *Ming History* project. However, the Qianlong appreciation of Southern Ming loyalists was not a one-sided compromise.

Notwithstanding the concession, the emperor also tried to make use of the policy to reaffirm the Cheng-Zhu Confucian doctrine that absolute submission of ministers to the throne was an indispensable element

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<sup>37</sup> *Qinding shengchao xunjie zhuchen lu*, vol. 1, Qianlong’s preface, pp. 5-9

contributing to the concept of loyalty. While the Qing literati considered those who “did not serve two dynasties” as loyalists, regardless of whether they were martyrs or *yimin*,<sup>38</sup> the emperor, on the contrary, admired only the former and emphasized their embodiment of the principle of “never changing allegiance even unto death” or *you si wu er* 有死無貳.<sup>39</sup> With the aim of directing public opinion, Qianlong, on the one hand, paid respect to the martyrs but, on the other hand, seriously criticized the *yimin* for not giving their lives for the Ming.<sup>40</sup> Obviously, by praising the former and blaming the latter, he attempted to make use of the official activity of commendation as a driving force for promoting absolute loyalism in society.

### The Selection Criteria and Process

The suggested selection criteria of the *Zhuchen lu*, which were subservient to the will of Emperor Qianlong, were recommended by the ad hoc group in its memorial of March 27, 1776.<sup>41</sup> It was proposed that the

<sup>38</sup> Quan Zuwang, *Jieqiting ji*, vol. 2, *waibian*, *juan* 42, p. 1300. Also see Ho Koon-piu, *Sheng yu si: Mingji shidafu de jueze*, pp. 97-124; Zhao Yuan 趙園, “Ming-Qing zhi ji shiren zhi si yiji youguan si de huati” 明清之際士人之死以及有關死的話題, *Xueren* 學人, 6 (Sept. 1994): 113-143; and Zhao, *Ming-Qing zhi ji shidafu yanjiu* 明清之際士大夫研究 (Beijing: Beijing Daxue chubanshe 北京大學出版社, 1999), pp. 23-49.

<sup>39</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 8, pp. 77-78; *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, *juan*, vol. 21, *juan* 995, Qianlong year 40, intercalary month 10, p. 301.

<sup>40</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 8, pp. 86-87; *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, *juan*, vol. 21, *juan* 996, Qianlong year 40, month 11, p. 318.

<sup>41</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 8, pp. 142-143; *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, *juan* vol. 21, *juan* 1002, Qianlong 41, month 2, pp. 417-418; *Qinding shengchao xunjie zhuchen lu*, vol. 1, “memorial,” pp. 15-32.

posthumous titles granted to loyal Ming officials be broadly divided into two categories, the “individual honorable titles” (*zhuan shi* 專謚) and the “general honorable titles” (*tong shi* 通謚) and that the former be granted to those figures that had lofty virtues or profound contributions while the latter to the others. To avoid duplication, it was suggested that martyrs who had already earned their posthumous titles offered by the Ming government before 1644 and the Qing government in 1633 be excluded from the commendation lists.<sup>42</sup> Nonetheless, all of the posthumous titles given by the Southern Ming regimes, which were said to be inappropriate due to factional bias, would be abolished. The deeds of these figures would be carefully reexamined and new titles would be granted accordingly after review.

In order to make the Ming martyrdom known to the public, it was proposed that when an official posthumous title was granted to a commended martyr, the title should be recorded in his memorial tablet, which would be enshrined in the memorial temple for loyalists located in his home county. Two lists of commended martyrs, the *zhuan shi* and *tong shi*, together with brief accounts of their deeds, would be prepared by the Department of Rites and distributed to the provinces and counties concerned. Descendants of the enshrined martyrs were allowed to use this official information to write epitaphs of their ancestors. If the native place of the martyr was unknown, he should be enshrined in the temple of the county he last served. For those junior officers, laymen, the nameless, and female,

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<sup>42</sup> Although it was not mentioned in the memorial, the martyrs who were given posthumous titles during the Shunzhi period were also excluded from the *Zhuchen lu*.



who gave their lives for the fallen dynasty, although no posthumous title would be given, their memorial tablets should also be placed in the temples for public memory and worship.

Observing the instructions of Emperor Qianlong, the ad hoc group suggested that not all former officials who had died for the Ming cause be commended. At least three types of figures should be excluded from the commendation lists: those who had previously associated with the late-Ming cliques; those who had surrendered to other rebels before taking part in the resistance to the Qing; and those who had submitted to the Qing before committing suicide. The ad hoc group argued that these three types of figures could hardly be regarded as loyalists according to a strict standard and it was important that their death could not wipe out the offences or faults they had committed during their careers.

Last but not least, the proposal dealt with the matter of sources. Members of the ad hoc group went through the official *Ming History* and *Yupi lidai tongjian jilan* and came to a conclusion that the government's evaluation of martyrs should be based on the official accounts in these two works. To ensure that all known martyrs were included in the project, the *Daiqing yitong zhi* and local gazetteers were recommended as cross-references. Zhang Ruogui 張若淮 (d. 1787), the Chief Censor, had previously advised the emperor that a half-year and nation-wide investigation into Southern Ming martyrs be conducted but his advice was immediately rejected after discussion. Insisting on the authority of official historiographical works, the ad hoc group argued that the accuracy and

comprehensiveness of the *Ming History* and other proposed official sources were unquestionable. Furthermore, it was believed that the use of private sources would inevitably arouse problems of fraudulent claim. The compilers also worried that a nation-wide investigation would not necessarily bring more information but would surely disturb the daily lives of the people.<sup>43</sup> The compilers' strong objection to Zhang's suggestion is understandable as a large-scale research would bring additional work and might present them with the problem of reading the emperor's mind in the evaluation of historical figures.

It seemed that Emperor Qianlong very much agreed with the ideas of the ad hoc group members. Convinced by their arguments, he adopted the proposal without any amendment. The *Zhuchen lu* project was then carried out.

### The Taxonomy and Contents

As all necessary materials were already collected from the *Ming History* and *Yupi lidai tongjian jilan* before the ad hoc group submitted its proposal to the throne, after the edict of March 27, 1776, it took only about a month to complete the whole project of the *Zhuchen lu*. The short duration of compilation suggested that little time had been spent on further study of collected materials from official histories. Most likely, the major work of the compilers was to verify and edit these materials and then, rearrange them

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<sup>43</sup> *Qinding shengchao xunjie zhuchen lu*, vol. 1, "memorial," pp. 33-38.

in an order of status according to the previously set criteria of *zhuan shi* and *tong shi*. It seemed that Emperor Qianlong was highly satisfied with the product. Receiving the final draft, he granted an imperial preface with a poem to the work.<sup>44</sup>

The martyrdom of 3,717 individuals was recorded in the project and a total number of 1,759 posthumous titles were offered to those historical figures who held office or gentry status in the *Jingnan* Incident or Southern Ming era.<sup>45</sup> Among these former Ming officials, 33 received individual honorable titles and 124 were given a general honorable title of *zhonglie* 忠烈 (loyalty and bravery), 120 *zhongjie* 忠節 (loyalty and integrity), 599 *liemin* 烈愍 (bravery and commiseration) and, 883 *jiemin* 節愍 (integrity and commiseration). Apart from the above figures, a total number of 1,958 junior officers and common people were officially praised without any posthumous title.<sup>46</sup> The details are presented in the following table (Table 1):

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<sup>44</sup> *Qinding shengchao xunjie zhuchen lu*, vol. 1, preface, p. 1-2; *Qing Gaozong (Qianlong) yuzhi shiwen quanji*, vol. 6, *Yuzhishi siji*, juan 35, p. 830.

<sup>45</sup> For a long period of time, there is a misconception that all figures recorded in the *Zhuchen lu* received posthumous titles. For instance, Wu Zhenyu 吳振械 (1792-1871) asserted that three thousand six hundred late-Ming martyrs gained their honorable posthumous titles in the Qianlong commendation. Wu, *Yanjizhai conglu* 養吉齋叢錄 (Beijing: Beijing guji chubanshe 北京古籍出版社, 1983), juan 12, p. 145.

<sup>46</sup> There is miscounting in the *Zhuxhen lu*. In some *juan*, the total number mentioned in the preface does not match with the actual figures recorded. *Siku quanshu zongmu*, and *Qingchao tongzhi* 清朝通志 also give incorrect figures of certain categories. See *Siku quanshu zongmu*, vol. 1, juan 58, p. 526; *Qingchao tongzhi*, in *Shitong* 十通 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji chubanshe 浙江古籍出版社, 1988), juan 53, pp. 7063-7069. The figures employed here are based on my own counting from the *Zhuxhen lu*.



**Table 1**  
**Number of Praised Ming Martyrs\* and**  
**Posthumous titles Granted in *Zhuchen lu***

	Late-Ming Martyr	<i>Jingnan</i> Martyr	Sub-total	Total
<b>Individual title</b>	<u>26</u>	<u>7</u>		<u>33</u>
<b>General title</b>				
<i>Zhonglie</i>	113	11	124	
<i>Zhongjie</i>	107	13	120	
<i>Liemin</i>	574	25	599	
<i>Jiemin</i>	840	43	883	
	<u>1634</u>	<u>92</u>		<u>1726</u>
<b>No title granted</b>				
<b>Junior officer</b>	495	16	511	
<b>Layman</b>	1434	13	1447	
	<u>1929</u>	<u>29</u>		<u>1958</u>
<b>Total</b>	<u>3589</u>	<u>128</u>		<u>3717</u>

Sources: *Qinding shengchao xunjie zhuchen lu*, Qianlong edition.

\* Figures of the attached family members are not included.

The twelve-juan *Zhuchen lu* mainly consists of two sections: the first eleven *juan* of late-Ming martyrs and the last *juan* of *Jingnan* martyrs. The figures in both sections are further subdivided into seven categories according to their given statuses: ministers with individual posthumous titles,

ministers with general posthumous title of *zhonglie*, *zhongjie*, *liemin*, or *jiemin*, and junior officers as well as common people who were enshrined in local temples for loyalists. In the late-Ming section, the spaces of the eleven *juan* are distributed to these seven different categories in the following sequences:

- 1) Individual posthumous title, *juan* 1 (one *juan*);
- 2) General posthumous title of *zhonglie*, *juan* 2 (one *juan*);
- 3) General posthumous title of *zhongjie*, *juan* 3 (one *juan*);
- 4) General posthumous title of *liemin*, *juan* 4-5 (two *juan*);
- 5) General posthumous title of *jiemin*, *juan* 6-8 (three *juan*);
- 6) Enshrined junior officer, *juan* 9 (one *juan*); and
- 7) Enshrined common people, *juan* 10-11 (two *juan*).

All biographical sketches in the *Zhuchen lu* are drafted in a standardized format. For each martyr, there is a brief account of his rank, native place, and deeds of martyrdom, with references to the *Ming History*, *Yupi Lidai tongjian jilan*, *Gazetteer of the Great Unified Qing Empire*, or local gazetteers. If the martyrdom involves his family members, names of the members concerned are also recorded as attachments. For those receiving individual posthumous titles, official remarks praising their virtues, together with the bestowed titles, are attached at the end of their biographical sketches. For example, in the case of He Fengsheng 賀逢聖 [d. 1642], who took his own life in the resistance against the late-Ming rebels and was given an individual posthumous title of *zhongque* 忠愍 (loyalty and honesty), it states:

He Fengsheng, Grand Secretary of the Wenyuan Palace and Chief Minister of the Department of Revenue, was a native of Jiangxia. He

was an honest and loyal official, who retired due to sickness. Captured by Zhang Xianzhong's 張獻忠 [1606-1646] bandits during their occupation of Wuchang in 1642, he refused to surrender. He committed suicide by drowning himself in a lake in his official robes. His wife Madame Wei 危 [then] drowned herself in a pond. His sons Jinming 覲明, Guangming 光明, daughters-in-law, Madame Zeng 曾, Madame Chen 陳, and three grandsons also took their own lives in similar ways. (See *Ming History* and *Yupi lidai tongjian jilan*.) As He Fengsheng was a man of orthodox learning and upright behavior, who sacrificed his life for integrity, an [individual] posthumous title *zhongque* is granted to him.<sup>47</sup>

The sketches for those receiving general posthumous titles and laymen are placed in the *juan* under a title specifying the category they belong to. In most cases, the accounts are extremely brief, usually containing only a paragraph or even a sentence. In the account regarding Liu Shu 劉曙 [d. 1645], who was placed in the list of general posthumous title of *jiemin*, it reads:

Liu Shu was a native of Changzhou, who was appointed Magistrate of Nanchang County after earning a *jinshi* degree. Before he took the post, Nanjing fell [into the hands of the Qing] and he committed suicide. (See *Gazetter of Jiangnan*).<sup>48</sup>

The biographical sketches in each category of the late-Ming section are basically grouped and arranged in sequence according to the histories of martyrdom concerned:

- 1) Martyrdom in the pre-1644 Sino-Manchu conflicts;
- 2) Martyrdom in the 1644 Incident;
- 3) Martyrdom in the Southern Ming resistance movements (Hongguang; Longwu; Lu; and Yongli); and
- 4) Victims who resisted the late-Ming rebellions.

<sup>47</sup> *Qinding shengchao xunjie zhuchen lu*, vol. 1, *juan* 1, p. 49.

<sup>48</sup> *Qinding shengchao xunjie zhuchen lu*, vol. 1, *juan* 6, p. 365.



The distribution of different categories and groups in the late-Ming section and their proportion to the whole figures of the *Zhuchen lu* are summarized as follows (Table 2 & 3):

**Table 2**  
**Distribution of late-Ming Biographical Sketches**  
**in *Zhuchen lu***

	Martyrs with individual title	Martyrs with general title	Martyrs with no granted Title	Total (%)
<b>Pre-1644 Sino-</b>				
<b>Manchu conflicts</b>	<u>10</u>	<u>266</u>	<u>165</u>	<b><u>441</u> (12.3%)</b>
<b>1644 Incident</b>	<u>0</u>	<u>110</u>	<u>175</u>	<b><u>285</u> (7.9%)</b>
<b>Southern Ming Resistance:</b>				
<b>Hongguang</b>	9	91	108	
<b>Longwu</b>	3	109	81	
<b>Lu</b>	1	50	6	
<b>Yongli</b>	3	160	146	
	<u>16</u>	<u>410</u>	<u>341</u>	<b><u>767</u> (21.4%)</b>
<b>Resistance Against Rebellions</b>	<u>0</u>	<u>848</u>	<u>1248</u>	<b><u>2096</u> (58.4%)</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b><u>26</u></b>	<b><u>1634</u></b>	<b><u>1929</u></b>	<b><u>3589</u> (100%)</b>

Sources: *Qinding shengchao xunjie zhuchen lu*, Qianlong edition.

\* Figures of the attached family members are not included.

**Table 3**

**Distribution and Proportion of Late-Ming and *Jingnan***

**Biographical Sketches in *Zhuchen lu***

Type of martyrs	Number	Percentage
Pre-1644 martyrs	441	(11.9%)
Martyrs of the 1644 Incident	285	(7.7%)
Martyrs of the Southern Ming Resistance:	767	(20.6%)
Victims of the resistance against rebellions	2096	(56.4%)
<i>Jingnan</i> martyrs	128	(3.4%)
Total	<u>3717</u>	(100%)

Sources: *Qinding shengchao xunjie zhuchen lu*, Qianlong edition.

The proportion of Southern Ming court martyrs in the late-Ming section is worth noting. Although most of the known martyrs who died loyally for Southern Ming courts are incorporated in the project, they form only one-fifth of the total biographical sketches in the *Zhuchen lu*. As table 2 shows, these 767 cases of anti-Qing activists account for 21.4% of the

total number of sketches for the praised late-Ming loyalists (3,589). Their proportion drops to 20.6% if the 128 cases of the *Jingnan* martyrs are added to the base (Table 3). The official project collects a great number of late-Ming loyalists who never took part in the resistance movements led by Southern Ming princes. In the late-Ming section, the majority (58.4%) of the biographical sketches comes from victims of local resistance against the late-Ming rebellions. The section also includes a certain number of martyrs who died in the pre-1644 Sino-Manchu conflicts and the 1644 Incident, which are 441 (12.3%) and 285 (7.9%) respectively, altogether accounting for 20.2%. The relatively low proportion of post-1644 anti-Qing activists distinguishes the *Zhuchen lu* from late-seventeenth-century private historiography on the biographies of late-Ming martyrs.

Generally speaking, during the late seventeenth century, the private historiographical works in memory of late-Ming martyrs, either by Ming *yimin* or Qing scholars, lay considerable emphasis on Southern Ming martyrdom and therefore, preserve a higher proportion of biographies for the anti-Qing activists of 1644-1662. For instance, in the 12-juan *Collected Records of Righteousness from the Xuejiao Pavilion* (*Xuejiaoting zhengqi ji*) compiled by the *yimin* scholar Gao Yutai, the proportion of post-1644 anti-Qing figures is over 90%. As the work of Gao was influenced by his anti-Qing attitude, except the first *juan*, which is for the martyrs of the 1644 Incident, almost all the *juan* are dedicated to those who died loyally for the Southern Ming regimes against Manchu invasion.<sup>49</sup> Qu Dajun's *Records of the Martyrdom of the Four Imperial Ming Courts* (*Huang Ming sichao*



*chengren lu*) is another valuable reference provided by the Ming *yimin*. In the work of Qu, which records the martyrdom of the Chongzhen, Hongguang, Longwu, and Yongli reigns, 1628-1662, martyrdom of the Southern Ming reigns carries a great weight and the author devotes half of his writings to brief accounts on the deeds of the anti-Qing activists of 1644-1662.<sup>50</sup> Even in the *True Accounts of the Late Ming Martyrs* (*Mingmo zhonglie jishi*), the work of the early-Qing scholar-official Xu Bingyi, there is an equal proportion of biographies of victims of the late-Ming rebellions and martyrs of Southern Ming courts.<sup>51</sup> The dominating proportion of Southern Ming martyrs in these biographical writings clearly indicates the cultural significance of Southern Ming martyrdom in the early-Qing intellectual discourse on loyalty. To Han Chinese, especially the literati, the martyrdom of the resistance activists, in particular those who took part in the movement of 1644-1662, was an embodiment of moral integrity and courage, which were the inseparable parts of Confucian culture.

Unlike Gao, Qu, and Xu, who paid special attention to Southern Ming martyrdom, the compilers of the *Zhuchen lu*, in compliance with the instructions of Emperor Qianlong, placed the focus of official commendation on Ming loyalism in general. This is evinced by the fact that the work deliberately incorporates a huge number of late-Ming victims who died in local resistance against rebellions and consequently reduces the proportion of commended anti-Qing activists. The incorporation of the

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<sup>49</sup> Gao Yutai, *Xuejiaoting zhengqi ji*, juan 2-12, pp. 29-198.

<sup>50</sup> Qu Dajun, *Huang Ming sichao chengren lu*, juan 7-12.

*Jingnan* martyrs further extends the scope of the project from the late-Ming period to the entire Ming dynasty. Undoubtedly, these arrangements are highly related to the imperial policy of promoting Neo-Confucian ideology in the society through a campaign of mass commendation for loyalty. However, to a certain extent, these also reveal the emperor's deliberate attempt to divert public attention from the sensitive history of Manchu invasion and ethnic conflicts of 1644-1662. By incorporating both the *Jingnan* martyrs and local victims who were usually neglected in the previous private writings on late-Ming biographies, the project eventually achieved an intended balance between admiring the Southern Ming martyrs for their moral quality and preventing these anti-Qing figures from gaining dominance in the official commendation.

As a product of official historiography relying heavily upon the sources of the official *Ming History*, the *Zhuchen lu* takes a Qing perspective and adopts a tactful approach to handling the narratives of Southern Ming martyrdom which involved taboos of the Ming-Qing history. Like the *Ming History*, the project in most of its Southern-Ming biographical sketches cautiously avoids mentioning the events concerning the persecutions these historical figures suffered due to their anti-Qing attitude. For instance, in the case of Zhang Huangyan, a martyr of the Lu and Yongli regimes who received a general posthumous title of *zhonglie*, it states:

Zhang Huangyan, Grand Secretary of the East Palace and Chief Minister of the Department of War, was a native of Yin county. At the beginning, Zhang, being a *ju ren*, brought the memorials [of the Zhejiang gentry] to

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<sup>51</sup> Xu Bingyi, *Mingmo zhonglie jishi*, *juan* 12-18, pp. 185-386 and *juan* 20, pp. 417-460.

welcome Prince Lu to Shaoxing as regent and he with his troops, followed [the prince] to flee overseas. Later, Prince Gui [Emperor Yongli] remotely appointed him as Grand Secretary. When [the Yongli court] was quelled in Yunnan, [Zhang] dismissed his troops and lived as a hermit in Xuan'ao. Captured by the [Qing] army, he refused to submit and was killed. (See *Ming History* and *Yupi lidai tongjian jilan*.)<sup>52</sup>

Being a diehard Ming loyalist, Zhang was active in the coastal regions of Zhejiang and Fujian during 1645-1662 and was best known for his northern expedition to Nanjing with Zheng Chenggong in 1659.<sup>53</sup> Available sources indicate that because of Zhang's uncompromising attitude, all members of his family, except his daughter, who had married to the Quan's family of Yin county, were then detained by the Qing government as hostages.<sup>54</sup> A number of his relatives were also implicated in the incident.<sup>55</sup> Zhang's wife and son were jailed for more than ten years and both of them were executed with him in 1664.<sup>56</sup> Of course, these historical facts are deliberately skipped in the *Zhuchen lu*.

In the case of Hou Dongzeng 侯峒曾 (1591-1645), one of the key figures of the Jiading resistance movement, 1645, who was given a general posthumous title of *zhongjie* in the Qianlong commendation, the biographical sketch says:

Hou Dongzeng, Vice Commissioner of the Office of Transmission, was a

<sup>52</sup> *Qinding shengchao xunjie zhuchen lu*, vol. 1, *juan* 2, p. 84.

<sup>53</sup> Zhang recorded the north expedition campaign of 1659 in detail, see *Zhang Cangshui ji*, pp. 192-202.

<sup>54</sup> See my article, "Quan Zuwang zumu Zhang ruren kao" 全祖望族母張孺人考, *Gugong xueshu jikan* 故宮學術季刊, 12.1 (Autumn, 1994): 133-139.

<sup>55</sup> Zhongyan yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo, comp., *Ming-Qing shiliao, wubian* 明清史料, 戊編 (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1959), vol. 1, pp. 15a-16a and Zhang Huangyan, *Zhang Cangshui ji*, pp. 157-160, p. 162.

<sup>56</sup> Huang Zongxi, *Huang Zongxi quanji*, vol. 10, p. 285; Zha Jizuo, *Zuiwei lu, liezhuan*, *juan* 9, p. 1564; and, Quan Zuwang, *Jiqiting ji*, vol. 1, *juan* 9, pp. 117-118.



native of Jiading. When Nanjing fell, he raised an army to defend his own county. Under the fierce attack of [Qing] troops, the defenders were exhausted and the city was captured. Dongzeng and his two sons, Yuanyan 元演 (Xuanyan 玄演) and Yuanjie 元潔 (Xuanjie 玄潔), committed suicide by drowning themselves into a well after visiting their ancestor temple. (See *Ming History* and *Yupi lidai tongjian jilan*.)<sup>57</sup>

According to other reliable sources, when Hou Dongzeng's body was found, Qing soldiers, angered at his desperate struggle, cut his head off and exposed it to the public.<sup>58</sup>

In the biographical sketch of Wang Yi 王翊 (1616-1651), an anti-Qing activist in Zhejiang who was granted a general title of *liemin*, it states:

Wang Yi, Minister of War and Censor-in-chief, was a native of Yuyao. When Prince Lu fled overseas, he raised an army at Siming Mountain. [Wang] was defeated and captured [by Qing troops]. Refusing to submit, he was killed.<sup>59</sup>

Like the sketches of Zhang Huangyan and Hou Dongzeng, it does not mention the case that when Wang was captured, he was shot to death by arrows as a penalty for his resistance.<sup>60</sup> In fact, many martyrs of the resistance movements also suffered from similar savage acts of Qing troops but none of these is told in the project, not to mention the massacres that occurred in the conquered regions during the Ming-Qing transition.<sup>61</sup> In the accounts of Southern Ming loyalists, even the concrete deeds of their resistance to the Qing authorities, which might arouse ethnic hatred, are

<sup>57</sup> *Qinding shengchao xunjie zhuchen lu*, vol. 1, juan 3, p. 125.

<sup>58</sup> *Jiading tucheng jilue* 嘉定屠城紀略, in *Yangzhou shiri ji* 揚州十日記, *Zhongguo lishi yanjiu ziliao congshu* 中國歷史研究資料叢書 (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian 上海書店, 1982), p. 262; *Xuejiaoting zhengqi ji*, vol. 1, juan 2, p. 55; and, Huang Zongxi, *Hongguang shilu chao*, in *Huang Zongxi quanji*, vol. 2, p. 101.

<sup>59</sup> *Qinding shengchao xunjie zhuchen lu*, vol. 1, juan 4, p. 195.

<sup>60</sup> Quan Zuwang, *Jiqiting ji*, vol. 1, waibian, juan 4, p. 692.

intentionally omitted. The compilers carefully skipped events about the Manchu-Han political conflict during the dynastic change and put the emphasis on the martyrs' hard experience that reflected their moral commitment to the fallen dynasty.

Those narratives regarding late-Ming victims who died in the rebellions constitute a sharp contrast to the intentional omissions in the Southern Ming biographical sketches. Notwithstanding the brief accounts, sketches of these victims tend to highlight the deeds reflecting their moral courage, especially their uncompromising attitude and condemnation against the rebels after being captured. The biographical sketches of Yang Chengxiu 楊呈秀 (d. 1634), Cao Tong 曹同 (d. 1635), and Hung Fachen 洪法臣 (d. 1633) provide typical examples:

Yang Chengxiu, Magistrate of Shunqing, was a native of Huayin county.

Having been rated inadequate and dismissed [after nine-years' service], he returned to his home county. When bandits attacked [Huayin] in 1634, he assisted the magistrate in defending the county and was captured after the failure of the resistance. He reviled the rebels and was dismembered...<sup>62</sup>

Cao Tong (or Cao Tongsheng), Magistrate of Xunxi, was a native of Chao county. In 1635, when the city was seized, the bandits asked him for the seal [of magistrate], but he reviled them and refused to hand it over. The bandits beat and Cao to death, smashing his flesh and bones to pulp. (See *Gazetteer of Jiangnan*.)<sup>63</sup>

Hung Fachen was a *bagong* 拔貢 student of You county. In 1633, when the rebel general Zhang Kecheng 張克成 looted [You] with his troops, [Hung] was captured. He reviled the rebels until being killed. (See *Gazetteer of the Great Unified Qing Empire*.)<sup>64</sup>

<sup>61</sup> *Jiading tucheng jilüe*, pp. 260-269 and *Yangzhou shiri ji*, pp. 229-243.

<sup>62</sup> *Qinding shengchao xunjie zhuchen lu*, vol. 1, *juan* 5, p. 226.

<sup>63</sup> *Qinding shengchao xunjie zhuchen lu*, vol. 1, *juan* 7, p. 419.

<sup>64</sup> *Qinding shengchao xunjie zhuchen lu*, vol. 2, *juan* 11, p. 716

Similar accounts can be easily found in the sketches concerning other late-Ming victims. The striking contrast in narratives between these victims and those anti-Qing figures evidently conveyed an important message to the public. In the official memory of late-Ming martyrs and in the Qianlong commendation for Ming martyrdom, the Manchu-Han ethnic conflict, even after a century, was still a taboo that should be forgotten and eliminated from any official record. The *Zhuchen lu* also revealed the imperial policy of handling the history of the Ming-Qing transition. The Qing court was prepared to make some concessions to the Han Chinese on the evaluation of the late-Ming resistance figures, aiming that such a compromise would promote loyalty among its subjects. Nonetheless, any narrative of the issues that might threaten ethnic reconciliation in the empire was forbidden. This was further evinced in the government censorship of the private writings on the conquest history.

### **The Qianlong Commendation and Censorship**

It should be noted that the imperial commendation for the loyalty of late-Ming martyrs did not imply the government's tolerance of their anti-Qing political ideas. On the contrary, the official recognition of their martyrdom was accompanied by a censorship of their writings. Ironically, most of the works of these Ming loyalists could not escape the Qianlong campaign of book banning in the 1770s and 1780s.

The *Zhuchen lu* was compiled during a period of government



censorship of private writings on the history of Ming-Qing transition. As Kent Guy's study indicates, the Qing literary inquisitions were systematized under the name of the *Siku* project during the mid-Qianlong period and reached its zenith in early 1780s.<sup>65</sup> Through a nation-wide campaign of book collection and scrutiny, many "seditious materials," at least about three thousand titles and sixty to seventy thousand volumes, concerning the histories of Manchu origins and Sino-Manchu conflicts were banned and destroyed.<sup>66</sup> Needless to say, the chief purpose of censorship was to suppress anti-Manchu sentiment. This intention was disclosed in the emperor's edict of September 10, 1774:

There are many unofficial histories of the late-Ming with arbitrary praise and blame as well as deviant narratives. Among them, there must be some words offending our (Qing) dynasty. [During the book-collection campaign of the *Siku* project, these works] should be totally banned and destroyed so as to suppress heresies and straighten out people's mind and social customs.<sup>67</sup>

The imperial order of book banning was applied not only to historiographical works but also to individual collections of prose and poetry of late-Ming and early-Qing figures. Usually, when the collected books were suspected of containing seditious elements, they would be carefully scrutinized by provincial officials. The suspect materials would be

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<sup>65</sup> Guy, *The Emperor's Four Treasuries*, pp. 157-200. Also see Huang Aiping, *Siku quanshu zuanxiu yanjiu*, pp. 40-68.

<sup>66</sup> Sun Dianqi 孫殿起 (1894-1958), *Qingdai jinshu zhi jian lu* 清代禁書知見錄 in *Zhongguo xueshu mingzhu, muluxue mingzhu* 中國學術名著, 目錄學名著, Series 1, vol. 4 (Taipei: Shijie shuju 世界書局, 1960), preface, p. 1. Also see Liu Jiaju 劉家駒, "Qing Gaozong zuanxiu *Siku quanshu* yu jinhui shuji" 清高宗纂修四庫全書與禁燬書籍 *Dalu zazhi* 大陸雜誌, 75.2 (Aug. 1987): 5-21; 75.3 (Sept. 1987): 6-18; and, "Zuanxiu *Siku quanshu* de ling yimian" 纂輯四庫全書的另一面, *Gugong wenwu yuekan* 故宮文物月刊, 4.5 (Aug. 1986): 130-136.

submitted to the throne with the officials' investigation reports and recommendations. With reference to the reports and sometimes to his own reading, the emperor would resolve whether these books should be partly or completely banned and destroyed. Although the campaign in fact had very little effect on the survival of books on the history,<sup>68</sup> a number of the written works of the loyalists, including the writings of the praised martyrs, were prohibited from open circulation for decades under the order of massive book banning.<sup>69</sup> The extant sources of the Qing banned books strongly suggest that the granted honor to late-Ming martyrs did not come with the government's blessing to the circulation of their writings on sensitive topics. For instance, Liu Zongzhou, the respected Neo-Confucian scholar of the late-Ming, was considered a perfect man and granted an individual posthumous title of *zhongjie* 忠介 (loyalty and faithfulness) but his published memorials, which consisted of strong anti-Manchu sentiment, were completely banned after scrutiny.<sup>70</sup>

Some of the late-Ming sources with propaganda values received a different treatment. In December 1776, Emperor Qianlong read the memorials of Xiong Tingbi 熊廷弼 (1569 or 1573-1625), the late-Ming

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<sup>67</sup> *Zuanxiu Siku quanshu dang'an*, vol. 1, p. 240.

<sup>68</sup> Struve, "Southern Ming History and Southern Ming Historiography," p. 8 and Timothy Brook, "Censorship in Eighteenth-Century China: A View from the Book Trade," *Canadian Journal of History*, 22 (August 1988): 177-196.

<sup>69</sup> For the details, see Yao Jinyuan 姚覲元 ed., *Qingdai jin hui shumu* 清代禁燬書目 (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan 商務印書館, 1957); Sun Dianqi 孫殿起 (1894-1958), *Qingdai jinshu zhi jian lu* 清代禁書知見錄, in *Zhongguo xueshu mingzhu, muluxue mingzhu* 中國學術名著, 目錄學名著, Series 1, vol. 4. (Taipei: Shijie shuju 世界書局, 1960); and, Lei Mengchen 雷薨辰, *Qingdai gesheng jinshu huikao* 清代各省禁書彙考 (Beijing: Shumu wenxian chubanshe 書目文獻出版社, 1989).

<sup>70</sup> Yao Jinyuan ed., *Qingdai jin hui shumu sizhong*, p. 12.

general of Liaodong who was framed by his political opponents and executed by the Ming court. Moved by Xiong's loyalty to the Ming, he thought that the case of Xiong and the fate of other victims of factionalism, such as Yang Lian 楊漣 (1572-1625), Zuo Guangdou 左光斗 (1575-1625) and Ni Yuanlu 倪元璐 (1594-1644), had amply demonstrated the late-Ming problems of political corruption and fully explained why Heaven's Will shifted from Ming to Qing in 1644. Therefore, he instructed the officials responsible for the book-banning campaign that the works of these victims, especially their criticism on late-Ming maladministration, should not be banned. Of course, those words offending the Manchus were changed or deleted.<sup>71</sup>

In January 1777, two anthologies of late-Ming political writings entitled *Memorials of the Late-Ming Officials* (*Mingmo zhuchen zoushu* 明末諸臣奏疏) and *Records of Popular Views of the Contemporaries* (*Tongshi shanglunlu* 同時尙論錄) were submitted by the officials of Jiangsu with the recommendation that they be destroyed. However, as the emperor decided to make use of late-Ming sources to legitimize the Qing rule, he ordered these two anthologies be edited and rearranged. All sensitive materials, as well as those writings of the collaborators, were deleted from the original editions and the revised editions of both works were released.<sup>72</sup> By commending the late-Ming martyrs but eliminating the

<sup>71</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 8, pp. 468-469 and *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, juan, vol. 21, juan 1021, Qianlong year 41, month 11, pp. 683-685.

<sup>72</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 8, pp. 479-480 and *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, juan, vol. 21, juan 1022, Qianlong year 41, month 12, pp. 693-694. The *Memorials of the late-Ming Officials* was extended to incorporate the memorials of the previous reigns and renamed as *Memorials of the Ming Officials, Authorized by the*



influence of their anti-Manchu sentiment, the Qing house had demonstrated its great effort to reshape the social memory of the Ming-Qing dynastic change. To the rulers, the memory of the late-Ming martyrs was an appreciation of their loyalism, which should not involve any discourse on Manchu-Han ethnic conflicts of the seventeenth century.

In this sense, the compilation of the *Zhuchen lu* is consistent with the Qianlong censorship of writings on the transitional period. If the latter indicates the government restriction of the discourse on the conquest history, then the former, like other official historiographical projects, represents the official perspective of how the history should be told. Obviously, the emperor intended to use these projects as models for future writings on the history of Ming fall and Qing rise.

### The Project as an Imperial Concession to the Han Chinese

In imperial China, granting posthumous titles to the dead was one of the significant rituals employed by the ruler to give moral guidance to the public as to what correct behavior should be.<sup>73</sup> As Emperor Qianlong stated in his edict of 1766, “to praise and reward loyalists was to promote loyalty” in society. In response to a century-long demand of the literati for an official admiration of Southern Ming martyrs, the emperor, in a

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Emperor (*Qinding Ming chen zoushu* 欽定明臣奏疏) in 1781. See *Siku quanshu zongmu*, juan 55, pp. 502-503.

<sup>73</sup> Wang Shoukuan 汪受寬, *shifa yanjiu* 謚法研究 (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji chubanshe 上海古籍出版社, 1995), pp.20-23, 263-266.

period of political stability and economic flourish, found it high time to alter the previous imperial policy and recognize the Confucian virtues of the resistance activists to make the commemoration of these victims a tool for ideological indoctrination. In some senses, the official reinterpretation of the resistance history and the commendation of its martyrs could be regarded as a concession of the Qing house to the Han Chinese. Nevertheless, it was also a deliberate attempt of the emperor to direct the intellectual discourse on the Neo-Confucian ideas of loyalty.

Being a direct product of the Qianlong commendation for the Ming martyrdom, the *Zhuchen lu* clearly reveals Emperor Qianlong's tactics in manipulating the discourse. By singling out martyrs and ignoring *yimin* in the official commendation, the ruler tried to reinforce the idea that absolute submission to the throne was an essential moral quality of being a loyalist. Moreover, through its selection criteria in determining whether a martyr should be praised, the project also taught the public that loyalty, as a virtue, required a lifetime commitment, any violation of which would disqualify a minister from being called a loyalist. In addition, the granted posthumous titles, together with the hierarchical arrangement of the biographical sketches, clearly indicated the imperial standard of moral evaluation, which, according to the emperor, could be applied not only to the historical figures but also to those Qing subjects living in the mid-Qianlong era and in the future generations.

From the imperial perspective, in the memory of the resistance history and in the admiration of its martyrs, not all the matters concerned

were worth commemorating. Therefore, it was the emperor who held the ultimate authority to decide which figures and events should be commended and recorded. Under these presuppositions, Emperor Qianlong, through the taxonomy and narratology of the *Zhuchen lu*, tried to give an official definition of loyalty and make it the imperial principle of “praise and blame,” which, to him, should be adopted as an authoritative guideline for the future writing of the history.

In this sense, if the Qianlong reevaluation of the Southern Ming martyrs was an accomplishment of the Han Chinese literati in winning the compromise of the Qing house with their Confucian ideas, it also cost them a considerable price for such an achievement. In exchange for an imperial concession, they gave tacit consent to the government dominance in the intellectual discourse on Confucian virtues.

#### The Initiation of the Projects and Their Objectives

On January 11, 1717, shortly after the completion of the *Zhuchen lu*, Emperor Qianlong issued an edict ordering the compilation of the *Biographies of Ministers Who Served Two Successive Emperors* and *Twice-Serving Ministers (Erchen zhuan)*. According to the edict, the idea was inspired by his reading of memorials written by the late-Ming ministers, collected in two anthologies entitled the *Memoirs of the Late-Ming Officials* and the *Records of the Regular Views of the Contemporary*. Going through writings of the former Ming ministers, such as Wang Yangming,



#### 4. The Compilation of the *Erchen Zhuan* and *Nichen Zhuan*

The completion of the *Zhuchen lu* in 1776 publicly proclaimed the official recognition of the moral deeds of the Ming loyalists who died in the resistance movement, 1644-1662. The imperial commendation of these martyrs inevitably required the Qing court to review its previous evaluation of the disloyal Ming officials who were praised during the conquest period for their collaboration with the new government. As a result of careful reconsideration, the emperor came to the conclusion that in spite of their contributions to the founding of the Qing dynasty, the Han collaborators should not be forgiven for their violation of the Neo-Confucian principles of loyalty.

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王永吉 (1600-1659), Gong Dingzi, Wu Weiye, Zhang Jinyan 張縉彥 (1631 *jinshi*), Fang Kezhuang 房可壯 (d. 1653), and Ye Chuchun 葉初春 (1628 *jinshi*), who took office under the Qing after 1644, Qianlong severely criticized them for their disloyalty to the previous dynasty and said:

... When our [Qing] dynasty was established, the late-Ming ministers who recognized the reality and surrendered [to us]... were countless in number. To achieve the great unification of the empire, [the government] had no choice but to appoint them to office so as to pacify the people and tell the obedient from those rebels. In an honest retrospection, these [collaborators] were officials of the previous dynasty who failed to sacrifice themselves for their emperor at the crucial time when they were needed. Cravenly clinging to life rather than braving death, they shamelessly surrendered [to the Qing]. None of them could be called perfect men. Even if they had any small service commendable, their faults should not be obscured. Those like Li Jiantai 李建泰 (d. 1650) and Jin Shenghuan 金聲桓 (d. 1649), who rebelled after surrender, and Qian Qianyi, who secretly slandered [the Qing] after his submission, were unreliable and evil, and, therefore, could not be considered as human beings! These [collaborators] did not qualify for [a biography] in the *Ming History*. If the official history of our [Qing] dynasty, considering their small contributions, places their [biographies] with those [of the ministers] with fair reputation, such as Fan Wencheng 范文程 (1597-1666) in the conquest period or Li Guangdi 李光地 (1642-1718) in the peace time, this is unjust in regard to “praise [and blame].” [However,] if [deeds of these collaborators] are not recorded [in history] because they served two dynasties, their faults will not be known. Then, how can [the official history] fulfil its function of keeping a true record of [history]? I think that these men with guilt of misconduct should not be forgiven during their lifetime, even if they had made contributions [to the Qing]. Nor should they be spared from blame after their death out of consideration [for the interests] of their descendants. A section of “twice-serving ministers” should be established in the [official] history to keep a true record of their deeds in both the Ming and our [Qing] dynasties without hiding [their faults]... Officials in the Historiography Bureau are hereby instructed to check the names and deeds [of the “twice-serving ministers”], compile their

biographies, and submit these to me for final approval.<sup>1</sup>

The imperial edict of January 11, 1777 marked the beginning of a two-decade official historiographical project for the compilation of biographies of the early-Qing twice-serving ministers. It was a major enterprise that indicated the Qing house's reevaluation of the Han collaborators who had assisted the Manchus with the conquest of China in the mid-seventeenth century. It was not until the compilation of the *Erchen zhuan* that the political realignment of these collaborators, one that had previously been recognized by the conquerors as an act that accorded to "Heaven's Will," was the subject of a full-scale reassessment by the Qing court.

During the conquest period, a considerable number of former Ming officials were recruited and appointed by the new government.<sup>2</sup> As an important factor contributing to the founding of the new dynasty, their shift of loyalty was openly acknowledged and rewarded by the alien regime.<sup>3</sup> Despite the later avowed state policy of promoting Neo-Confucian principles of loyalty, this did not affect the imperial recognition of the collaborators' collaboration and the policy remained unchanged for decades

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<sup>1</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 8, pp. 479-480 and Qinggui et al. comps., *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 21, *juan* 1022, Qianlong year 41, month 12, pp. 693-694.

<sup>2</sup> For instance, when the Manchu entered Beijing in 1644, most of the former Ming officials were appointed by the new government with promotion. The submitted officials were also encouraged to recommend qualified persons to the new court for appointment. See Batai et al. comps., *Shizu Zhanghuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 3, *juan* 10, Shunzhi year 1, month 5, p. 57, pp. 59-60 and *Shunzhi yuan nian neiwai guanshu zoushu*.

<sup>3</sup> Several cases demonstrated this attitude of the new regime. For instance, when Xu Yifan 徐一范 (d. 1648), a former junior Ming official who submitted himself to the Qing in 1644, gave up his life for the new dynasty in 1648, he received the imperial funeral and one of his sons was offered a place in the Imperial Academy. *Shizu Zhanghuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 3, *juan* 49, Shunzhi year 7, month 6, p. 392.



after the consolidation of Qing rule.<sup>4</sup> Neither Kangxi nor Yongzheng had criticized these former Ming ministers for their disloyalty to the fallen dynasty. In his sixty-one years on the throne, Emperor Kangxi did not hesitate to laud the collaborators who were distinguished in their service to the Qing, regardless of their personal histories.<sup>5</sup> In order to promote loyalty and filial piety in the wider society, on a number of occasions Emperor Yongzheng ordered the enshrinement of Qing loyalists and virtuous officials. In his decrees of 1725, 1729, 1730 and 1732, collaborators like Sun Dingliao 孫定遼 (d. 1647), Hao Xiaozhong 郝效忠 (d. 1651), Liu Liangchen 劉良臣 (d. 1632), and Meng Qiaofang 孟喬芳 (1595-1654), men who had sacrificed or devoted their lives for the new dynasty, were included in the lists of enshrined Qing officials.<sup>6</sup> Even Emperor Qianlong, earlier in his reign, had in 1764 ordered that the collaborator Xu Yifan, an official killed in the resistance against rebellions, be enshrined in the temple for Qing loyalists.<sup>7</sup>

Apart from the case of Xu Yifan, the granting of rewards to the

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<sup>4</sup> Ye Gaoshu, *Xiang Qing Mingjiang yanjiu (1618-1683)* 降清明將研究 (Taipei: Institute of History, National Normal Taiwan University, 1993), pp. 287-288.

<sup>5</sup> Two cases demonstrated Kangxi's attitude toward the collaborators. In 1681 and 1684, he commended Shang Kexi for his loyalty to the Qing during the Three Feudatories Rebellion and openly admired Zhang Yong 張勇 (1616-1684) for his military accomplishments in the northwest frontiers. *Kangxi qijuzhu*, vol. 1, Kangxi year 20, month 9, pp. 747 and vol. 2, Kangxi year 23, month 4, p. 1176.

<sup>6</sup> *Qinding guoshi erchen biao zhuan* 欽定國史貳臣表傳 (archive materials, Guoli gugong bowuyuan 國立故宮博物院 [National Palace Museum], Taipei, no page number), vol. 1, *jia shang* 甲上, "Liu Liangchen," "Sun dingliao," "Hao Xiaozhong," and vol. 2, *jia zhong* 甲中, "Meng Qiaofang." Also see *Qingshi liezhuan*, vol. 20, *juan* 78, p. 6412, 6414, 6424, 6431.

<sup>7</sup> *Qinding guoshi erchen biao zhuan*, vol. 1, *jia shang*, "Xu Yifan;" *Qingshi liezhuan*, vol. 20, *juan* 78, p. 6422.

descendants of Wang Aoyong 王鼐永 (d. 1644), Tian Xiong 田雄 (1663) in 1750, and Xu Yong 徐勇 (d. 1654) in 1767 for the contributions of Wang, Tian, and Xu to the establishment of Qing rule also suggests that in the first half of the Qianlong reign, the emperor did not consider the Ming officials' subjection to the Qing to have been a grave fault.<sup>8</sup> It seems that Qianlong only gradually formulated a rationale for condemning Han collaborators in the late 1760s and early 1770s, a time during which he reconsidered the previous imperial interpretations of the history of the resistance movement. When the court decided to commend late-Ming martyrs for their loyalty to the defunct dynasty in 1766, imperial approval of collaboration became problematic and required reconsideration. Therefore, when the *Zhuchen lu* was compiled in 1776, the emperor came to the conclusion that the early Qing attitude toward the collaborators should be revised and it was in these circumstances that the project of *Erchen zhuan* was initiated.

The *Erchen zhuan*, together with the *Zhuchen lu*, constitutes the body of Qianlong-period historiography in regard to the reevaluations of these late-Ming and early-Qing figures. These works were ostensibly ethical tracts that would apportion "praise and blame" for the officials' deeds; furthermore, they were to serve a political purpose of ideological indoctrination. According to the emperor's term, both works were to be employed to "foster forever the cardinal principles and constant virtues

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<sup>8</sup> *Qinding guoshi erchen biao zhuan*, vol. 1, *jia shang*, "Wang Aoyong," "Xu Yong," vol. 3, *jia xia* 甲下, "Tian Xiong;" *Qingshi liezhuan*, vol. 20, *juan* 78, p. 6420, 6424, 6520.

among ministers” (*wei wanshi chenzi zhi gongchang* 爲萬世臣子植綱常).<sup>9</sup>

Both the history and purpose of the two books were closely interrelated.

The *Erchen zhuan* was concerned to condemn disloyalty; while *Zhuchen lu* celebrated loyalty.

In fact, the emperor’s idea to use history as an effective means to warn his ministers against any misconduct can be traced back to 1765 when he read the official biographies of early-Qing ministers compiled by the Historiography Bureau during the Kangxi and Yongzheng periods.<sup>10</sup> The subjects of these biographies were important ministers who had made significant contributions to the Qing dynasty.<sup>11</sup> In the imperial edicts of August 9 and October 29, 1765, Qianlong criticized these official biographies of Qing ministers for extolling the merits of their subjects without mentioning their faults. He argued that this practice palpably violated the basic principles of historiography, which he deemed to be an emphasis on objectivity and accuracy. To improve the quality of the

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<sup>9</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 8, p. 480 and *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 21, *juan* 1022, Qianlong year 41, month 12, p. 694.

<sup>10</sup> According to Kanda Nobuo 神田信夫, the Qing Historiography Bureau was first established as a temporary institute in 1636 and reestablished during the Kangxi and Yongzheng periods for the purpose of compiling the histories of previous reigns. It was not until 1765 that the Bureau became a permanent government institution. See Kanda, “Shinchō no kokushi retsuden to jishinden” 清朝の國史列傳と貳臣傳, in *Tōhō Gakkai sōritsu nijūgo shūnen kinen tohōgaku ronshū* 東方學會創立二十五周年紀念東方學論集 (Tokyo: Toho Gakkai 東方學會, 1972), pp. 272-280. Also see Zhuang Jifa, “Qingdai guoshiguan de zhuanji ziliao ji liezhuan de bianzuan” 清代國史館的傳記資料及列傳的編纂, in *Qingdai shiliao lunshu* 清代史料論述, Vol. 2 (Taipei: Wenshizhe chubanshe 文史哲出版社, 1980), pp. 151-192; Wang Zhonghan, “Qing guoshiguan yu Qingshi liezhuan” 清國史館與清史列傳, in *Qingshi xinkao*, pp. 257-278; and, Qiao Zhizhong, *Qingchao guanfang shixue yanjiu*, pp. 27-61.

<sup>11</sup> See Zhaolian, *Xiaoting xulu* 嘯亭續錄, in *Xiaoting zalu*, 嘯亭雜錄, *juan* 1, pp. 399-400 and Oretai et al. comps., *Baqi tongzhi (chujī)* 八旗通志 (初集) (Jilin: Dongbei shifan daxue chubanshe 東北師範大學出版社, 1985), *fanli*, p. 5.



official works, Qianlong ordered the reestablishment of the Historiography Bureau so that not only the biographies in question could be rewritten, but also the project was extended to incorporate all high-ranking Manchu and Han ministers of the previous reigns. At the same time, special instructions concerning the contents and arrangement of entries for the new biographies were given to the Bureau. Basically, Qianlong now required that in each biography all the achievements and faults of the figure concerned had to be accurately listed in detail. When each biography was completed, it was to be submitted to the throne for final approval.<sup>12</sup>

These imperial instructions of 1765, which led to a full-scale review of previous official Qing biographies, had two significant historical implications for the development of official historiography in the Qianlong reign. In the first place, by monopolizing the authority to officially appraise past events and historical figures, the emperor made himself the ultimate judge of history.<sup>13</sup> Secondly, through these acts of "praise and blame," official historiography then became a tool for posthumous reward and punishment that the court could employ in regard to its subjects. In this sense, the imperial prerogative of rewarding or punishing a minister was no longer just restricted to his lifetime, but extended to his posthumous "career" as well. This was evinced, for example, in the emperor's handling of the composition of the official biographies of Mingju and Wang Hongxu.

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<sup>12</sup> *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 18, *juan* 739, Qianlong year 30, month 6, pp. 138-140, *juan* 744, month 9, pp. 192-193 and *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 4, pp. 718-719.

<sup>13</sup> Ho Koon-piu, "Lun Qing Gaozong ziwo chuixu de lishi panguan xingxiang," pp. 146-182.

Grand Secretaries of the Kangxi period, both men were impeached by the censor Guo Xiu 郭琇 (1638-1715) in 1688 and 1689 respectively. As a result of this impeachment, Mingju was demoted and Wang dismissed from office.<sup>14</sup> Pre-Qianlong-reign official biographies, however, did not cite details of their demotion and dismissal. Obviously, Qianlong disagreed with these omissions. In his imperial edicts of 1772 and 1775, he ordered Guo's memorials regarding the original cases to be incorporated in the official biographies of Mingju and Wang in full so as to inform to the public and later generations of the faults of these two former ministers. Taking the new arrangement as a posthumous punishment of the above figures, Qianlong also believed that these cases would serve as a warning to those currently in office against committing similar crimes.<sup>15</sup> Pursuing this logic, the principle of "praise and blame" was now also applied to the *Erchen* project.

When the *Erchen zhuan* was initiated in 1777, the emperor's evolving historical approach explained why for some time the contents and arrangement of the materials could not be finalized. On March 22, 1778, Emperor Qianlong issued a new edict to the Historiography Bureau detailing new instructions regarding the compilation of the work. He ordered that

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<sup>14</sup> For Guo's memorials regarding the impeachment of Mingju and Wang, see *Qingshi liezhuan*, vol. 2, *juan* 8, pp. 531-532 and vol. 3, *juan* 10, 690-691. Also see Fang Chao-ying, "Mingju," in *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912)*, vol. 2, pp. 576-578; Tu Lien-che "Wang Hung-hsü," *ibid.*, p. 826; He Lingxiu, "Mingju," in *Qingdai renwu zhuangao, shangbian*, vol. 6, pp. 35-47; and, Huang Aiping, "Wang Hongxu," *op. cit.*, vol. 8, pp. 164-169.

<sup>15</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 7, pp. 192-193, 196-197 and *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 20, *juan* 919, Qianlong year 37, month 10, pp. 327-328; vol. 21, *juan* 979, Qianlong year 40, month 3, pp. 73-74.

the *Erchen zhuan* was now to be divided into two categories, A and B (*jia* 甲 and *yi* 乙). Category A was for the early-Qing collaborators who had wholeheartedly supported the new government and made acknowledged contributions to the founding of the new dynasty after their submission. Category B was for those “inferior men” (*xiaoren* 小人), who had made only minor contributions, served the Qing without particular devotion, or who had previously taken office under the rebellious regime founded by the bandits before turning to the Qing. Chief officials in the Historiography Bureau were instructed to conduct a careful investigation of the personal dossiers of all collaborators and placed their biographies in Category A or B according to their conduct and service to the new court. Of course, as indelible stains in their lives, histories of their activities under the former dynasty, now construed as shameful, were not to be omitted either. The emperor’s written decision came with a moral explication of his approach. As he explained in the edict:

... I decided to [condemn disloyalty] not only to encourage ministers to observe the ethical code and foster the Confucian cardinal principles and constant virtues [ in society ] but also to remind [the future Qing] emperors of the foundations of the [Qing] dynasty and what [they should do] for the protection of their patrimony. Of course, there were capable ministers among these collaborators, and if the later Ming emperors could have maintained the authority [as passed on from their ancestors], these ministers would have assisted them in maintaining the succession of the dynasty and in turn be talents for the service of the country. Therefore, if an emperor is good at maintaining authority, there would be no twice-serving ministers...<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 22, *juan* 1051, Qianlong year 43, month 2, p. 51



Notwithstanding the above political-moral arguments, this new categorization applied in the *Erchen zhuan* revealed Qianlong's personal detestation of the collaborators who had served the new court without any real loyalty. A case in point was Qian Qianyi, a minister who even harbored anti-Qing sentiment and took a pro-Ming perspective in his post-1644 writings on the Ming-Qing transition.<sup>17</sup>

Qianlong's intense antipathy toward Qian Qianyi was first evinced in 1761, when he criticized Shen Deqian 沈德潛 (1673-1769), the compiler of the *Anthology of Poetry of the [Qing] Dynasty* (*Guochao shi biecai* 國朝詩別裁), for listing Qian's poems as the foremost works in the anthology and commenting on Qian with undisguised admiration.<sup>18</sup> It seems that the emperor was highly dissatisfied with the situation that Qian, a disloyal official of the former dynasty, still enjoyed a posthumous reputation for his literary talent among the Han literati. Arguing from a moral perspective, he advanced the opinion:

Those who lived in our [Qing] dynasty and still foolishly yearned for the former [Ming] dynasty were rebels. This is explicit in the law. [Qian] was a senior official of the Ming who voluntarily surrendered himself to us. Due to a consideration of expediency during the conquest period, [he was] not expelled [by the Qing court], yet he could not be regarded as a human being! Others may think as they will of his poems but I will not allow

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<sup>17</sup> For Qian's post-1644 anti-Qing ideas, see Qian, *Muzhai youxue ji* 牧齋有學集 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe 上海古籍出版社, 1996), vol. 2, *juan* 12, p. 574 and vol. 3, *juan* 49, p. 1587.

<sup>18</sup> In the "explanatory preface," Shen emphasizes the moral function of poetry and affirms that moral education is the main purpose of the anthology. These usual clichés provided Qianlong an excuse against Shen's selection of Qian's poems, which, to the emperor, defeated the purpose of the anthology. See Shen, *Qing shi biecai* (originally entitled as *Guochao shi biecai*) (1760 edition, repr. Hong Kong: Zhonghua shuchu 中華書局, 1977), *fanli*, pp. 3-5

them to be selected and placed in the preeminent position among the poetry of our [Qing] dynasty... What is poetry? It is but [an expression] of loyalty and filial piety. Anything divorced from loyalty and filial piety cannot be called poetry!<sup>19</sup>

The available sources indicate that in spite of his condemnation of Qian, until 1769 at least Qianlong had paid little attention to Qian as well as Qian's writings and it was only in 1769 that he systematically read Qian's *Collected Early Learning of Muzhai* (*Muzhai chuxue ji* 牧齋初學集) and *Collected learning of Muzhai* (*Muzhai youxue ji*).<sup>20</sup> Enraged at the egregious expression of anti-Qing sentiment, the emperor ordered a total ban on all Qian's works.<sup>21</sup> That same year, the ban was further extended to include the quotation or citation of Qian's works in the writings of other authors.<sup>22</sup> To a certain extent, the establishment of Category B in the *Erchen zhuan* 1778, can be viewed as an imperial revenge on those collaborators like Qian who harbored a disloyalty to the new dynasty following their subjection.<sup>23</sup> By announcing an official condemnation of these "twice-serving ministers" in Category B, the project attempted to deny

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<sup>19</sup> *Qing gaozong (Qianlong) yuzhi shiwen quanji*, vol. 10, *Yuzhiwen chuji*, juan 12, p.414-415.

<sup>20</sup> *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 19, juan 836, Qianlong year 34, month 6, p. 155-156.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.* Also see Yao Jinyuan ed., *Qingdai jin hui shumu*, p. 12, 56, 65, 58,90, 118, 218, 219, 251, 289, 322, 336; Sun Dianqi, *Qingdai jinshu zhi jian lu*, p. 68, 69, 77, 105, 156, 157; and, Lei Mengchen, *Qingdai gesheng jinshu huikao*, p. 116, 222.

<sup>22</sup> *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 19, juan 848, Qianlong year 34, month 12, p. 356. Also see Zhuang Jifa, "Qing Gaozong jinhui Qian Qianyi zhushu kao" 清高宗禁燬錢謙益著述考, *Dalu zazhi* 大陸雜誌, 7.5 (Nov. 1973): 22-30 and Jian Xiujuan 簡秀娟, *Qian Qianyi cangshu yanjiu* 錢謙益藏書研究 (Taibei: Hanmei tushu gongsi 漢美圖書公司, 1991), pp. 97-106.

<sup>23</sup> Sun Zhentao 孫甄陶 even goes so far as to argue that the compilation of the *Erchen zhuan* was Qianlong's revenge on Qian Qianyi. See Sun, "Qingshi Erchen zhuan ji Qingchu zhengju" 清史貳臣傳及清初政局, in *Qingshi shulun* 清史述論 (Hong Kong: Yazhou chubanshe 亞洲出版社, 1957), pp. 3-5.

totally their historical position in the history of the Ming-Qing transition and eliminate their influence on the Qing literati.

Qianlong's condemnation of disloyalty also led to the compilation of another work dealing with the history of the early reigns of the dynasty. This was the *Biographies of the Traitors* (*Nichen zhuan*). In 1783, five years after the establishment of Category B in the *Erchen zhuan*, the emperor's attention was drawn to those historical figures of the Three Feudatories Rebellion, 1673-1681 as he found that a number of the rebellious officials came from the *erchen*. From the viewpoint of the Qing house, the three feudatories and their followers were rebels guilty of high treason.<sup>24</sup> According to the Qing precedent, no biography of these traitors would be permitted in the official history of the dynasty.<sup>25</sup> Qianlong, however, did not agree with this precedent. In the edict of November 19, 1783, he said:

The compilation of the [Qing] official history is aimed at commending virtue and exposing vice as well as making the truth known both at the present and in the future... The *Erchen zhuan*, which I instructed [the Historiography Bureau] to divide into categories A and B, is a new type of biography established to foster the [Confucian] cardinal principles and constant virtues. This work should be separated [from other sections of biographies in the official history] so as to transmit the true Way for the

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<sup>24</sup> In the Qing law, rebellion was one of the serious crimes listed in the "Ten Abominations" (*shi'e* 十惡). See Shen zhiqi 沈之奇, *Da Qing lüli jizhu* 大清律例輯註 (1746 edition, repr. in *Beijing Daxue Tushuguan cang shanben congshu, Ming-Qing shiliao congbian* 北京大學圖書館藏善本叢書·明清史料叢編, Beijing: Beijing Daxue chubanshe 北京大學出版社, 1993), vol. 1, *juan* 1, pp. 13-14. For the discussion of the Qing law regarding disloyalty, see Paul H. Ch'en, "Disloyalty to the State in Late Imperial China," in *State and Law in East Asia: Festschrift Karl Büniger*, Dieter Eikemeier and Herbert Franke eds. (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1981), pp. 159-183.

<sup>25</sup> *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 18, *juan* 739, Qianlong year 30, month



good of the world and the human heart. As for those rebellious ministers like Wu Sangui, the facts about their crimes should be clearly stated and [their biographies] be placed in another section [of the official history].<sup>26</sup>

It was this 1783 edict that made biographies of the rebellious Qing officials part of Qianlong-reign historiography. Despite the plan to establish a new section in the official history for the rebellious officials, it was not until 1790 that the official title *Nichen zhuan* was confirmed. On January 23, 1790, an edict regarding the project was issued. It stated that the *Nichen zhuan* should be compiled in order to condemn the traitors and make their crimes known to the public.<sup>27</sup> In other words, this was a posthumous punishment of the imperial house upon traitors to the Qing dynasty.

### The Compilation Process, Selection Criteria and Taxonomy

Although the *Erchen zhuan* was initiated in 1777, some of its biographies were compiled before this. A biography of Hong Chengchou, for example, had been submitted to the throne as early as 1766.<sup>28</sup> This suggests that some biographies of the collaborators were compiled immediately after the reestablishment of the Historiography Bureau in 1765. When the 1777 edict was issued, they were sorted out by the Bureau and

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6, pp. 138-139.

<sup>26</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 11, p. 855 and *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 23, *juan* 1191, Qianlong year 48, month 10, pp. 928-929.

<sup>27</sup> *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 25, *juan* 1344, Qianlong year 54, month 12, pp. 1224-1225.

<sup>28</sup> *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 18, *juan* 761, Qianlong year 31, month 5, p. 373.

transferred to the newly-initiated project.

Compared with the *Zhuchen lu*, which was completed within about a month, the progress of the *Erchen* and *Nichen* projects were inordinately slow.<sup>29</sup> The compilation of both the *Erchen zhuan* and the *Nichen zhuan* came under the auspices of the Historiography Bureau, which was also responsible for the biographical projects on the early-Qing ministers. Unfortunately, most of the works being processed by the Bureau were far behind schedule and, since its reestablishment, only a few biographies had been done. In 1781, Emperor Qianlong openly expressed his dissatisfaction with the slow progress on the assigned projects and instructed the Bureau to accelerate its pace. As a result, a new production schedule was drawn up and the Bureau was required to submit its drafts every twenty days so that all the historiographical projects in hand would be completed within five years.<sup>30</sup> In spite of this imperial order, the compilers still failed to meet their target and little improvement was made in the following years. In 1792, officials in the Bureau were punished for their inefficient performance.<sup>31</sup>

The completion date of the *Erchen* and *Nichen* projects is not clearly stated in dynastic records, but there is a clue in the *Qinding guoshi erchen biao zhuan*, the final version of the *Erchen zhuan*, about the end of

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<sup>29</sup> Kanda Nobuo, "Shinchō no kokushi retsuden to jishinden," p. 7 and Zhuang Jifa, "Qingdai guoshiguan de zhuanji ziliao ji liezhuan de bianzuan," pp. 154-155.

<sup>30</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 10, p. 805 and *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 23, *juan* 1142, Qianlong year 46, month 10, pp. 293-294.

<sup>31</sup> *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 26, *juan* 1412, p. 993, Qianlong year 57, month 9.

this process. According to the “Compilers’ Notes” in this work, the project was completed “one hundred fifty years after the founding of the dynasty,”<sup>32</sup> in other words, some time around 1794, shortly before the end of the Qianlong reign. The *Nichen zhuan*, a project derived from the *Erchen zhuan*, was compiled during the same period and it was most probably that it too was completed in the same year.<sup>33</sup>

Detailed information about the compilation process of the *Erchen* and *Nichen* projects is not available but we can speculate on the basis of available evidence it was Qianlong’s constant vacillations on the subject and this class of biographies that were partially responsible for the Bureau’s tardiness. During the compilation, apart from changing his mind regarding the issue of categorization, the emperor also wavered in determining whether some controversial figures should be incorporated in the project at all. For instance, in 1789, twelve years after the initiation of the *Erchen zhuan*, Emperor Qianlong advanced the opinion that those twice-serving ministers who had worked for the rebels during the transitional period and “inferior men” like Feng Quan 馮銓 (1595-1672), Gong Dingzi, and Qian Qianyi, were not qualified to have any place in the official history and their biographies should be withdrawn from the *Erchen zhuan*. As a way of

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<sup>32</sup> *Qinding guoshi erchen biao zhuan*, “Compilers’ Notes.”

<sup>33</sup> In the *Qingshi Nichen zhuan* 清史逆臣傳, there is a volume of biography of Cao Lun 曹綸 (d. 1813), a Company Commander of Eight Banners in the Jiaqing reign (1796-1820). Obviously the volume was compiled in the Jiaqing period and subsequently added into the *Qingshi Nichen zhuan*. The handwriting and page margin of this volume are different from other volumes done in the Qianlong period. In addition, Cao’s biography is not found in *Qinding guoshi nichen zhuan* 欽定國史逆臣傳, the manuscripts which are believed to be the Qianlong final version of the work. See the *Qingshi Nichen zhuan* and *Qinding guoshi nichen zhuan* (archive materials, Guoli gugong bowuyuan, Taipei).



condemning them, their names, together with their precise faults given in point form, were now to be recorded in an attached table.<sup>34</sup> Six months later, however, Qianlong again suddenly changed his mind and thought that if no biography was compiled for these figures, their evil deeds would not be known in detail and their faults could not be fully exposed. Therefore, his previous order was countermanded.<sup>35</sup> It is understandable that as Qianlong changed his mind about the way to handle the biographies of the early-Qing collaborators from time to time, officials in the Historiography Bureau would find it extremely difficult to read his mind and proceed with their work. The compilers' hesitation about fickle imperial intentions would certainly have hindered the progress of their work.

Qianlong's decision regarding the biography of Zhang Yuanxi may further reflect his unpredictable ideas about the selection criteria for the *Erchen* project. Zhang was a Ming *jinshi* of 1643 who began his official career in the Qing and was promoted to Governor-general of Zhili, Shandong, and Henan in 1657.<sup>36</sup> Insulted by Maleji, a Manchu Hanlin Bachelor, he committed suicide in 1658.<sup>37</sup> During the compilation of the *Erchen zhuan*, the Historiography Bureau originally incorporated Zhang's biography in category B. In 1791, Qianlong read the *Veritable Records of the Shunzhi Reign* and was attracted by the case of Zhang. As a result, he

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<sup>34</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 14, pp. 967-968 and *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 25, *juan* 1332, Qianlong year 54, month 6, pp. 1031-1032.

<sup>35</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 15, 348-9 and *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 25, *juan* 1344, Qianlong year 54, month 12, pp. 1224-1225.

<sup>36</sup> Zhu Baojiong and Xie Peilin, *Ming-Qing jinshi timing beilu suoyin*, vol. 3, p. 2624 and *Qingshi gao*, vol. 24, *juan* 197, pp. 7077-7078.

<sup>37</sup> *Shizu Zhanghuangdi shilu*, *juan* 117, Shunzhi year 15, month 5, p. 909; *juan* 118, month

re-read Zhang's biography. Bitterly denouncing Maleji for victimizing his Han Chinese colleagues and restating the imperial policy of equal treatment between the Manchus and Han Chinese, the emperor now criticized the Director-generals of the Bureau for their bias toward Zhang. He thought that it was a mistake in principle to consider Zhang a twice-serving official. The imperial edict pointed out:

Zhang Yuanxi served the [Qing] dynasty without misdeed. Despite being a Hanlin bachelor of the Ming, [he] had not been appointed any official position [in the Ming,] and thus different from those prominent Ming ministers who shamelessly realigned [with the new dynasty]. [Therefore, Zhang] should not be incorporated in the *Erchen zhuan*, let alone in Category B.<sup>38</sup>

Pursuing this same logic, Qianlong then instructed the Historiography Bureau to crosscheck the compiled biographies of twice-serving ministers. For those Ming degree-holders in the Qing court, if they had never taken any government position during the Ming, their services in the Qing were not to be regarded as a betrayal of the earlier dynasty. It was now decreed that any misjudgment upon these figures should be corrected and their biographies withdrawn from the *Erchen* project.

The edict of 1791 formulated Emperor Qianlong's definition of *erchen* and made it clear that the imperial condemnation of disloyalty was only confined to the former Ming ministers who took office under Qing rule and did not apply to those Ming degree-holders whose first official appointments were under the new government. The emperor's resolution

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6, pp. 920-921; and, *juan* 119, month 7, p. 925.

<sup>38</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 16, p. 214 and *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing*

of these selection criteria for the *Erchen zhuan* also demonstrated a close resemblance regarding the definition of loyalty and disloyalty between the imperial view and the shared perspective of the educated Han Chinese.

Both of them emphasized, in Quan Zuwang's words, "not serving two dynasties."<sup>39</sup> To what extent the emperor's decision was influenced by public opinion may never be known, however, to a certain extent, the resolution of 1791 can be considered a tacit acceptance by the Qing house of its shared perspective of the conquest history with the Han literati in eighteenth-century China.<sup>40</sup>

When the two biographical projects were completed in 1794, 144 biographies, together with 23 sub-biographies, of the *erchen* and *nichen* had been compiled. As the *Erchen zhuan* had excluded the collaborators of low ranks from the Ming, the incorporated figures of the two projects only account for a small proportion of the total number of the surrendered Ming officials.<sup>41</sup> For example, Sun Degong 孫得功 Zu Dashou 祖大壽 (d. 1656), and Zuo Menggeng 左夢庚 (d. 1654) surrendered themselves to the Qing along with their subordinates but most of their underlings were excluded from the *Erchen* project.<sup>42</sup> The work also excluded Shi Lang, a former subordinate of Zheng Chenggong who played an important role in the Qing conquest of Taiwan. Moreover, after the subjugation of Taiwan

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*shilu*, vol. 26, *juan* 1375, Qianlong year 56, month 3, pp. 460-461.

<sup>39</sup> For the discussion on the shared Qing perspective of loyalty, see chapter three of this thesis.

<sup>40</sup> For the shared Qing perspective, see the earlier discussion in chapter 2.

<sup>41</sup> According to the preface of the *Qinding guoshi erchen biao zhuan*, only those former Ming officials with high rank and significant standing were qualified for a place in the project.



in 1683, the descendants of Zheng were appointed to government positions in the Qing court. Their deeds were mentioned in the biography of the *nichen* Zheng Zhilong 鄭芝龍 (1604-1661), but none of them was given a place in the *Erchen zhuan*.<sup>43</sup> From an analysis of the contents of the two works and our study of the 125 *erchen* and 42 *nichen*, the following table (Table 4) can be deduced:

Table 4  
Allocation of biographies in the *Erchen zhuan*  
and *Nichen zhuan*

Categories	Biographies	Sub-biographies	Total
<i>Erchen zhuan</i> , A	51	3	54
<i>Erchen zhuan</i> , B	69	2	71
<i>Nichen zhuan</i>	24	18	42
Total	144	23	<u>167</u>

Sources: *Qinding guoshi erchen biao zhuan* and *Qinding guoshi nichen zhuan*<sup>44</sup>

<sup>42</sup> Sun Zhentao, “Qingshi Erchen zhuan ji Qingchu zhengju,” in *Qingshi shulun*, p. 15.

<sup>43</sup> Ye Gaoshu suggests that this is because Qianlong regarded the Zheng descendants Qing pirates in the coastal regions rather than Ming subjects. See Ye, *Xiang Qing Mingjiang yanjiu (1618-1683)*, p. 3.

<sup>44</sup> The figures are based on a tabulation of the final version of *Qinding guoshi erchen biao zhuan* and *Qinding guoshi nichen zhuan*. In the *Man-Han mingchen zhuan* 滿漢名臣傳 (Guoshiguan 國史館 comp., Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe 黑龍江人民出版社, 1991) and *Qingshi liezhuan*, the biography of Cao Lun, a Jiaqing figure, is also incorporated.

In addition to the above categorization, both Categories A and B of the *Erchen zhuan* are subdivided into three hierarchical sections: the upper, middle, and lower sections. The selection criteria of each section are clearly stated in the “Compilers’ Notes” and the “Table of *Erchen*” of the work:

[The *Erchen zhuan*] is divided into two categories, A and B, each containing three sections. Those [twice-serving ministers] who joined the [Qing] dynasty and died for the empire are placed in the upper section of Category A, ... those [who served the Qing] in an exemplary manner in the middle, ... and those [who discharged their duties] with honor in the lower... Those [twice-serving ministers] who made no contribution are placed in the upper section of Category B, ... those who later committed crimes in the middle, ... and those who served as bandits or began as bandits in the lower.<sup>45</sup>

The incorporated biographies of the *erchen* are arranged in six volumes in the order of rank based on the aforementioned criteria. In Category A, 9 biographies are placed in the upper section, 10 in the middle, and 32 in the lower. The numbers of biographies in the three sections of Category B are 23, 18, and 28 respectively. As a summary of the imperial evaluations, a “Table of *Erchen*,” indicating the official ranking of each incorporated figure, is placed at the beginning of the first volume of the work.<sup>46</sup>

The twenty-three sub-biographies of *erchen* and *nichen* mainly come from the minor historical figures of the Ming-Qing transition. Brief narratives of their deeds are attached to the biographies of their relatives or

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<sup>45</sup> *Qinding guoshi erchen biao zhuan*, vol. 1, “Compilers’ Notes.”

<sup>46</sup> *Qinding guoshi erchen biao zhuan*, vol. 1, “Table of twice-serving minister.” Also see *Qinding guoshi er-ni chen zhuan mulu* 欽定國史貳逆臣傳目錄 (archive materials, Guoli gugong bowuyuan, Taipei), no page number.

colleagues. For instance, the sub-biographies of Liu Zehong 劉澤洪 (d. 1695), Zu Zepu 祖澤溥 (d. 1661), Zhang Tianfu 張天福 (d. 1667), and Zhang Duan 張端 (d. 1654) are placed at the end of the biographies of their fathers or brothers.<sup>47</sup> Sub-biographies of other six rebels, Yang Yuming 楊遇明, Yang Baoyin 楊寶蔭, Yang Fu 楊富 (d. 1674), Cai Lu 蔡祿 (d. 1674), Yang Laijia 楊來嘉 (d. 1680), and Wang Yongqing 王永清 (d. 1682) are attached to the biography of Zhang Guozhu 張國柱 (d. 1683), one of the followers of Wu Sangui in the Three Feudatories Rebellion.<sup>48</sup> Strictly speaking, Zhang's biography, like some others in the *Nichen zhuan*, is actually composite of several biographical sketches of the minor figures involved in the Three Feudatories Rebellion.

The two extant official manuscripts of the *Erchen* and *Nichen* projects available in the Palace Museum, Taipei, are different from the privately-printed *Erchen zhuan* and *Nichen zhuan* circulated in the late Qing.<sup>49</sup> Apart from the six-volume *Qinding guoshi erchen biao zhuan* and

<sup>47</sup> See the attached sub-biographies in the biographies of Liu Liangchen 劉良臣 (d. 1632), Zu Zerun 祖澤潤 (d. 1659), Zhang Tianlu 張天祿 (d. 1659), and Zhang Xin 張忻 (d. 1658). *Qinding guoshi erchen biao zhuan*, vol. 1, *jia shang*, "Liu Liangchen," vol. 3, *jia xia*, "Zu Zerun," "Zhang Tianlu," vol. 6, *yi xia* 乙下, "Zhang Xin." Also see *Qingshi liezhuan*, vol. 20, *juan* 78, pp. 6412-6413, 6507-6508, 6477-6478, *juan* 79, p. 6618.

<sup>48</sup> *Qinding guoshi nichen zhuan*, "Biography of Zhang Guozhu."

<sup>49</sup> According to Kanda Nobuo, there are at least two privately printed editions of the *Erchen* and *Nichen zhuan*. See Kanda, "Shinchō no kokushi retsuden to jishinden," pp. 8-9. One of them later is incorporated in *Qingdai zhuanji congkan* 清代傳記叢刊, (Zhou Junfu 周駿富 ed., Taipei: Mingwen shuju 明文書局, 1985), vols. 56 and 57. Apart from the printed editions, there is also a Qing manuscript of the *Erchen zhuan* kept in the Fu Sinian Library, Academia Sinica, Taipei. The categorization and arrangement of biographies of these later private versions are different from those of the official *Qinding guoshi erchen biao zhuan* and *Qinding guoshi nichen zhuan*. They also contain a number of printing or writing errors. Li Xinda affirms that there is another Qing manuscript entitled the *Qinding guoshi erchen zhuan* in Beijing Library. See Li, "Qianlong di yu erchen zhuan" 乾隆帝與貳臣傳, *Zhongguo shi yanjiu* 中國史研究, 1988.4 (Nov. 1988):



the two-volume *Qinding guoshi nichen zhuan*, several volumes of individual biographies are grouped together under the titles *Qingshi erchen zhuan jiabian* 清史貳臣傳甲編, *Qingshi erchen zhuan yibian* 清史貳臣傳乙編, and *Qingshi Nichen zhuan*.<sup>50</sup> Evidence suggests that these individual biographies were compiled before the “imperial approved” (*Qinding*) volumes. First, obvious mistakes of the former are revised in the latter.<sup>51</sup> Moreover, on the cover of the biography of Li Yongfang 李永芳 (d. 1634), it states that the volume is “the original text submitted [to the throne] in the ninth month of the forty-third year [1778] of the Qianlong reign.”<sup>52</sup> Apparently, the *Qingshi* titles of the grouped materials were given by the Bureau of Qing History during the Republican period. As Kanda Nobuo asserts, the *Qingshi* biographies are the final drafts separately submitted by the Historiography Bureau to the throne and the “imperial approved” materials are the definitive versions of the projects approved by the emperor.<sup>53</sup> Notwithstanding the open imperial condemnation of the early-Qing *erchen* and *nichen*, neither the *Erchen zhuan* nor the *Nichen zhuan* was

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165-166. Yet, no information about the Beijing manuscript is found in the catalog of the Library. See Beijing tushuguan 北京圖書館 comp., *Beijing tushuguan guji shanben shumu* 北京圖書館古籍善本書目 (Beijing: Shumu wenxian chubanshe 書目文獻出版社, date unknown).

<sup>50</sup> There are 20 volumes of the *Qingshi erchen zhuan jiabian*, 37 volumes of the *Qingshi erchen zhuan yibian*, and 7 volumes of the *Qingshi Nichen zhuan*. Basically, each volume contains one biography but some volumes also consist of sub-biographies. As there are two volumes of the biography of Liu Yingbun 劉應賓 (1613 *jinshi*) and the volume of Cao Lun was added in the late Jiaqing period, the total number of early-Qing biographies available in the Qianlong *Nichen zhuan* should be 62, about 42 % of the projects.

<sup>51</sup> For instance, in the individual volumes, the term “great Qing” (*da Qing* 大清) was marked and changed to “the dynasty” (*benchao* 本朝) or “our dynasty” (*wochao* 我朝). In the *Qinding* versions, “the dynasty” and “our dynasty” are used in addressing the Qing.

<sup>52</sup> *Qingshi erchen zhuan jiabian*. “Li Yongfang.”

officially published after their completion.<sup>54</sup> It was not until the late-Qing and early-republican periods that the *erchen* and *nichen* biographies were privately published and circulated in society.<sup>55</sup>

### The Contents and Narratives of the *Erchen Zhuan*

Like other Qianlong-reign historiographical products, the *Erchen* project relies heavily on official sources, including government dossiers, imperial memorials, and the *Veritable Records*. The incorporated biographies usually consist of the following information of the figures concerned in chronological order: their native places, official ranks and positions during the Ming, the year of their realignment with the Manchus, their career paths under the new government, contributions to the Qing court, and rewards and punishments received.<sup>56</sup> The selected materials and their arrangement convey not only imperial evaluations of the twice-serving ministers but also the Qing house's proclamation which restated its

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<sup>53</sup> Kanda Nobuo, "Shinchō no kokushi retsuden to jishinden," pp. 10-12.

<sup>54</sup> This assertion is based on the following observations: except the manuscripts, no official published materials of the projects is found or mentioned in the catalogs of the Qing imperial published books; secondly, no information relating to the publication of the projects is found in the extant official Qing documents, including the imperial edicts, *Veritable Records*, and the memorials of the central and local officials.

<sup>55</sup> Apart from the popular editions, biographies of the projects are also incorporated in the *Man-Han mingchen zhuan* and *Qingshi liezhuan*. See, *Man-Han mingchen zhuan*, vol. 4, *Appendices*, pp. 4413-4681 and *Qingshi liezhuan*, vol. 20, *juan* 78-80, pp. 6412-6701.

<sup>56</sup> As Denis Twitchett observes, in imperial China, the official biographies are usually filled by materials relating to family backgrounds, official career paths, and social reputations of the subjects. See Twitchett, "Chinese Biographical Writing," in William G. Beasley and Edwin G. Pulleyblank eds., *Historians of China and Japan*, pp. 95-114. This is also applied to the *Erchen* project though, according to Qianlong, it was a "new type" of

legitimate succession to the Ming and legitimacy of rule in China after 1644.

In the biographies of Category A, *Erchen zhuan*, considerable space is given to the narratives relating to the shift of loyalty of the historical figures, which implicitly explains the fall of Ming and the rise of Qing from a Manchu perspective. One typical example is the official account of the submission of Shang Kexi, the former Ming Regional Commander of Liaodong who collaborated with the Manchus in 1634 and was conferred with the title Prince of Pacifying the South (*ping nan wang* 平南王) in 1649. The biography points out that for generations members of the Shang family were Ming loyalists who served in the Ming armies. In the late Ming, Shang Kexi's father died for the dynasty but he himself suffered from the chaotic factional politics of the court and was terribly persecuted by his political opponents. It was in this life-and-death situation that he turned to the Manchus.<sup>57</sup> The narratives of Shang's biography suggest that his realignment with the Manchus was a direct result of late-Ming factionalism.

Furthermore, in the case of Hong Chengchou, the compilers intentionally make use of his subjection in 1642 to illustrate the shift of the Mandate of Heaven during the dynastic transition. On the one hand, the biography gives an account of Hong's demotion in 1638 despite his exploits in the suppression of the late-Ming rebellion in 1629-1638. On the other hand, it highlights his dreadful predicament resulting from the shortage of military supplies in the Ming-Manchu wars, 1639-1642, which led to his

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biography.

<sup>57</sup> *Qinding guoshi erchen biao zhuan*, vol. 2, *jia zhong* "Shang Kexi," *Qingshi liezhuan*, vol. 20, *juan* 78, p. 6438.



eventual defeat and capture by the Qing. The recounting of the desperate straits Hong found himself in could be considered to be an indirect criticism of late-Ming administrative dysfunction. Quoting the words of Emperor Taizong (Abahai), the biography offers a concluding remark to the effect that the Manchus' military victories in Liaodong "were an expression of Heaven's Will," and this laid a solid foundation for their conquest of China.<sup>58</sup>

In contrast to the criticism of late-Ming factionalism and administrative chaos, events demonstrating the Qing house's benevolent treatments of the surrendered Ming officials are particularly emphasized in the biographies. For instance, in the account of the imperial rewards Sun Dingliao received after his submission, the following episode is recounted:

Sun Dingliao, a native of Liaoyang and the Regional Commander of Tailinghe, followed Zu Dashou and submitted [to the Qing] in 1630. He was awarded silver, saddles and horses, arrow quivers, and other articles for daily use. Later, [he] was appointed Vice Commander-in-chief affiliated to the Bordered Red Banner of the Eight Han Banners. In 1632 [1640], when the great [Qing] armies seized Songshan, [Emperor Abahai]

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<sup>58</sup> *Qinding guoshi erchen biao zhuan*, vol. 2, *jia zhong* "Hong Chengchou," *Qingshi liezhuan*, vol. 20, *juan* 78, pp. 6443-6445. The earliest Qianlong drafts of Hong's biography are available in *Zhongguo diyi lishi Dang'anguan*, Beijing, PRC. See "Guoshiguan dang'an," *Quanzong* no. 11, *Zhuan* 傳 129. I have compared the earliest drafts in Beijing with those in *jiabian* and *biao zhuan* in Taipei. The Beijing drafts provide the sketch with notes and commentaries done by the compilers and editors. Hong's biographies in the *jiabian* and *biao zhuan* were compiled based on the narratives of the drafts and most of these notes and commentaries were incorporated. For the recent discussion on Hong's submission to the Qing, see Li Guangtao, "Hong Chengchou bei Ming shimo" 洪承疇背明始末, *Guoli zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiu jikan* 國立中央研究院歷史語言研究集刊, vol. 17 (April 1948): 231-245; Wang Chen-main, "Historical Revisionism in Ch'ing Times: The Case of Hung Ch'eng-ch'ou (1593-1665)," *Zhongguo lishi xuehui shixue jikan* 中國歷史學會史學集刊, 17 (May 1985): 450-476; and, Wang, "Persistence in Chinese Culture: A Case Study of Hung Ch'eng-ch'ou (1593-1665)," *Late Imperial China*, 10.1 (June 1989): 27-62.

permitted the family reunion of the submitted Tailinghe generals whose family members and relatives were in Songshan and Jinzhou. At the beginning of Dingliao's submission, two of his servants escaped. It was rumoured that Dingliao had sent his servants back to the Ming. Yet, the emperor did not investigate the case. Then, the edict [of family reunion to Sun] mentioned [the rumor]. Dingliao in his memorial [to the throne] said: "Upon receiving the edict, I came to learn that in the past twelve years, I was suspected of such a crime and it was due to the kindness of his Majesty that [I had never been] questioned [about my loyalty to the Qing]. After Songshan and Jinzhou were captured, it was time to prove my innocence. The two escaped servants had never been at my home [in Songshan]. If they are detained elsewhere, they should be closely questioned about the facts." The emperor comforted Sun in his response [to this memorial].<sup>59</sup>

In the narratives of Hong Chengchou's realignment with the Qing, stress is put upon the emperor's generosity and the benevolent Qing policy in dealing with the submitted Ming ministers. Hong was captured by Qing troops in Songshan and sent to the Manchu capital in 1642. Being a man of talent, he enjoyed the favor of Emperor Abahai and was induced to collaborate with the new regime. According to the official biography, after his submission, Hong was granted an audience in the imperial palace. Realizing his previous offenses against the Manchus, he did not dare face the emperor and kneeled outside the imperial hall and begged for forgiveness. To dispel Hong's misgivings, the emperor assured Hong that he would not be blamed for his past deeds or political stance. As the imperial edict to Hong stated:

At that time, you [Hong] were engaged in the battles, fighting for your [Ming] master against us. Why should I mind that? It was Heaven's

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<sup>59</sup> *Qinding guoshi erchen biao zhuan*, vol. 1, *jia shang* "Sun Dingliao;" *Qingshi liezhuan*,

Will that I defeated one hundred and thirty thousand [Ming] soldiers and captured Songshan and Jinzhou. The Way of Heaven emphasizes saving lives. Those [rulers] who are good at saving lives are in conformity with the Way of Heaven. I therefore bestow favor upon you. What you should do is to bear in mind my imperial grace saving your life and do your best to repay it.<sup>60</sup>

Through the selected events and narratives in the biographies of Category A, the compilers have made their points clear that the dynastic change in seventeenth-century China was an inevitable result of historical development, in which the benevolent and energetic Manchus were chosen by Heaven to replace the corrupt Ming rulers.

It is worth noting that although condemnation of disloyalty was said to be the chief objective of the *Erchen* project, in the biographies of Category A, except the negative *erchen* label, the twice-serving ministers concerned were not seriously censured for their violation of the principles of loyalty. Nor were they personally blamed for the demise of the Ming in 1644. On the contrary, their contributions to the founding of the new dynasty were officially addressed and recognized in the biographies. Furthermore, in spite of the imperial decree depriving several *erchen* of their posthumous honors in 1790, the posthumous titles granted in the previous reigns to acknowledge the merits of these figures were not affected.<sup>61</sup> It

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vol. 20, *juan* 78, p. 6413.

<sup>60</sup> *Qinding guoshi erchen biao zhuan*, vol. 2, *jia zhong* "Hong Chengchou," *Qingshi liezhuan*, vol. 20, *juan* 78, pp. 6445-6446.

<sup>61</sup> For the imperial order of 1790, see *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 15, pp. 348-349 and *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 25, *juan* 1344, Qianlong year 54, month 12, pp. 1224-1225. Among the fifty-four *erchen* (including the three in sub-biographies) in this category, eighteen of them received posthumous titles, which were not affected by the order and still recorded in the *Qinding guoshi erchen biao zhuan*.



appears that in the imperial reevaluation of the early-Qing figures, Emperor Qianlong did not adopt a rigid attitude toward all of the collaborators. At least, for those former Ming ministers who wholeheartedly supported the new government after submission, the emperor maintained that their loyal and meritorious service deserved appropriate approval. In some biographies, they were characterized as victims of late-Ming politics rather than merely being opportunists. Of course, to the compilers, it was the Qing dynasty that had given the surrendered Ming ministers a chance for a new life.

Comparatively speaking, the treatments received by the figures in Category B of the *Erchen zhuan*, as well as those in the *Nichen zhuan*, were much severe. As archive materials indicate, the emperor's condemnation of disloyalty is mainly reflected in the narratives and comments on people in these two categories, especially evident in Qianlong's strong censure on the deeds of Feng Quan, Gong Dingzi, and Qian Qianyi.<sup>62</sup> Resorting to a method of punishment for the immoral deeds of the twice-serving ministers, Emperor Qianlong issued a decree in 1790 to deprive some of the *erchen* of posthumous titles. In 1792, he gave further instructions to the Historiography Bureau that the term *zu* 卒, which was traditionally employed to denote the death of a senior official, be prohibited from use in the official biographies of the punished ministers. As a result, this word was immediately replaced in all biographies of the middle and lower sections of Category B by the term *si* 死, a general expression denoting

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<sup>62</sup> Several biographies in the *Qingshi erchen zhuan jiabian* are attached with the emperor's edicts condemning the *erchen* but except that in the biography of Qian Qianyi, all of them are removed in the *Qinding guoshi erchen biao zhuan*.

death.<sup>63</sup> These punitive measures implied an imperial denial of these former ministers qualified as scholar-officials, an act which could be regarded the most severe punishment to an educated Han Chinese in late-imperial times.

Feng Quan's biography, which is placed in the middle section of Category B, provides a valuable case study of the imperial tactics employed in creating these narratives of disloyalty. Feng, a Grand Secretary of both the Ming and Qing dynasties, was notorious for his corruption and involvement in court factionalism, nonetheless, he survived an impeachment launched by his colleagues in the Shunzhi period.<sup>64</sup> During the compilation of the *Erchen zhuan*, Feng was singled out in imperial edicts as one of the typical examples of "unreliable inferior men."<sup>65</sup> The biography first gives an account of his immoral deeds relating to late-Ming factionalism, in particular his attachment to eunuch cliques, blaming him for the political chaos of the dynasty. Then, it cites a number of Qing

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<sup>63</sup> For the imperial edict, see *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 26, *juan* 1416, Qianlong year 57, month 11, pp. 1049-50. In the *Qingshi erchen zhuan yibian*, the term *zu* appearing in the biographies of the middle and lower sections was tagged and changed to *si*.

<sup>64</sup> Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan 中國第一歷史檔案館, "Feng Quan beihe an" 馮銓被核案, *Lishi Dang'an* 歷史檔案, 1981.4 (Nov. 1981): 12-16, 29 and Gugong bowuyuan zhanggubu 故宮博物院掌故部 comp., *Zhanggu congbian* 掌故叢編 (Repr., Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1990), pp. 779-791. Also see Tu Lien-che, "Feng Ch'ün," in Hummel ed., *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912)*, vol. 1, pp. 240-241; Wang Zhengyao, "Feng Quan," in *Qingdai renwu zhuangao, shangbian*, vol. 1, pp. 146-153; and, Zhang Sheng 張升, "Feng Quan shishi zakao" 馮銓史事雜考, *Qingshi yanjiu* 清史研究, 1998.3 (Sept. 1998): 89-96.

<sup>65</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 10, p. 805, vol. 14, pp. 967-968, vol. 15, pp. 348-349, and vol. 16, p. 214; *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 23, *juan* 1142, Qianlong year 46, month 10, pp. 293-294, vol. 25, *juan* 1332, year 54, month 6, pp. 1031-1032, *juan* 1344, month 12, pp. 1224-1225, vol. 26, and, *juan* 1375, year 56, month 3, pp. 460-461.

memorials impeaching him for taking bribes, ganging up for selfish interests, and abusing his authority.<sup>66</sup> Through the narratives and cited materials, Feng was characterized as a completely negative historical figure and his position in the history of the Ming-Qing transition was totally negated. Solely by studying Feng's biography in the *Erchen zhuan*, one would hardly disagree with the imperial evaluation of the subject.<sup>67</sup>

Similar tactics were adopted in the biography of Gong Dingzi, a former Ming censor who took office under the rebels in 1644, turned to the Qing in the same year, and was promoted to Minister of Punishment in the Kangxi reign. Placed in the lower section of Category B, the biography points out that Gong was one of the former Ming officials who submitted to Li Zicheng immediately after the fall of Beijing. To expose his shamelessness, an incident involving a confrontation at court between Gong and his political opponent Feng Quan is mentioned:

The event originated from the impeachment of Feng Quan by the censors Xu Zuomei 許作梅 [1640 *jinshi*] and Zhuang Xianzu 莊憲祖 [1637 *jinshi*]. Prince Rui [Dorgon] summoned the departmental ministers to make inquiries [in the matter]. [During the meeting, Gong] Dingzi [attacked Feng and] said, "Feng Quan betrayed [Emperor] Tianqi 天啓 [Zhu Youxiao 朱由校, 1605-1627, r. 1620-1627] and aligned himself with Wei Zhongxian 魏忠賢 [1568-1627] to engage in evil." Quan [responded in kind] by saying, "The rebel Li Zicheng killed the Ming emperor [Chongzhen] and usurped state power. Dingzi submitted himself to the rebels and served as Censor of the North City." Dingzi argued, "I

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<sup>66</sup> *Qinding guoshi erchen biao zhuan*, vol. 5, *yi zhong* 乙中, "Feng Quan;" *Qingshi liezhuan*, vol. 20, *juan* 79, pp. 6554-6559.

<sup>67</sup> Obviously, some favorable comments on Feng was intentionally omitted. At least, Feng had been praised by Emperor Shunzhi for his political talent. See *Shizu Zhanghuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 3, *juan* 73, Shunzhi year 10, month 3, p. 579.



was not the only one [who capitulated. Among the Han officials,] who didn't surrender [at that time]? [Besides, in Chinese history,] even Wei Zheng 魏徵 [580-643] submitted himself to [his former enemy Emperor] Taizong 太宗 [Tang Taizong, Li Shimin 李世民, 559-649, r. 626-649]. Prince [Dorgon] laughed [at Gong] and said, "One must be loyal oneself before one can criticize others [for disloyalty]. Dingzi is shameless to compare himself with Wei Zheng and the bandit Li [Zicheng] with Tang Taizong. People [like Gong] would be advised to withdraw and remain silent. How could they glibly comment on others?"<sup>68</sup>

Furthermore, Gong's involvement with Shunzhi-era Manchu-Han factionalism and the punishments he received are also highlighted in the biography. The construction of this narrative naturally leads readers to the conclusion that Gong's moral integrity was highly questionable. Although the compilers do not make direct comment on the deeds of these subjects, the intention to condemn Gong is clear.

Qian Qianyi was one of the most controversial figures of the Ming-Qing transition. Among the twice-serving ministers, he was the *erchen* most despised by Emperor Qianlong.<sup>69</sup> Since 1769, all of his works had been banned by the government. Mindful of the imperial will on this matter, the writers of the biography of Qian concentrate on negative stories, including his involvement in late-Ming factional politics, the punishment and dismissal he received in the Ming, and his alleged association with the anti-Qing activists after 1645. To declare the emperor's hatred of Qian,

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<sup>68</sup> *Qinding guoshi erchen biao zhuan*, vol. 6, *yi xia*, "Gong Dingzi," *Qingshi liezhuan*, vol. 20, *juan* 79, p. 6594.

<sup>69</sup> For instance, although Qian Qianyi, Gong Dingzi, and Feng Quan were openly condemned by Emperor Qianlong, only Qian's works were totally banned by the government. For the circulation of Gong's and Feng's works, See Ding Yuanji 丁原基, "Qingshi Erchen zhuan zhushu kaolue" 清史貳臣傳著述考略, *Guoli bianyiguan guankan* 國立編譯館館刊, 12.2 (Dec. 1983), p. 193, pp. 202-205.

excerpts from imperial edicts relating to the condemnation of the subject are attached to the end of the biography. Moreover, the emperor's negative remarks on Qian are highlighted and the government's order of the censorship of his works is indicated.<sup>70</sup> This arrangement clearly reveals the emperor's calculated attempt to suppress any public opinion in favor of Qian.

### The Contents and Narratives of the *Nichen Zhuan*

The use of history as a tool to condemn treason was not an innovation of Emperor Qianlong. There were numerous precedents in traditional Chinese official historiography. Since the Yuan dynasty, when the standard histories of the preceding dynasties were compiled, certain sections had been assigned to the biographies of evil and rebellious ministers under the titles of *jianchen zhuan* 姦臣傳, *panchen zhuan* 叛臣傳, and *nichen zhuan*.<sup>71</sup> During the early Ming, Zhu Yuanzhang, the first emperor of the dynasty, resorted to similar methods to declare the crimes of his executed ministers. In 1390 and 1393, he ordered the compilation of the

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<sup>70</sup> *Qinding guoshi erchen biao zhuan*, vol. 5, *yi zhong*, "Qian Qianyi;" *Qingshi liezhuan*, vol. 20, *juan* 79, pp. 6575-6578. Qianlong's edicts condemning disloyalty are attached to several biographies of the *Qingshi erchen zhuan yibian*. However, except those in Qian's biography, all of them are removed in the *Qinding guoshi erchen biao zhuan*.

<sup>71</sup> Tuotuo 脫脫 (1314-1355) et al. comps., *Songshi* 宋史 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1977), vol. 39, *juan* 471-477, pp. 13697-13852; Tuotuo, *Jinshi* 金史 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1975), vol. 8, *juan* 132-133, pp. 2817-2864; Tuotuo, *Liaoshi* 遼史 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974), vol. 5, *juan* 110-114, pp. 1483-1518; Song, Lian et al. comps., *Yuanshi*, vol. 15, *juan* 205-207, pp. 4557-4606; and, Zhang Tingyu, *Mingshi*, vol. 26, *juan* 308, pp. 7906-7987.

*Records Announcing the Gang of Traitors* (*Zhaoshi jiandang lu* 昭示奸黨錄) and the *Records of the Rebellious Officials* (*Nichen lu* 逆臣錄), which were composed of the confessions of the figures involved in the two early-Ming great trials regarding high treason, to denounce Hu Weiyong 胡惟庸 (d. 1380), Lan Yu 藍玉 (d. 1393), and their cliques for their “rebellious” activities against the Ming.<sup>72</sup> In some senses, Qianlong’s compilation of the *Nichen zhuan* could be regarded as a Qing continuation of this tradition.

Derived from the *Erchen* project, the compilation of the *Nichen zhuan* was initiated to condemn early-Qing traitors for their betrayal of the dynasty during either the conquest period or the Three Feudatories Rebellion. The two-volume *Qinding guoshi nichen zhuan* comprises biographies of 42 *juan*. Among them, 30 are the Ming officials or rebels who had capitulated while the rest, including Geng Jingzhong and Shang Zhixin 尙之信 (1636-1680), two of the three rebellious feudatories, come from among Qing subjects, who began their official careers under the alien regime. The focus of the project is evidently the rebellion, as nearly four-fifths of the biographies, 33 out of 42, placed in the first part of the project are about its participants, accounting for about 75% of the narratives. From a broader sense, the compilation of the *Nichen zhuan* was also

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<sup>72</sup> Qian Qianyi, *Muzhai chuuxue ji* (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe 上海古籍出版社, 1985), vol. 3, *juan* 104, pp. 2129-2142 and Zhu Yuanzhang, *Nichen lu* (Beijing: Beijing Daxue chubanshe 北京大學出版社, 1991), preface, pp. 1-2. As Wu Han 吳晗 (1909-1969) points out, the cases of Hu and Lan were framed by Zhu Yuanzhang to consolidate his power. See Hu, *Zhu Yuanzhang zhuan* 朱元璋傳 (Beijing: Sanlian shudian 三聯書店, 1965), pp. 244-255 and “Hu Weiyong an kao” 胡惟庸案考, in *Wu Han shixue lunzhu xuanji* 吳晗史學論著選集 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe 人民出版社, 1984), vol. 1, pp. 442-480.



intended to tell the people about the imperial ability and determination to suppress any rebellious activity against the Qing.

Wu Sangui as the chief plotter of the rebellion was the central figure of the insurrection and his biography occupies considerable space in the work. The *nichen* biography of Wu Sangui concentrates on the historical events relating to his submission to the Manchus and his rebellion against the Qing, which provides an imperial perspective of the rise and fall of the powerful Yunnan feudatory in the mid-seventeenth century.<sup>73</sup> At the beginning of the biography, the compilers affirm that when the rebels seized Beijing in 1644, Wu initially considered subjugating himself to Li Zicheng. It was only after his concubine Chen Yuan 陳沅 (Chen Yuanyuan 陳圓圓, 1624-?1681) was taken by Liu Zongmin 劉宗敏 (d. 1645), a subordinate of Li, that he decided to collaborate with the Qing instead.<sup>74</sup> From an official Qing view, Wu's subjection was an act with selfish motives and a temporary expedient in an extremely desperate situation. Moreover, it is said that Wu's conspiracy to overthrow the Qing could be traced back to the late-Shunzhi and early-Kangxi reigns, in which he captured and executed the last Ming claimant, Prince Gui (Emperor Yongli), in Yunnan, and his power

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<sup>73</sup> *Qinding guoshi erchen zhuan*, vol. 1, "Wu Sangui;" *Qingshi liezhuan*, vol. 20, *juan* 80, pp. 6632-6646.

<sup>74</sup> Obviously, this assertion is based on the well-known literary writing of Wu Weiye. See Wu, *Wu Meicun quanji*, vol. 1, *juan* 3, pp. 78-79. Also see Angela Hsi, "Wu San-kuei in 1644: A Reappraisal," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 34.2 (Feb. 1975): 443-453. Recently, the question of whether Wu surrendered to the Qing in 1644 has aroused a debate in mainland China. For a summary of this debate, see Ye Gaoshu, "Dalu xuezhe dui Wu Sangui 'xiang Qing' wentei de taolun" 大陸學者對吳三桂 "降清" 問題的討論, *Jindaishi yanjiu tongxun* 近代史研究通訊, 12 (Sept. 1991): 114-120. Also see Ye, "Zhengzha yu maodun: pouxi Wu Sangui de jueze" 掙扎與矛盾: 剖析吳三桂的抉擇, *Lishi yuekan* 歷史月刊, 81 (Oct. 1994): 42-51.

gradually increased to a level where it could not be controlled by the Beijing court.

To expose the anti-Qing intrigues of Wu, details about his military activities in Yunan and Guizhou are given. Previously, when the *Comprehensive Mirror of Successive Reigns* (*Yupi lidai tongjian jilan*) was revised and extended in 1775 to incorporate the Southern Ming histories of Prince Tang and Prince Gui,<sup>75</sup> the compilers, fawning upon the emperor, had cautiously avoided mentioning the contributions of Wu to the Qing conquest of Southwest China and the capture of Prince Gui in Yunnan. However, reviewing the submitted enlarged edition of the work, Emperor Qianlong was not satisfied with this approach. In his edict of 1782, he pointed out:

The officers in the [Historiography] Bureau, seeing Wu Sangui as a rebellious minister, avoided mentioning his capture of Prince Gui, [Zhu] Youlang, [in *Yupi lidai tongjian jilan*] and instead attributed this [military exploit] to Aixing'a 愛星阿. Of course, Aixing'a was the General of Pacifying the West. But Sangui was the Chief General of Pacifying the West and the strategy regarding the "three troubles and two problems," the aim of which was to destroy Youlang, was formulated by him. Even subsequent to this, when [the Qing] troops advanced [on Burma], the official denunciation of the Burma [authorities], the expulsion of Li Dingguo 李定國 (1621-1662), and the surrender of Bai Wenxuan 白文選 (1615-1675) were results of Sangui's plan. His contributions were undeniable. Yet, were his plans really devised for the benefit of our country? At that time, he was already plotting to seize Yunnan and Guizhou. If Youlang, Dingguo, and Bai Wenxuan were there, how could he seize them? ... If we compare the past with the present, Sangui's conspiracy is exposed. Why not give an impartial account of his merits and demerits? [Therefore, I instruct that] the Burma affairs of Wu based

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<sup>75</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 8, pp. 77-79 and *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 21 *juan* 995, Qianlong year 40, intercalary month 10, pp. 300-301.

on his personal dossiers in the Historiography Bureau all be incorporated [in the *Yupi lidai tongjian jilan*] without abridgement...<sup>76</sup>

In response to the emperor's criticism, the compilers then revised the last *juan* of the *Comprehensive Mirror of Successive Reigns* and highlighted the role of Wu in the Qing victories in Yunnan and Guizhou.<sup>77</sup> A note explaining the rearrangement was attached to the end of the work:

In the Burma campaign, Aixing'a was a branch general and Wu Sangui in fact was the general-in-charge. At that time, Sangui's conspiracy was not obvious and therefore he was admired for military exploits in which he captured the enemies and pacified the borders. When we compiled the first draft [of the *Comprehensive Mirror of Successive Reigns*], we mentioned Aixing'a and other generals but deleted Sangui's name [from the history] because of his evilness and rebellion. His Majesty was brilliant in pointing out that Sangui's defiant character [gradually] developed and, at that time, he already entertained a rebellious scheme in his mind. His leadership in the Burma campaign and capture of Prince Gui did not demonstrate his exploits but, on the contrary, were evidence of his plot... [His rebellion] was planned far in advance...<sup>78</sup>

As the compilers realized, to the emperor, the exploits of Wu in the conquest period were nothing more than irrefutable proof of his heinous crimes. When the *Nichen* project was initiated, the imperial instruction of 1782 was also observed and the pursuit and attack of Wu upon the last Southern Ming

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<sup>76</sup> *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 23, *juan* 1168, Qianlong year 47, month 11, pp. 667. The edict is also attached at the end of Wu's biography in the *Qinding guoshi erchen zhuan* but misdated as Qianlong year 45 (1780). The edit is quite misleading since it mentions the sources of Wu's Burma affairs based on the "*guoshi Wu Sangui zhuan*" 國史吳三桂傳, which might imply there was an official biography of Wu. However, as I have pointed out, the biographies of the Qing traitors were compiled after 1783. Therefore, the statement should be interpreted as "the personal dossiers of Wu Sangui in the Historiography Bureau," rather than "the biography of Wu Sangui in the History [of the Qing]."

<sup>77</sup> Fuheng 傅恒 et al., comps., *Yupi lidai tongjian jilan*, in *Yingyin Wenyuange siku quanshu*, vol. 339, *juan* 120, p. 792, 797.

<sup>78</sup> *Yupi lidai tongjian jilan*, *juan* 120, p. 792.



regime, including the strategic plans and the warfare, were described in his biography. Although the Emperor Qianlong repeatedly argued that such an arrangement was to expose the conspiracy of Wu and give an impartial account of the history, to a large extent it was a calculated attempt to lay the blame for the killing of Prince Gui on the former Ming general.

In the biographies of Geng Jingzhong and Shang Zhixin, stress is put on their collusion with Wu. In the view of the compilers, both Geng and Shang were disloyal and unfilial persons. It is said that when Geng decided to join the rebellion, his mother tried very hard to dissuade him from doing so but he did not listen and this resulted in her death from fury.<sup>79</sup> According to the biography, Shang was also an incorrigible alcoholic. For years, his brothers and subordinates suffered from persecution and abuse. Failing to force his father Shang Kexi to rebel against the Qing, he secretly collaborated with Wu and refused to obey Qing orders.<sup>80</sup> It was only after the Qing government had gained control over the situation that the two rebellious feudatories resubmitted themselves to the court in 1675 and 1678. The *nichen* biographies include details about the imperial verdicts and the sentences upon them.

For other accomplices in the rebellion and those submitted Ming officials who betrayed the Qing in the conquest period, their biographies in the *Nichen zhuan* are very brief, generally only containing information about

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<sup>79</sup> *Qinding guoshi nichen zhuan*, vol. 1, "Geng Jingzhong," *Qingshi liezhuan*, vol. 20, juan 80, p. 6663.

<sup>80</sup> *Qinding guoshi nichen zhuan*, vol. 2, "Shang Zhixin," *Qingshi liezhuan*, vol. 20, juan 80, pp. 6669-6673.

their official titles, sketches of their careers and rebellious activities, and punishments received. In most cases, the biographies incorporate one or more sub-biographies of the figures with similar backgrounds.

The biography of Zheng Zhilong is an interesting exception. In fact, it is a history of the resistance of the Zheng family, in particular the anti-Qing activities of Zheng's elder son, Chenggong, instead of being a biography of Zheng himself. In the first half of the biography, there is a brief account of the submission of Zheng Zhilong in 1645, and most of its narrative concentrate on the deeds of Zheng Chenggong, including his split with his father, his confrontation with the new dynasty, and finally the establishment of an anti-Qing regime in Taiwan. In the second half, it gives an exhaustive account of Kangxi reign policies and strategies in handling the "Zheng bandits," which contributed to the subjugation of Taiwan.<sup>81</sup> It seems that placing Zheng Zhilong in the *nichen* category is inconsistent with the selection criteria of the project. After his submission to the Qing, the subject was sent to Beijing and remained under home detention until his death in 1661.<sup>82</sup> Though he was charged and executed for the traitorous connivance of his son, there was no substantial evidence to prove that Zheng had participated in any rebellious activities against the new government. If he was regarded as a traitor to the Qing simply because he was held responsible for his son's resistance against the Qing invasion, then

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<sup>81</sup> *Qinding guoshi nichen zhuan*, vol. 2, "Zheng Zhilong," *Qingshi liezhuan*, vol. 20, *juan* 80, pp. 6691-6699.

<sup>82</sup> Earl Swisher, "Chêng Chih-lung," in *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912)*, vol. 1, pp. 110-111 and Deng Kongzhao 鄧孔昭, "Zheng Zhilong," in *Qingdai renwu zhuangao, shangbian*, vol. 4, pp. 179-180.

according to the same logic, Shang Kexi, father of Shang Zhixin, and Geng Zhongming 耿仲明 (1604-1649), grandfather of Geng Jingzhong, should also have been placed in the *Nichen zhuan*, rather than in the *Erchen zhuan*.

The possible explanation for why Zheng Zhilong was included in the *nichen* list might lie in Emperor Qianlong's interpretation of the history of the resistance movement. To the emperor, the Southern Ming resistance was justified by the imperial lineage of its princes even though the legitimacy of Ming rule in China ended in 1645. Nevertheless, when the last Southern Ming regime was defeated in 1662, all resistance movements lost their legitimate basis for existence. Without a leader with the imperial lineage of the Ming house, any anti-Qing activity under the name of Ming restoration, from a Qing perspective, was nothing more than a rebellion, like those frequently found in Chinese history. Based on these presuppositions, Zheng's resistance in Taiwan was to be differentiated from the resistance movement in mainland China. Since Zheng Zhilong was executed as a traitor by the court and his descendants were basically regarded as Qing bandits who had usurped the name of Ming loyalists, the resistance history of the Zheng family was classified as traitorous activity and consequently incorporated in the *Nichen zhuan*.

### **The Projects and the Qianlong Condemnation of Disloyalty**

The *Erchen* and *Nichen* projects were initiated with the stated objective of condemning disloyalty. To the emperor, they were official



teaching materials providing negative examples to the Qing subjects, warning them against any misdeeds which violated Neo-Confucian principles of loyalty, the most significant moral value governing human behavior. Furthermore, the projects also served as a political means for the emperor to reinforce imperial control over his ministers. Through the tactic of using “praise and blame” in the compilation of the selected biographies, they demonstrated the ruler’s absolute authority of being able to inflict posthumous punishments upon the condemnable figures and conveyed a strong message that anyone who failed to comply with the avowed Confucian principles of loyalty would leave a foul reputation in history and be condemned for generations.

From a historical perspective, the *Erchen* project revealed not only a new imperial attitude toward the early-Qing collaborators but also the emperor’s personal observation of the high-Qing socio-political development, in which, to him, absolute submission, rather than collaboration, was the chief factor contributing to state security. As the empire had by then existed for more than a hundred years and flourished in the mid-eighteenth century, the Manchus were no longer invaders but the legitimate rulers in China. The previous government policy of recognizing political realignment, which was an expedient measure adopted in the conquest period to gain collaboration from the resistant Han Chinese, was now outmoded and was no longer in line with the best interests of the dynasty any more. Seeing that the promotion of absolute loyalty among his subjects was the chief political task of the government, the emperor did not

hesitate to abandon the outdated policy and make use of the condemnation of the twice-serving ministers as a means of political indoctrination in this new chance of the dynasty's history. As a result of imperial interpretation of contemporary politics, the initiation of the *Erchen zhuan* marked an end of the early-Qing policy of approval of the political realignment of the former Ming officials.

From its initiation in 1777, the compilation of the *Nichen zhuan* had never been a smooth process. This may be partly accounted for by the changing mindset of Emperor Qianlong. Throughout the compilation, the emperor kept a constant eye on the work and repeatedly issued instructions to the compilers. Nonetheless, it appears that initially, he did not have a clear overview of the project and the details, including the contents, selection criteria, and taxonomy, were only gradually finalized under his direct supervision in his later years. The available sources indicate that even final selection criteria were not determined until 1791, at which time the emperor decided to restrict imperial condemnation of disloyalty to the twice-serving ministers and traitors, excluding those former Ming degree-holders who began their official careers in the Qing. While criticizing the officials in the Historiography Bureau for inefficiency, Qianlong himself was chiefly responsible for the slow progress of the compilation process.

Divided into two categories, A and B, the *Qinding guoshi erchen biao zhuan* amply demonstrates Qianlong-period evaluations of the twice-serving ministers. Though both were condemned for their disloyalty to the Ming, the historical figures in Category A and Category B received different

treatments in the narratives. The former were mentioned with their contributions to the Qing dynasty while the latter were characterized as evil and unreliable “inferior men.” To the emperor, the three types of twice-serving ministers who constituted the biographies of Category B were the most condemnable figures: firstly, those who submitted to the Qing but harbored an anti-Qing attitude, like Qian Qianyi; secondly, those who were political opportunists taking part in court factionalism, like Feng Quan; and thirdly, those who compromised with the rebels before submitting to the Qing, like Gong Dingzi. Emperor Qianlong’s contempt for these figures is understandable. From the standpoint of a Qing ruler, their duplicity and infamy were harmful to the fundamental interests of the empire and, even in the high Qing, such behaviors were still definitely unforgivable. Since he took the throne, Qianlong had made great efforts to suppress the factional activities in the court.<sup>83</sup> The establishment of Category B and the caustic comments in the biographies of Qian, Feng, and Gong, reflected, to a certain extent, the emperor’s abhorrence of court factionalism and political opportunism and the compilation of the biographies served a warning to

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<sup>83</sup> Many studies indicate that during the Qianlong period, especially in the first half of the reign, court factionalism was a problem drawing the emperor’s attention. See Dai Yi 戴逸, *Qianlong di ji qi shidai* 乾隆帝及其時代 (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue chubanshe 中國人民大學出版社, 1982), pp. 124-146; Bai Xinliang 白新良, *Qianlong zhuan* 乾隆傳 (Shenyang: Liaoning jiaoyu chubanshe 遼寧教育出版社, 1990), pp. 58-74; Lai Huimin 賴惠敏, “Lun Qianlong chao chu zhi Mandang yu Handang” 論乾隆朝初期之滿黨與漢黨, *Family Process and Political Process in Modern Chinese History*, (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1992), Part II, pp. 721-743; Sun Wenliang 孫文良, Zhang Jie 張杰, and Zheng Chuanshui 鄭川水, *Qianlong di* 乾隆帝 (Changchun: Jilin wen shi zhe chubanshe 吉林文史出版社, 1993), pp. 131-141; and, Tang Wenji 唐文基 and Luo Qingsi 羅慶泗, *Qianlong zhuan* 乾隆傳 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe 人民出版社, 1994), pp. 94-103.



those in his court.

Apart from serving as a means to condemn disloyalty, the compilation of the *Nichen zhuan* could also be considered an imperial refutation of the anti-Qing propaganda launched by the rebellious feudatories in the Three Feudatories Rebellion. During the rebellion, the chief accomplices Wu Sangui and Geng Jingzhong deliberately made use of ethnic issues to appeal to the Han Chinese for support.<sup>84</sup> Despite their malodorous reputation, some Ming *yimin* answered to the call and cherished hopes for Ming restoration.<sup>85</sup> Although these sensitive materials were intentionally omitted in the *nichen* biographies, the negative characterization of Wu Sangui and his followers, in particular the details of Wu's murder of Prince Gui, indirectly presented the government's counter-arguments against the ethnic-based claims of the rebels.

The *Erchen zhuan*, and the *Nichen zhuan* were the last two historiographical projects completed in the Qianlong reign. Finished in 1794, they brought to an end Qianlong-era evaluations of the early-Qing collaborators and traitors. These two works, together with other Qianlong historiographical projects, became the official guidelines for the later writings on the early history of the empire. Their influence is evinced in

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<sup>84</sup> Chen Hong 陳鴻 and Chen Bangxian 陳邦賢, *Qingchu Pubian xiaocheng* 清初莆變小乘, in *Zhongguo shehui kexue yuan lishi yanjiu suo Qingshi yanjiu shi* 中國社會科學院歷史研究所清史研究室 ed., *Qingshi ziliao* 清史資料, vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1980), pp. 90-91.

<sup>85</sup> For example, when the rebellion broke out, the well-known Guangdong Ming *yimin* Qu Dajun went to Guilin to meet Wu in 1675 and accepted his appointment in the troops. When he realized Wu ambition, he left Wu for home in 1676. See Wang Zongyan 汪宗衍, *Qu Dajun nianpu* 屈大均年譜, in *Qu Dajun quanji*, vol. 8, pp. 1926-1929.

the post-Qianlong historiography on the Ming-Qing history though the effectiveness of the imperial attempt to use history as a means of indoctrination is highly questionable. This will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.

## PART DE INFLUENCE

## 3. Qianlong-era Official Historiography and Its Influence

### on High Qing Discourses on Loyalty

#### Qianlong Official Historiography in the Qing Context

### PART III: INFLUENCE

Compared with other emperors in Chinese history, Emperor Qianlong was enthusiastic about official historiography.<sup>1</sup> During his sixty-year reign, he oversaw the compilation of over sixty official historiographical works. These historiographical projects covered a wide range of areas, including the veritable records of the previous reign, general histories, dynastic histories, histories of particular events and institutions, historical criticism, collections of historical sources, biographies, and geographical histories.<sup>2</sup> The compilation of these projects was subject to a highly-developed system of imperial review, as a result of which the emperor regularly scrutinized drafts of the works being compiled by official historians. Naturally, when an official project was being compiled, Qianlong would keep an eye on its contents and the overall approach so as to ensure that his directions were observed and that his viewpoint was fully

<sup>1</sup> He Kebin, "Qianlong qianqi jishi dui guanli shixue de yingxiang" 清代前期历史对官修史学的影响, *Hanxue yanjiu* 汉学研究 16.1 (Jan. 1997): 171.

<sup>2</sup> Center et al., comps. *Qianlong gongwen* 乾隆朝政 乾隆朝政 (Shanghai: Shanghai chubanshe 上海人民出版社, 1994 [1987]), juan 22, pp. 494-497; juan 23, p. 506; juan 24, pp. 540-550; juan 25, pp. 582-583; and juan 30, pp. 600-603; and Center et al., comps. *Qianlong gongwen* 乾隆朝政, juan 23, pp. 506-525; juan 26, pp. 576-581; juan 27, pp. 643-662; juan 29, pp. 663-672; juan 30, pp. 674-683; and juan 31, pp. 691-692. Also see Qiu Chengzong 邱成宗 et al., *Qianlong jingdi quanwen* 乾隆皇帝 乾隆皇帝 (Shanghai: Kexue chubanshe 科学出版社, 1994), pp. 585-586 and Qiu Chengzong, *Qianlong*



## 5. Qianlong-era Official Historiography and Its Influence on High Qing Discourse on Loyalty

### Qianlong Official Historiography in the Qing Context

Compared with other emperors in Chinese history, Emperor Qianlong was enthusiastic about official historiography.<sup>1</sup> During his sixty-year reign, he oversaw the compilation of over sixty official historiographical works. These historiographical projects covered a wide range of areas, including the veritable records of the previous reign, general histories, dynastic histories, histories of particular events and institutions, historical criticism, collections of historical sources, biographies, and geographical histories.<sup>2</sup> The compilation of these projects was subject to a highly-developed system of imperial review, as a result of which the emperor regularly scrutinized drafts of the works being compiled by official historians. Normally, when an official project was being compiled, Qianlong would keep an eye on its contents and the overall approach so as to ensure that his directions were observed and that his viewpoint was fully

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<sup>1</sup> Ho Koon-piu, "Qingdai qianqi junzhu dui guansi shixue de yingxiang" 清代前期君主對官私史學的影響, *Hanxue yanjiu* 漢學研究, 16.1 (June 1998): 171.

<sup>2</sup> Oertai et al. comps *Guochao gongshi* 國朝宮史 (Beijing: Beijing Guji chubanshe 北京古籍出版社, 1994 [1987]), *juan* 22, pp. 494-497; *juan* 25, p. 536; *juan* 26, pp. 540-550; *juan* 28, pp. 582-583; and, *juan* 30, pp. 600-603 and Qinggui et al. comps., *Guochao gongshi xubian*, *juan* 85, pp. 809-823, *juan* 86, pp. 826-831, *juan* 88, pp. 845-862, *juan* 89, pp. 863-873, *juan* 90, pp. 874-883, and, *juan* 91, pp. 884-898. Also see Guo Chengkang 郭成康 et al., *Qianlong huangdi quanzhuan* 乾隆皇帝全傳 (Beijing: Xueyuan chubanshe 學苑出版社, 1994), pp. 585-588 and Qiao Zhizhong, *Qingchao*

incorporated.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, it was the emperor's practice to grant an imperial preface to important historiographical works upon their completion. Some of these products were also published along with edicts and memorials relating to the court's discussions of the histories. On the one hand, these prefaces and attached materials stated concisely the objectives of the project and, on the other hand, summarized official interpretations of the recorded past, which were considered the authoritative guides for the study of the histories.<sup>4</sup>

From the perspective of cultural history, these projects marked the climax of Qing control over historiographical compilation. As all detailed arrangements of the projects were monitored and had to be endorsed by the emperor, the imperial influence on official historiography reached its apex in the eighteenth century.<sup>5</sup>

The Manchus began with little knowledge about Chinese history. Although Nurhaci and Abahai were aware of the value of such knowledge to

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*guanfang shixue yanjiu*, pp. 68-72.

<sup>3</sup> Ho Koon-piu, "Lun Qing Gaozong ziwo chuixu de lishi panguan xingxiang," pp. 146-182.

<sup>4</sup> For example, an imperial preface and relevant edicts were attached to the *Qinding shengchao xunjie zhuchen lu* to provide "references for the study of this history." See the emperor's preface, pp. 1-2.

<sup>5</sup> Qiao Zhizhong, *Qingchao guanfang shixue yanjiu*, pp. 10-13. As Lien-sheng Yang observes, imperial influence on historiographical compilation became more prominent in Ming and Qing times as a result of the increase of despotism. See Yang, "The Organization of Chinese Official Historiography," p. 50. Comparatively speaking, the Qing control over official projects was much stricter than that of the Ming as most of the Ming emperors did not have a keen interest in monitoring the compilation process. For instance, except the *Veritable Records of the Hongwu reign* compiled during the Yongle period, the compilation of the Ming veritable records was monitored by the Director-generals. See Xie Gui'an 謝貴安, *Ming shilu yanjiu* 明實錄研究 (Taibei: Wenjin chubanshe 文津出版社, 1995), pp.34-89, 208-267.

the effective rule of the conquered Han Chinese, due to a language barrier and the lack of available translations, their understanding of the Chinese past was very limited.<sup>6</sup> Chinese history was first introduced to the Manchu court through oral accounts.<sup>7</sup> As extant sources indicate, however, it was not until the Tiancong period (1627-1635) that written materials were systematically translated into Manchu.<sup>8</sup> Nevertheless, it seems that Abahai himself was more interested in historical novels rather than history as an academic subject.<sup>9</sup> With the acquired command of Chinese, Emperor Shunzhi was an amateur in Chinese literature but he did not have a keen interest in Chinese history.<sup>10</sup> Notwithstanding the initiation of the *Veritable Records of the Nurhaci Reign* (*Taizu gaohuangdi shilu*) in 1633, the *Ming History* in 1645, and the *Veritable records of the Abahai reign* (*Taizong wenhuangdi shilu*) in 1649, neither Abahai nor Emperor Shunzhi had a hand in the compilation process of these official projects.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Abahai might acquire some Chinese but according to the available sources, he learnt Chinese classics and history mainly from the translated texts. See *Tiancong chao chengong zouyi* 天聰朝臣工奏議, in Luo Zhenyu 羅振玉 (1866-1940) ed., *Shiliao congkan chubian* 史料叢刊初編 (Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe 文海出版社, 1964), vol. 1, *juan shang* 卷上, pp. 144-145, *juan zhong* 卷中, pp. 243-244.

<sup>7</sup> Qiao Zhizhong, *Qingchao guanfang shixue yanjiu*, p. 125.

<sup>8</sup> Tuhai et al. comps, *Taizong wenhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 2., *juan 5*, Tiancong year 3, month 4, p. 70.

<sup>9</sup> Li Guangtao, "Qing Taizong yu Sanguo yanyi" 清太宗與《三國演義》, *Guoli zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan* 國立中央研究院歷史語言研究所集刊, vol. 12 (Jan. 1947): 251-272.

<sup>10</sup> Ho Koon-piu, "Qingchu junzhu yu Zizhi tongjian ji Zizhi tongjian gangmu" 清初君主與《資治通鑑》及《資治通鑑綱目》, *Zhongguo wenhua yanjiusuo xuebao* 中國文化研究所學報, New series no. 7 (1998): 105-107.

<sup>11</sup> The *Taizu gaohuangdi shilu* was initiated around 1633 and completed in 1636. Revised in the Shunzhi and Kangxi periods, the original texts of the work was destroyed. See Qiao Zhizhong, *Qingchao guanfang shixue yanjiu*, pp. 137-144. In the *Taizong wenhuangdi shilu* and the *Shizu Zhanghuangdi shilu*, no information indicates that Abahai and Shunzhi



Recent research findings point out that the Qing house's strict control over the compilation of official historiographical works began in the Kangxi reign, a time during which the emperor repeatedly attempted to impose his viewpoint on such work.<sup>12</sup> Devoting much of his leisure time to study, Emperor Kangxi was adept in the Chinese classics. Instead of allowing appointed officials a free hand in their work, he had no hesitation to issue detailed instructions and convey his personal views to the working teams, as well as monitor works-in-progress by requiring that compilers regularly submit completed drafts to him for review.<sup>13</sup> This was a notable change in the previous Manchu practice in regard to compilation of historical works and set a precedent for later Qing emperors.

Following the example of his father, Emperor Yongzheng made considerable effort to establish the authority of official historiography and enhanced his role in the compilation process.<sup>14</sup> Apart from criticizing the reliability of private writings on history, he persistently argued that the true records of the past only came from those official works approved of by the

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had any personal involvement in the compilation of the veritable records or the *Ming History*.

<sup>12</sup> For instance, during the compilation of the official *Ming History*, he repeatedly instructed the compilers that the narratives of the late Ming events should be based on the Qing sources. Maqi et al. comps., *Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 6, *juan* 212, Kangxi year 42, month 4, pp. 149-150; *juan* 218, year 43, month 11, pp. 205-206; and, *juan* 225, year 45, month 6, p. 264.

<sup>13</sup> Ho Koon-piu, "Qingchu junzhu yu Zizhi tongjian ji Zizhi tongjian gangmu," pp. 112-123 and Ho, "Qingdai qianqi junzhu dui guansi shixue de yingxiang," pp. 158-167.

<sup>14</sup> Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan comp., *Yongzheng chao qijuzhu cao*, vol. 4, Yongzheng year 7, month 10, pp. 3240-3242; Oertai et al., comps., *Shizong Xianhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 8, *juan* 87, Yongzheng year 7, month 10, pp. 170-171; and, Yinzhen, *Shizong Xianhuangdi yuzhi wenji*, in *Yingyin Wenyuange siku quanshu*, vol. 1300, *juan* 3, pp. 46-48.

emperor.<sup>15</sup> Following this argument, he found it reasonable to extend the government's control over official history to the compilation of local gazetteers.<sup>16</sup> The emperor's intention to centralize historiographical activities was obvious though his reign was too short for him to achieve such a goal.

From Kangxi to Yongzheng, a definite government policy regarding official historiography, which emphasized imperial approval of the contents and narratives of official projects, was gradually developed. When this policy was carried forward in the Qianlong era, the imperial domination of official writings on history was further intensified. In the compilation of official histories, the energetic ruler exercised an absolute authority over the decisions of what details of and how the past should be recorded. In contrast to this, in the name of the *Complete Library of the Four Treasuries* (*Siku quanshu*) project, many private writings on history, especially those relating to the history of the Ming-Qing transition, were banned and destroyed.<sup>17</sup> Official historiographical activities in the Qianlong reign, which embodied the emperor's will, signified the zenith of imperial attempts to direct the intellectual discourse on Chinese history and the Manchus'

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<sup>15</sup> Ho Koon-piu, "Qingdai qianqi junzhu dui guansi shixue de yingxiang," pp. 167-171. Also see Mou Runsun 牟潤孫 (1908-1988), "Lun Qingdai shixue shuailuo de yuanyin" 論清代史學衰落的原因, in *Haiyi zazhu* 海遺雜著 (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1990), p. 74.

<sup>16</sup> Yunlu 允祿 (1695-1767) et al., comp., *Shizong xianhuangdi shangyu neige* 世宗憲皇帝上諭內閣, in *Yingyin Wenyuange siku quanshu*, vol. 415, *juan* 75, pp. 160-161 and *Shizong Xianhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 7, *juan* 75, Yongzheng year 6, month 11, p. 1122.

<sup>17</sup> Sun Dianai, *Qingdai jinshu zhi jian lu*, preface, p. 1; Liu Jiaju, "Qing Gaozong zuanxiu *Siku quanshu* yu jinhui shuji," *Dalu zazhi*, 75.2: 5-21; 75.3: 6-18; and, Liu, "Zuanxiu *Siku*

constant endeavors to seek cultural hegemony over the ruled Han Chinese.

In the tradition of Chinese historiography, Qianlong was a successor rather than a creator. His idea of history was generated from the Neo-Confucian tradition and his approach to official history, seen in the context of Qing history itself, was theoretically and practically a development of the endeavor of Kangxi and Yongzheng.

Emperor Qianlong's keen interest in history was developed during his youth, during which time he received his formal education in the Chinese classics and history.<sup>18</sup> From the time he was a prince, he had deeply admired Confucius and Zhu Xi for their achievements in Chinese historiography. In his preface to Zhu's *Outline of the Mirror for Aid in Government* (*Zizhi tongjian gangmu* 資治通鑑綱目), an abridgement of the well-known annals, *Mirror for Aid in Government* (*Zizhi tongjian* 資治通鑑), compiled by the Song historian Sima Guang 司馬光 (1019-1086), he said:

[It is said that] "Confucius compiled the *Spring and Autumn* which made rebels and traitors fear." The *Spring and Autumn* is compiled as a historical annals. It made rebels and traitors fear because of [its principle of] praising good and execrating evil. The analogy and rhetoric [employed in the writing] to condemn the evil in the past and prevent rebellion from occurring in the future made rebels and traitors who paid no respect to the law fear [for being condemned in history] by reading the work. Shouldn't it be regarded as contributing to the Way of the world and the human heart? From the Three Dynasties [the Xia 夏, Shang, and Zhou dynasties] onward, the Way

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*quanshu de ling yimian*," pp. 130-136.

<sup>18</sup> Kahn, *Monarch in the Emperor's Eyes*, pp. 115-120, 125-132.



emphasized by Confucius nearly perished. As a result, there were cases in which ministers rebelled against their monarchs and sons disobeyed their fathers. Rebels and traitors had nothing to fear. Master Zhu [Xi] was born after Zhou [Dunyi 周敦頤, 1017-1073] and [the two] Cheng [Cheng Hao 程顥, 1032-1085, and Cheng Yi 程頤, 1033-1107]. Studying the abandoned teachings [of the sages] and deeply regretting [to see the chaotic situation, he] succeeded the practice of Confucius and established new precedents [for praise and blame] in the work entitled *Outline of the Mirror for Aid in Government*, which was adapted from the [previous] work of Wengong [Sima Guang]. ... [All principles of] praise and blame were presented therein and, therefore, people learnt [the facts] that loyalists and martyrs definitely would be blessed by Heaven. Even [they were] not acknowledged at a time, people in the later generations would vie eagerly in their admiration [of them] and follow [their example]. [On the contrary, they realized that] rebels and traitors would be punished by the Heaven in the end. Even surviving [the punishment] in the their time, they could not escape from general condemnation in the future.<sup>19</sup>

In Qianlong's eyes, Zhu Xi was the legitimate successor of Confucius and the *Outline Mirror*, illustrating the orthodox Confucian code of ethics through the narrative of past events, not only provided people with guidance for proper behavior but also admonished them against disloyalty and misdeeds.

Educated in the Confucian tradition and influenced by the teachings of his father and grandfather, Qianlong had a traditional and conservative idea of history. His appreciation of Zhu Xi and Zhu's *Outline Mirror* demonstrated his acceptance of Confucian ideology, one which had been

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<sup>19</sup> Hongli, *Leshantang quanji dingben* 樂善堂全集定本, in *Qing Gaozong [Qianlong] yuzhi shiwen quanji*, vol. 1, *juan* 7, p. 103.

adopted by Kangxi and Yongzheng in the formulation of their cultural policies, thereby establishing an ideological foundation for the early-Qing imperial compilation of histories. Taking a Confucian perspective, Qianlong was convinced that the most significant function of history was moral education, in particular its contributions to the promotion of loyalty and filial piety in society.<sup>20</sup> Therefore, after ascending the throne in 1735, he was eager to take every opportunity to reinforce the imperial policy of using history as a tool for ideological indoctrination and as a political measure to facilitate the development of the absolute monarchy.<sup>21</sup> In defense of this policy, he argued that one of the chief objectives of his official historiographical projects was to teach later rulers and subjects about the Way of Heaven and the principles of morality.<sup>22</sup> Obviously, being the initiator of a number of huge projects, Emperor Qianlong, like his ancestors, considered himself not only the ruler but also the teacher of his subjects.<sup>23</sup> By establishing a self-image of sage-emperor, one who transmits the Confucian Way, and emphasizing the ethical aspect of official historiography, he justified his manipulation of the recorded past to serve the best interests of the Qing house. As a result of his direct control over the compilation of the histories discussed herein, the emperor extended his

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<sup>20</sup> Hongli, *Yuzhiwen chuji*, in *Qing Gaozong [Qianlong] yuzhi shiwen quanji*, vol. 10, *juan* 11, pp. 401-402.

<sup>21</sup> Qiao Zhizhong, *Qingchao guanfang shixue yanjiu*, pp. 255-271 and Ye Gaoshu, "Qianlong shidai guanxiu shishu de jiaohua gongneng" pp. 173-185.

<sup>22</sup> See Qianlong's preface to *Yupi lidai tongjian jilan*, in *Yingyin Wenyuange siku quanshu*, vol. 335, pp. 1-2. Also see Hongli, *Yuzhiwen chuji*, in *Qing Gaozong [Qianlong] yuzhi shiwen quanji*, vol. 10, *juan* 16, pp. 688-689.

<sup>23</sup> Hongli, *Yuzhiwen chuji*, in *Qing Gaozong [Qianlong] yuzhi shiwen quanji*, vol. 10, *juan* 1, p. 315, 320.

absolute power from politics to historiographical activities.

The influence of Kangxi-reign cultural policy on Qianlong official historiography is particularly in evidence. This is demonstrated in two outline histories, the *Outline History of the Ming Dynasty* (*Mingshi gangmu*) and the *Comprehensive mirror of successive reigns* (*Yupi lidai tongjian jilan*), which were compiled in the first half of the Qianlong reign with the aim of dominating the intellectual discourse on Chinese history. By offering imperial interpretations of the Chinese past, these two works aimed at restricting the contents of discourse to the permitted areas as determined by the emperor, thereby preventing the literati from advancing any heterodox ideas that might challenge the legitimacy of Qing rule over China.

Emperor Kangxi was the first Qing emperor who paid special attention to the educational functions of the “outline history” in the Neo-Confucian tradition.<sup>24</sup> Following his accession to power, the emperor was conscious of making himself a sage-emperor, a ruler who combines the Confucian tradition of governance (*zhitong*) with that of the Way (*daotong*).<sup>25</sup> In his comments on studying the *Four Books* he asserted:

Heaven gives birth to sages and makes them the rulers and teachers of people. The transmission of the tradition of the Way is the foundation of the tradition of governance. ... Where the tradition of the Way exists, the tradition of governance exists too. The sage-emperors in previous

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<sup>24</sup> For a study of the educational functions of the “outline history” (*gangmu*) in the Neo-Confucian tradition, see Wu Huai qi 吳懷祺 *Songdai Shixue sixiang shi* 宋代史學思想史 (Hefei: Huangshan shushe 黃山書社, 1992), pp. 180-197.

<sup>25</sup> Huang Chin-shing, *Philosophy, Philology and Politics in Eighteenth-century China*, pp. 49-57 and “Qingchu zhengquan yishi xingtai zhi tanjiu: zhengzhi di daotong hua,” pp. 97-109.



dynasties, no matter they were founders or successors, would honor and praise [the Way] and make it realized [by the people]. ...<sup>26</sup>

To realize the Confucian ideal and win the admiration of the ruled Han Chinese, Kangxi emphasized learning statecraft from the Confucian classics and Chinese history.<sup>27</sup> To him, the study of the classics and history were closely related. While the former illustrated the principle of the Way, the latter provided references for practical governance.<sup>28</sup> With increasing confidence in his understanding of Confucianism, Emperor Kangxi proclaimed himself to be a defender of the Confucian tradition<sup>29</sup> and worked energetically to promote orthodoxy against heterodoxy in society.<sup>30</sup>

Apart from learning Chinese classic and philosophy, during 1685-1687, he diligently studied Sima Guang's *Mirror for Aid* and annotated Zhu Xi's *Outline Mirror*, as well as other outline-type histories written by Jin Lüxiang 金履祥 (1232-1303) and Shang Lu 商輅 (1414-1486).<sup>31</sup> In 1707, his annotations on these works, together with the original texts of Zhu, Jin, Shang, and the previous private annotations of these works, were collected

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<sup>26</sup> *Shengzu Renhuangdi yuzhi wenji*, in *Yingyin Wenyuange siku quanshu*, vol. 1298, *chujī*, *juan* 19, p. 185.

<sup>27</sup> *Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 4, *juan* 70, Kangxi year 16, month 12, p. 901, vol. 5, *juan* 119, year 24, month 2, p. 254, *juan* 126, year 25, intercalary month 4, p. 336; and, *Kangxi qijuzhu*, vol. 2, Kangxi year 24, month 2, day 21, p. 1292.

<sup>28</sup> *Shengzu Renhuangdi yuzhi wenji*, in *Yingyin Wenyuange siku quanshu*, vol. 1298, *juan* 19, p. 184.

<sup>29</sup> Huang Chin-shing, "Qingchu zhengquan yishi xingtai zhi tanjiu: zhengzhi di daotong hua," p. 106.

<sup>30</sup> *Shengzu Renhuangdi yuzhi wenji*, in *Yingyin Wenyuange siku quanshu*, vol. 1298, *juan* 29, p. 241.

<sup>31</sup> For Kangxi's annotations of the outline-type histories, see Zhu Xi, *Yupi zichi tongjian gangmu* 御批資治通鑑綱目, Jin Lüxiang, *Yupi zichi tongjian gangmu qianbian* 御批資治通鑑綱目前編, Shang Lu, *Yupi xu zichi tongjian gangmu* 御批續資治通鑑綱目, in *Yingyin Wenyuange siku quanshu*, vols. 689-694.

and published under the title *Imperial Annotations and Commentaries on the Complete Outline Mirror* (*Yupi zichi tongjian gangmu quanshu* 御批資治通鑑綱目全書), which aimed at suppressing all unorthodox views on the Chinese past by providing an authoritative imperial interpretation of Chinese history from ancient times to the Yuan dynasty.<sup>32</sup>

Inspired by his grandfather, Qianlong also gave particular prominence to the outline-type history for the purpose of promoting Confucian ethics. In 1739, four years after his enthronement, he ordered the compilation of the *Outline History of the Ming Dynasty*.<sup>33</sup> Because of its strict observance of Zhu Xi's principles of "praise and blame," the project could, to some extent, be regarded as a continuation of Kangxi's *Imperial Annotations*, which extended the imperial interpretation of Chinese history to the Ming period.<sup>34</sup> It could appear that Qianlong was not entirely satisfied with the *Imperial Annotations* as he later criticized the work for its incorporation of other private annotations which were said to be inconsistent with Zhu's Neo-Confucian principles.<sup>35</sup> In the late 1750s, he initiated another outline-type historiographical project, the *Comprehensive Mirror of Successive Reigns*, a general Chinese history, which consisted of his

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<sup>32</sup> Ho Koon-piu, "Qingchu junzhu yu Zizhi tongjian ji Zizhi tongjian gangmu," pp. 119-120.

<sup>33</sup> For a study of this compilation, see Ho Koon-piu, "Qing Gaozong gangmuti shiji bianzuan kao," pp. 245-256.

<sup>34</sup> *Yuzhiwen chuji*, in *Qing Gaozong [Qianlong] yuzhi shiwen quanji*, vol. 10, *juan* 10, p. 397.

<sup>35</sup> "Preface," *Yupi lidai tongjian jilan*, in *Yingyin Wenyuange siku quanshu*, vol. 335, p. 1 and *Yuzhiwen chuji*, in *Qing Gaozong [Qianlong] yuzhi shiwen quanji*, vol. 10, *juan* 16, p. 688.

annotations and commentaries on recorded events.<sup>36</sup> In 1771, these annotations and commentaries were abridged and edited as a separate edition entitled *Essential Commentaries on the Mirror* (*Ping jian chanyao* 評鑑闡要).<sup>37</sup> In the narratives, as well as in the imperial annotations and commentaries, of the outline-type histories, the emperor gave an authoritative interpretation of pre-Qing history which revealed a long-standing ambition to establish imperial hegemony in the realm of cultural discourse on the Chinese past. With an intense desire to suppress deviant views, eleven years later he even ordered that the *Kangxi Imperial Annotations* be revised according to the *Comprehensive Mirror*. Except Kangxi's annotations and commentaries, all the incorporated materials concerning the Song-Yuan periods were reviewed so as to eliminate any heterodox elements, especially all hints of Han ethnic prejudices against alien rule.<sup>38</sup>

In addition to Kangxi cultural policy, the influences of the Yongzheng reign on Qianlong's approach to history are also worth noting. Since the Yongzheng period, the Qing house had constantly derided the value of private historiography in order to justify imperial attempts to

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<sup>36</sup> The compilation date of the work is unknown. According to the study of Ho Koon-piu, the project was initiated around 1759. See Ho, "Qing Gaozong gangmuti shiji bianzuan kao," p. 259. Although some annotations were not penned by Qianlong himself, they were endorsed by him. See "Preface," *Yupi lidai tongjian jilan*, in *Yingyin Wenyuange siku quanshu*, vol. 335, p. 2 and *Yuzhiwen chujì*, in *Qing Gaozong [Qianlong] yuzhi shiwen quanji*, vol. 10, juan 16, p. 689.

<sup>37</sup> The work later was incorporated in the *Siku quanshu*. See *Yingyin Wenyuange siku quanshu*, vol. 694.

<sup>38</sup> *Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan*, comp., *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 11, pp. 461-4622 and Qingui et al., comps *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu* vol. 23, juan 1168, Qianlong year 47, month 11, pp. 666-667.



monopolize historiographical writing.<sup>39</sup> In line with this policy, to a certain extent Emperor Qianlong's enthusiasm for historiographical compilation and criticism demonstrated his negative attitude toward unofficial works. Like his father, the emperor repeatedly queried the intentions and reliability of privately authored historical writings. He argued that the impartiality of most private histories was highly questionable because in the process of composition, individual authors were usually influenced by personal interest and, in some cases, even the compilers of the standard histories could not free themselves from political bias.<sup>40</sup> To him, these historical prejudices would undermine moral order of society and were obstacles to the transmission of the Way.<sup>41</sup> Qianlong's pointed criticisms of private histories explicitly conveyed a strong message that it was the official histories compiled under the supervision of a sage-emperor that offered impartial narratives of the past and preached the Confucian Way. In continuation of Yongzheng cultural policy against private historiography, the compilation of official histories in the Qianlong reign could thus be viewed as another imperial measure to discourage the educated elite from composing private histories of the Chinese past.

As one of the imperial measures of ideological indoctrination, Qianlong official historiography reflects the evolution of the Manchu tactic to promote ethnic reconciliation. Since its establishment, the Qing house

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<sup>39</sup> Ho Koon-piu, "Qingdai qianqi junzhu dui guansi shixue de yingxiang," pp. 170-171.

<sup>40</sup> *Yuzhiwen chuji*, in *Qing Gaozong [Qianlong] yuzhi shiwen quanji*, vol. 10, *juan* 14, p. 425 and *juan* 22, pp. 493-494.

<sup>41</sup> *Yuzhiwen chuji*, *juan* 22, p. 493.

as an alien regime had been extremely sensitive to the potential Manchu-Han ethnic tensions that might endanger the security of the empire. To win the cultural recognition of the Han Chinese, Kangxi devoted himself to a project of Sinification which focused on maintaining a balance between Manchu domination and an adaptation to Chinese culture.<sup>42</sup> Given the cultural achievements of his father, Yongzheng was confident of claiming the Qing as being a Chinese dynasty. In the Zeng Jing-Lü Liuliang case of 1728, he had drawn his arguments from the Confucian classics to refute Lü's anti-Qing ideas based on Han ethnocentrism.<sup>43</sup> Following the early Qing policy of ethnic reconciliation, Emperor Qianlong went a step further and introduced the strict censorship of Han chauvinism whenever it appeared in previous historiographical writings. From 1747, he ordered the standard histories of the Liao (916-1125), Jin and Yuan dynasties be reviewed and those translated names, places, and official titles reflecting Han attitudes of ethnic discrimination to be replaced. In 1771, an official dictionary of these new translations entitled *A Dictionary of Terminology of the Standard History of the Liao, Jin, and Yuan Dynasties* (*Liao Jin Yuan sanshi guoyu jie* 遼金元三史國語解) was compiled and published.<sup>44</sup> At the same time, the standard histories of the Song and Ming dynasties, as well as other Qing

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<sup>42</sup> Lawrence Kessier, *K'ang-hsi and the Consolidation of Ch'ing Rule, 1661-1684*, pp. 121.

<sup>43</sup> Thomas Fisher, "Lü Liu-liang (1629-83) and the Tseng Ching Case (1728-33)," pp. 270-276.

<sup>44</sup> Ho Koon-piu, "Lun Qing Gaozong zhi chongxiu Liao Jin Yuan san shi" 論清高宗之重修遼金元三史, in *Ming-Qing renwu yu zhushu*, pp. 222-229. As Ho notes, Jin history was the focus of these activities as the Nüzhen were the recognized ancestors of the Manchus. *Ibid.*, pp. 228-229.

official historiographical writings on these periods, were carefully revised in accordance with the newly-issued translations.<sup>45</sup>

The policy of anti-Han chauvinism in Qianlong official historiography was accompanied by an imperial campaign aimed at mythicizing the origin of the Manchu and its minority rule over China. In 1741, six years after its initiation, the *Veritable Records of the Yongzheng Reign* was completed.<sup>46</sup> During the compilation of this work, Emperor Qianlong was conscious of the need to defend imperial authority against any challenge from the ruled. From the contents to the narratives of the *Veritable Records*, the project was intentionally designed to build up a sage-emperor image for his father.<sup>47</sup> Pursuing to such an approach to the imperial past, Qianlong then went through the veritable records and sacred instructions of the previous Qing reigns and wrote prefaces to each work, highlighting the great achievements of the early Manchu emperors.<sup>48</sup> Moreover, intent on glorifying their Manchu ancestors and making the claim

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<sup>45</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 8, pp. 742-743 and *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu* vol. 21, *juan* 1039, Qianlong year 42, month 8, pp. 918-920 and *juan* 1044, month 11, p. 985. Also see Ho Koon-piu, "Lun Qing Gaozong zhi chongxiu Liao Jin Yuan san shi," pp. 237-240.

<sup>46</sup> *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu* vol. 9, *juan* 4, Yongzheng year 13, month 10, p. 229 and vol. 10, *juan* 156, Qianlong year 6, month 12, p. 1236.

<sup>47</sup> This is evinced by the fact that the work avoids mentioning the rumors concerning Yongzheng's succession to the throne and his fascination with Buddhism and Taoism. In 1735, several months after the death of Yongzheng, Qianlong ordered the execution of Zeng Jing and Zhang Xi, who made use the rumors attacking Qing rule but were released by Yongzheng after confession. In addition, all materials relating to the Zeng case and the religious activities of the Yongzheng reign were banned and destroyed. See *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu* vol. 9, *juan* 4, Yongzheng year 13, month 10, pp. 215-216 and *juan* 5, pp. 232-233, p. 238.

<sup>48</sup> *Yuzhiwen chujì*, in *Qing Gaozong [Qianlong] yuzhi shiwen quanji*, vol. 10, *juan* 8-9, pp. 376-388. Also see Oertai et al. comps., *Guochao gongshi*, *juan* 22-23, pp. 486-509.



that the Qing had reasserted the mandate of Heaven, official histories about the rise of the Manchus and the founding of the dynasty, such as the *Investigations of the Origins of the Manchu* (*Manzhou yuanliu kao* 滿洲源流考) and the *Founding of the Great Qing Dynasty* (*Huang Qing kaiguo fanglüe* 皇清開國方略), were initiated.<sup>49</sup> Through the projects, the emperor explicitly restated the Qing house's status as *zhengtong* or "legitimate dynastic succession" in the Chinese historical cycle of dynastic changes.

The narratives of Manchu and early-Qing histories inevitably touched on the sensitive topic of Manchu-Han relations, in particular the ethnic conflicts caused by the dynastic transition in seventeenth-century China. This soon drew the emperor's attention to the long existing discrepancy between official perspectives on the conquest history and that of the educated Han Chinese. For more than a hundred years, there was a general demand in society for an official recognition of the virtue of Southern Ming loyalists.<sup>50</sup> From the Shunzhi to the Yongzheng periods, however, the Qing house was reluctant to compromise due to its suspicion of the political motives behind such demands.<sup>51</sup> Reconsidering the issue in the high Qing context, Qianlong eventually decided in the second half of his reign to modify the policy in accordance with the socio-political situation of

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<sup>49</sup> Qiao Zhizhong, *Qingchao guanfang shixue yanjiu*, pp. 144-149, 260-266. For a study of the myth of the Manchu origins, see Pamela Crossley, *The Manchus*, pp. 47-74.

<sup>50</sup> For the state of intellectual discourse on the conquest history, please refer Chapter two of this thesis.

<sup>51</sup> Ho Koon-piu, "Qingchu sanchao dui Nanming lishi diwei de chuli," pp. 23-34 and "Qing Gaozong dui Nanming lishi diwei de chuli," pp. 1-27.

his time, which led to a reinterpretation of the history of the Ming-Qing transition and a revaluation of the historical figures concerned. As a result, he initiated the official biographical projects *Zhuchen lu*, *Erchen zhuan*, and *Nichen zhuan*.

### The *Zhuchen lu*, the *Erchen zhuan*, and Qianlong's Idea of Loyalty

Promoting loyalty was one of the objectives of Qianlong-period official historiography. In his comments on historical events, Emperor Qianlong was never tired of using history to remind his ministers of their moral obligations to the throne.<sup>52</sup> As the official products of Qianlong-era historiographical compilation, the *Zhuchen lu*, the *Erchen zhuan* and the *Nichen zhuan*, initiated in 1776, 1777, and 1790 respectively, gave concrete expression to their common objective of moral education. While making a considerable concession in the *Zhuchen lu* to the popular demand for a revaluation of the Southern Ming figures, at the same time in return, Emperor Qianlong required all his subjects to observe the Neo-Confucian principle of loyalty. Through the projects of writing Ming-Qing biographies, he reiterated the orthodox Confucian doctrine of loyalty, which stresses the lifetime moral obligations of ministers. Drawing his arguments from Neo-Confucianism, he further advanced the formula that absolute

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<sup>52</sup> See, for example, *Yupi lidai tongjian jilan*, in *Yingyin Wenyuange siku quanshu*, vol. 335, *juan* 13, p. 319; vol. 337, *juan* 53, p. 111; vol. 338, *juan* 92, p. 684; and, *juan* 94, p. 764. Also see Hongli, *Ping jian chanyao*, in *Yingyin Wenyuange siku quanshu*, vol. 694, *juan* 3,

submission was an indispensable element of loyalty and the essential moral quality of a loyalist. In other words, a minister was required to make a life-long commitment to the throne and under no circumstance should he change his allegiance.<sup>53</sup> The emperor proclaimed that late-Ming loyalists were admired and officially commended mainly because of their martyrdom for the fallen dynasty, an act that was regarded as an embodiment of the Neo-Confucian principle of ministership.<sup>54</sup>

In Qianlong's definition of loyalty, absolute lifetime submission of ministers to the throne was considered the most important principle which should be strictly upheld at all times without compromise. In the Qianlong projects of Ming-Qing history, it was a yardstick for the evaluation of historical figures. In accordance with this criterion, not all martyrs were qualified to be called loyalists. At least, those who had surrendered to the rebels before taking part in the resistance to the Qing, as well as those who had submitted to the new government before taking their lives for the defunct dynasty, could not be considered loyalists. Furthermore, for those late-Ming ministers who had previously associated with late-Ming political cliques, their martyrdom could not make up for their involvement in the chaotic politics of court factionalism. Therefore, in Qianlong's imperial appraisal of Southern Ming martyrdom, these three types of figures were

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p. 451, 453, *juan* 5, p. 488.

<sup>53</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 8, pp. 77-78 and *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, *juan*, vol. 21, *juan* 995, Qianlong year 40, intercalary month 10, p. 301.

<sup>54</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 8, pp. 86-87 and *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 21, *juan* 996, Qianlong year 40, month 11, pp. 316-318.



excluded from his commendation list.<sup>55</sup>

The same principle was also applied to the evaluation of Ming *yimin* who demonstrated an unalterable personal identification with the fallen order and refused to compromise with the new government. In his "praise and blame" of the Ming-Qing figures, Emperor Qianlong had severely criticized the *yimin* for paying lip service to the Confucian principle of loyalty but failing to sacrifice themselves for the Ming dynasty. In his eyes, no matter what the *yimin* advanced, their words were not matched by deeds and their uncompromising attitude toward the Qing court was nothing more than a mere gesture made to cull fame and reputation.<sup>56</sup> The emperor's caustic criticism of the Ming *yimin* may be partly explained by his detestation of their anti-Qing writings. This was clear in the case of Qu Dajun, a well-known *yimin* who took part in the resistance movement and the Three Feudatories Rebellion.<sup>57</sup> During the censorship of 1774-1775, it was ordered that the prose and poetry of Qu be prohibited from circulation and all Qu's works destroyed.<sup>58</sup> Later, Qu was criticized by name in imperial edicts relating to the discussion on the deeds of the Ming-Qing

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<sup>55</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 8, pp. 142-143 and *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 21, *juan* 1002, Qianlong year 41, month 2, pp. 416-418.

<sup>56</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 8, p. 87, 468 and *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 21, *juan* 996, Qianlong year 40, month 11, pp. 317 and *juan* 1021, year 41, month 11, pp. 683-684.

<sup>57</sup> Wang Zongyan, *Qu Dajun nianpu*, in *Qu Dajun quanji*, vol. 8, pp. 1859-1862, 1925-1929. Also see L. C. Goodrich and Fang Chao-ying, "Ch'üTa-chün," in *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912)*, vol. 1, pp. 201-203 and Zhang Jiefu, "Qu Dajun," in *Qingdai renwu zhuangao, shangbian*, vol. 6, pp. 32-335.

<sup>58</sup> *Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan comp., Zuanxiu Siku quanshu dang'an*, vol. 1, pp. 267-273, 291-292, 347-349.

figures.<sup>59</sup> Qianlong's criticism of Qu suggests that he was highly dissatisfied with the fact that the *yimin* had enjoyed a high social reputation among the Chinese literati from the early Qing. Strongly censuring the *yimin* for shirking off the responsibility of saving their country upon others, he then intentionally ignored them in official commendations for loyalty.<sup>60</sup>

The government's commendation of late Ming martyrs in 1766 was in effect a challenge to the previous imperial attitude toward collaboration as the martyrdom of the late Ming loyalists constituted a sharp contrast to the political realignment of the early-Qing collaborators. The commendation for loyalty logically led to condemnation of disloyalty. When the *Zhuchen lu* was initiated in 1776, the emperor came to the conclusion that imperial recognition of collaboration, which was said to be an expedient policy adopted in the conquest period, should not be maintained as a government policy any longer. In 1777, shortly after the completion of the *Zhuchen lu*, he therefore announced the initiation of a project entitled *Erchen zhuan* whose aim was to condemn for their disloyalty the former Ming ministers who surrendered to the Qing and took office under the new government.<sup>61</sup> By then, although the Qing house insisted that the fall of the Ming and the rise of the Qing reflected the shifting mandate of Heaven, the former Ming officials' submission to the Qing was no longer considered an act according

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<sup>59</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 8, p. 87, p. 468 and *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 21, *juan* 996, Qianlong year 40, month 11, pp. 317 and *juan* 1021, year 41, month 11, pp. 683-684.

<sup>60</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 8, pp. 86-87 and *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, *juan*, vol. 21, *juan* 996, Qianlong year 40, month 11, p. 318.

<sup>61</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 8, p. 480 and *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 21, *juan* 1022, Qianlong year 41, month 12, p. 694.

to Heaven's Will. To the emperor, despite their plausible excuses, the political choices of these *erchen* or "twice-serving ministers" were basically a result of selfish consideration and, judged by this Neo-Confucian principle, they were opportunists who failed to fulfill their duties in a time of cataclysm.<sup>62</sup>

From an ethical point of view, loyalty was a general principle that was applied to everyone in the society. However, as a moral responsibility, it was imposed on officials rather than the common people. This was indicated in the selection criteria of the *Erchen* project. In 1791, after reviewing the case of Zhang Yuanxi, a Ming *jinshi* who received his first official employment in the Qing, Emperor Qianlong thought that it was a mistake in principle to consider Zhang an *erchen* because Zhang had never taken any government position under the Ming. Taking Zhang's case as an example, the emperor made it clear that those Ming degree holders who began their careers in the Qing should not be regarded as people who violated the Neo-Confucian principle of loyalty.<sup>63</sup> In other words, in a period of dynastic transition, remaining loyal to the fallen dynasty was a personal choice of the common people made on a voluntary basis but a mandatory lifetime moral duty for all ministers of the fallen dynasty. This implies that once an individual expressed fealty to a regime, he had to remain loyal to the government he served until his death. When the dynasty was in crisis, as a minister one should be prepared to sacrifice

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<sup>62</sup> *Yuzhiwen chuji*, in *Qing Gaozong [Qianlong] yuzhi shiwen quanji*, vol. 10, *juan*

<sup>63</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 16, p. 214 and *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 26, *juan* 1375, Qianlong year 56, month 3, pp. 460-461.



oneself for the best interests of the throne regardless of the consequences. The basic principle of ministership could be summarized as being *bu shi erxing* or “not to serve two dynasties.” According to this principle, the collaborators were condemned simply because they had “served two dynasties.”<sup>64</sup>

Apart from betraying the Ming, a number of twice-serving ministers were bitterly censured by Emperor Qianlong for their political misconduct. Among the early-Qing *erchen*, three types of official who were most condemnable in the eyes of the emperor were incorporated in the *Erchen zhuan*. In Qianlong's opinion, those who harbored an anti-Qing attitude and participated in court factionalism after submission were unforgivable because, from a Qing perspective, what they did was harmful to the fundamental interests of the empire. Needless to say, they were disloyal to both the Ming and Qing dynasties.<sup>65</sup> By the same token, those who had previously associated with the late-Ming rebels were nothing less than rebellious ministers of the former dynasty. Despite their submission to the Qing, they were held in contempt by the literati and their moral integrity was questionable.<sup>66</sup> By condemning these figures, Emperor Qianlong openly expressed his abhorrence of court factionalism and political opportunism and his comments on the misdeeds of the *erchen* were

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<sup>64</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 8, pp. 479-480 and *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 21, *juan* 1022, Qianlong year 41, month 12, pp. 693-694.

<sup>65</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 14, pp. 967-968 and *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 25, *juan* 1332, Qianlong year 54, month 6, pp. 1031-1032.

<sup>66</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 8, pp. 934-935 and *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 22, *juan* 1051, Qianlong year 43, month 2, pp. 50-51.

actually a pointed warning to those currently in office.

In the discussion of loyalty, Qianlong also attempted to counteract Han ethnocentrism by employing the Confucian principle of the emperor-minister relationship to refute ethnic arguments against the Manchus.

During the conquest period, ethnic conflicts provided a valuable cause for the resistance activists to advance their anti-Qing ideas and resulted in a political tension between the Han Chinese and the Manchus. Following the consolidation of Qing rule in the Kangxi period, anti-Qing sentiment was suppressed. Nonetheless, ethnic issue remained a potential threat to the stability of society.

For more than a hundred years, Manchu-Han ethnic reconciliation was an indivisible part of imperial cultural policy. In his sixty-year reign, Qianlong devoted himself to promoting imperial literary activities and demonstrating his contributions to the development of Chinese learning. With the cultural achievements under his reign, he publicly proclaimed himself a defender and transmitter of the Chinese culture.<sup>67</sup>

Affirming the “Chineseness” of the Manchus, he further argued that the discourse on loyalty should be based on the Confucian principle of human relationship, regardless of ethnicity.<sup>68</sup> When the empire expanded its territory by conquest in the north and the west, the emperor became increasingly conscious of the urgent need to use the concept of dynastic

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<sup>67</sup> This is evinced in the *Siku* project. The emperor proudly proclaimed that since his enthronement, he had been working for the promotion of Chinese learning. *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 20, *juan* 900, Qianlong year 37, month 1, pp. 4-5 and Yongrong et al. comps., *Siku quanshu zongmu*, vol. 1, preface, p. 1.

<sup>68</sup> *Qianlong chao shangyu dang*, vol. 8, pp. 674-675; vol. 10, pp. 829-830; *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, in *Qing shilu*, vol. 21, *juan* 1034, Qianlong 42, month 6, pp. 863-864 and vol. 23, *juan* 1134, year 46, month 10, pp. 310-311.

loyalty to maintain the unity of the enlarged empire. As a result, in his commendations of the Southern Ming martyrs, details about Manchu-Han political conflicts were intentionally omitted and the martyrs' experiences that reflected their moral commitment to the fallen dynasty became the focus of the narratives.<sup>69</sup>

Strictly speaking, in the context of Chinese tradition, Qianlong's concept of loyalty was not an innovation. Apart from drawing his arguments from Neo-Confucian doctrine, the emperor also selectively adopted the prevailing ethical viewpoint of the educated elite in defining the concept. The official compilation of Chinese history and the nation-wide campaign of book banning in the mid-Qianlong era drew imperial attention to the shared perspective on loyalism among the literati.<sup>70</sup> Although seditious ideas with anti-Qing elements were vigorously suppressed, the emperor was convinced by certain constructive views based on the theories of Neo-Confucianism. Compared with the ideology deployed in these official historiographical projects, the shared perspective of Han scholars was obviously endorsed by the Qing house and its influence on Qianlong's establishment of an orthodox definition of loyalty is evident.

The shared perspective among the literati on loyalism was developed from a century-long examination of the history of the resistance

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<sup>69</sup> For the discussion of this point, please refer to the third chapter of the thesis.

<sup>70</sup> For instance, it was the compilation of the *Comprehensive Mirror of Successive Reigns* that drew the emperor's attention to Han scholars' views on Southern Ming history, which led to the official recognition of moral deeds of the figures concerned. For the discussion of the changing attitude of the emperor toward the Southern Ming regimes, see Ho Koon-piu, "Qing Gaozong dui Nanming lishi diwei de chuli," pp. 1-27.



movement and its principal figures. Since the early Qing, the educated Han Chinese had entertained ambivalent political and cultural identities. They experienced a tension between a desire to recognize Qing legitimacy and a sympathy with the late-Ming loyalists. Being Qing subjects, the scholar-officials like Tang Bin, Xu Qianxue, Peng Sunyu, and Wang Hongxu, who called for an official recognition of the activities of the Southern Ming martyrs stressed on the moral education dimension of the issue. To bypass the sensitive issue of a pro-Ming/pro-Qing political stance, they affirmed that the resistance loyalists had demonstrated the Confucian ministership in conditions of extreme difficulty, thereby establishing models of behavior for the public. It was reasoned that despite their uncompromising attitude toward "Heaven's Will," the Southern Ming martyrs should be acknowledged by the Qing government for fulfilling their moral obligation to the fallen dynasty.<sup>71</sup> From the angle of moral education, moral quality instead of political stance was the most important criterion on whether a historical figure should be admired. Therefore, the scholars in the Ming History Office further advocated a view that the deeds of these martyrs should be recorded in the official historiographical project and their biographies put under a section entitled "the loyal and righteous" so as to highlight their moral achievements.<sup>72</sup> Some of them even suggested that, to promote moral education among the people and to demonstrate the government's support for Confucian values, the heroic deeds of the late

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<sup>71</sup> Qinchuan jushi ed., *Huang Qing mingchen zouyi*, vol. 2, juan 9, pp. 918-921 and *Qingshi liezhuan*, vol. 2, juan 8, p. 518.

<sup>72</sup> Peng Sunyu, *Songguitang quanji*, in *Yingyin Wenyuange siku quanshu*, vol. 1317, juan

Ming loyalists should be mentioned not only in the biographies concerned but also in the basic annals of the *Ming History* that were being compiled.<sup>73</sup> The ethical arguments of the early Qing scholar-officials then provided a theoretical foundation for the later official commendation for late-Ming martyrdom and converted the cases of the resistance activists into valuable examples in the discourse on the Confucian principle of loyalty.

The ethical arguments were further reinforced in early-Qing historians' biographical writings on the late-Ming loyalists. For instance, in Xu Bingyi's *True Accounts of the Late Ming Martyrs*, particular emphasis was placed on the moral courage of the late-Ming or Southern-Ming figures, whose deeds were considered to be an embodiment of the Confucian virtues of loyalty. To Xu, remembering the Ming loyalists had nothing to do with their anti-Qing political stance but rather was an affirmation of their Confucian values, in particular the emperor-minister relationship that they had defended.<sup>74</sup> A similar approach was employed in the later works of the two Zhejiang historians, Wen Ruilin and Quan Zuwan. Wen, author of the *Neglected History of the Southern Frontiers*, stated that the main reason for writing the resistance history was to examine the causes of the rise and fall of the Southern Ming regimes and to apportion praise and blame to the figures based on their deeds. Stressing the educational function of history, he believed that by expressing admiration for loyalists and condemning traitors, his work would contribute to the promotion of Confucian ethics in

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35, p. 270.

<sup>73</sup> Liu Chenggan comp., *Mingshi li'an*, juan 2, pp. 30b-31b.

<sup>74</sup> Xu, *Mingmo zhonglie jishi, fanli*, pp. 1-2.

society.<sup>75</sup>

In the early Qianlong period, the above-mentioned arguments were integrated in the works of Quan Zuwan, a key historian who was best known for his epitaphs for the late Ming loyalists. Although Quan never completed a general history of the Southern Ming, he wrote a great number of accurate and sympathetic biographies of the late-Ming and early-Qing figures who were prominent in the local and regional resistance movements. In composing the biographies, Quan revealed not only a considerable level of professionalism but also a passionate sincerity in searching for the moral principles related to human relationships through the study of history. Loyalty and filial piety (*zhongxiao* 忠孝) were two main themes governing the narratives in his works. To Quan, in case the two were incompatible, the former was placed ahead of the latter.<sup>76</sup> In the discussion on loyalty, he advanced a view that the term “loyalist” simply denoted a person who “would not serve two dynasties.”<sup>77</sup> In his writings, special attention was given to the issues concerning loyalty and filial piety, which were concerned with the concrete moral achievements of human beings and the essence of Chinese culture. By taking a culturalist approach and emphasizing the significance of loyalism, he also extended his arguments to the study of alien rule in Chinese history and rejected any Han ethnocentric claim, which might be drawn as analogies to challenge the legitimate rule of the Manchus

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<sup>75</sup> Wen, *Nan jiang yishi*, preface, pp. 1-2.

<sup>76</sup> Quan, *Jieqiting ji*, vol. 2, *waibian*, *juan* 20, p. 926.

<sup>77</sup> Quan, *Jieqiting ji*, vol. 2, *waibian*, *juan* 42, p. 1300.



over China.<sup>78</sup>

Since the early Qing, from the scholar-officials in the Ming History Office to the high Qing amateur historians, the intellectual discourse on loyalty had reflected two noticeable characteristics: depoliticization and moralization. In this discourse, the participants attempted to free themselves from the ambivalence caused by the dilemma of their being Qing subjects on the one hand and recognizing the moral courage of the anti-Qing heroes on the other. Different from the *yimin*, the Qing educated elite asserted that the significance of the resistance was ethical and had nothing to do with politics. Their arguments, which bypassed sensitive pro-Ming/pro-Qing political disputes and emphasized the personal moral commitment of late-Ming figures as well as the embodiment of the Confucian cultural values in late-Ming martyrdom, demonstrate how the history of the mid-seventeenth century was depoliticized in the early eighteenth-century. The works of Xu Bingyi, Wen Ruilin, and Quan Zuwan also reveal, in practice, how the history of the Ming-Qing transition was reconstructed and reinterpreted according to the values of the authors' time. Obviously, by the mid-Qianlong era, the shared perspective of the Qing literati, together with the Neo-Confucian doctrine, became useful sources facilitating the imperial establishment of an orthodox ideology of loyalism. Of course, in establishing orthodoxy, the ruler was not passively led by the literati. The *Zhuchen lu*, the *Erchen zhuan*, and the *Nichen zhuan*, to a large extent, reflect the Qing house's manipulation of the shared

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<sup>78</sup> Quan, *Jieqiting ji*, vol. 2, *waibian*, *juan* 33, pp. 1128-1129

perspective in the process of ideological indoctrination.

### Qianlong's Influence on Post-Qianlong Discourses on Loyalty

To many historians of imperial Chinese history, the censorship of private writings and the flourishing of official historiographical activities largely account for the decline of private historiography, especially the composition of Ming-Qing history, in the Qianlong reign.<sup>79</sup> It is undeniable that the establishment of orthodox interpretation in the Qianlong reign did prevent individual historians from proposing any alternative perspective and approach for the study of the topics which had been incorporated in the official historiographical projects. In addition, it left little space for any open debate on the historical issues that had already been concluded by the emperor.<sup>80</sup> This was evinced in the decreasing number of private works as well as the historians' worry in composing history and their general tendency to avoid articulating historical criticism in written form.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> Mou Runsun, "Lun Qingdai shixue shuailuo de yuanyin," pp. 74-75; Ho Koon-piu, "Qingdai qianqi junzhu dui guansi shixue de yingxiang," pp. 180-182; Qiao Zhizhong, *Qingchao guanfang shixue yanjiu*, pp. 224-225; Li Xiaolin 李小林, "Qingdai de Ming shixue" 清代的明史學, in Nankai daxue Ming-Qing shi yanjiushi 南開大學明清史研究室 ed., *Qing wangcho de jianli, jieceng ji qita* 清王朝的建立、階層及其他 (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe 天津人民出版社, 1994), p. 313; Jiang Shengli 姜勝利, "Qingdai sijia Mingshixue de xingshuai ji qi beijing" 清代私家明史學的興衰及其背景, in *Di erjie Ming-Qingshi guoji xueshu taolun hui lunwenji* 第二屆明清史國際學術討論會論文集 (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe 天津人民出版社, 1993), pp. 133-135; and, Jiang, *Qingren Mingshi xue tanyan* 清人明史學探研 (Tianjin: Nankai daxue chubanshe 南開大學出版社, 1997), pp. 17-18.

<sup>80</sup> Ho Koon-piu, "Qingdai qianqi junzhu dui guansi shixue de yingxiang," pp. 181-182.

<sup>81</sup> For instance, in the secondary half of the Qianlong reign, there was no significant

Ruan Changsheng's 阮常生 (d. 1833) caution in editing the collected scholarly writings of his father Ruan Yuan 阮元 (1764-1849) was an extreme case. When the works of the latter were being edited, the former decided to delete those materials which were previously incorporated in the official histories so as not to incur any political trouble.<sup>82</sup> These phenomena suggest that by the late-Qianlong period, the work on the official historiographical projects and the proclaimed orthodox interpretation of the study of the Chinese past resulted in imperial hegemony in the high-Qing discourse on Chinese culture. The sage image of the emperor, accompanied by a stable and prosperous socio-economic environment under his reign, also facilitated the prevalence of state orthodoxy and justified the Neo-Confucian social order advocated by the Qing house. In fact, to many members of the educated elite, they believed that they were living in an ideal society under the governance of a sage-emperor.<sup>83</sup>

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individual work on Southern Ming history. See the "Chronology of Qing works on Ming history" in Jiang Shengli, *Qingren Mingshi xue tanyan*, pp. 161-178. As Zhu Weizheng 朱維錚 notes, it was a general phenomenon that most of the Chinese historians in the eighteenth century China tended to avoid the traditional practice of "praise and blame" in private historiographical writing. Zhu, *Zouchu zhongshiji* 走出中世紀 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe 上海人民出版社, 1987), p. 175. For a study of the Qing scholars' hesitation, see Ho Koon-piu, "Qingdai qianqi junzhu dui guansi shixue de yingxiang," pp. 177-180.

<sup>82</sup> See Ruan Changsheng's note on Ruan Yuan's biographical writings. Ruan Yuan, *Yanjingshi ji* 擘經室集 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1993), vol. 2, *xuji* 續集, *juan* 2, p. 1048.

<sup>83</sup> This is evinced in the appreciation for Qing rule under Qianlong by different social strata of the Qing scholars. Ji Yun 紀昀 (1724-1805), *Ji Xiaolan wenji* 紀曉嵐文集, (Shijiazhuang: Henan jiaoyu chubanshe 河南教育出版社, 1991), vol. 1, pp. 1-26; Qian Daxin 錢大昕 (1728-1804), *Qianyantang ji* 潛研堂集, in *Jiading Qian Daxin quanji* 嘉定錢大昕全集, ed. Chen Wenhe 陳文和 (Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe 江蘇古籍出版社, 1997), vol. 9, *juan* 1, pp. 12-16; and, Yao Nai 姚鼐 (1731-1815), *Xibaoxuan shi wenji* 惜抱軒詩文集 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe 上海古籍出版社, 1992),



Following the death of Emperor Qianlong in 1799, four years after his retirement from the throne, government control over private writings was relaxed. This relatively free academic environment encouraged historians to devote themselves to the study of the topics they were interested in and led to a restoration of private researches on the history of the Ming-Qing transition. Nevertheless, in conducting research, most of the scholars consciously observed previously established orthodox interpretations and developed their arguments based on the approved views. The influence of Qianlong official historiography on post-Qianlong historiographical writings is clearly reflected in the private works compiled during the Jiaqing (1796-1820), Daoguang (1821-1850), and Xianfeng (1851-1861) periods. In many cases, the official perspective and approach remained a research and writing guide in the production of historical knowledge. For instance, when Chen He 陳鶴 (1757-1811) compiled a Ming history entitled *Annals of the Ming dynasty* (*Mingji* 明紀) in the Jiaqing period, he accepted most of the imperial viewpoints and drew heavily on the official histories.<sup>84</sup>

Despite the negative effects on the development of Qing historiography, the Qianlong-era official projects, to a certain extent, inspired the mid-nineteenth century Chinese historians with confidence in utilizing history as a weapon against rebellious ideas. In the face of social

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*wenji* 文集, *juan* 16, pp. 238-242.

<sup>84</sup> Chen He and Chen Kejia 陳克家 (d. 1860), *Mingji* 明紀 (Hangzhou: Jiangsu shuju 江蘇書局, 1871). Chen He died before the completion of his work and rest of the job was done by his son Chen Kejia. As Feng Guifen 馮桂芬 (1809-1874) pointed out, Chen He's work was based on the imperial approach and perspective of the *Yupi lidai tongjian jilan*. See Feng's preface, *Mingji*, vol. 1, p. 1a-5b.

instability, the educated elite saw the promotion of loyalty, which was stressed in the imperial commendation for late Ming martyrdom and its product, the *Zhuchen lu*, as a solution to the gradual disintegration of the traditional order. In the private historiographical writings on the Southern Ming, praising loyalists then became the main theme of study. Li Yao's 李瑤 *Edited History of the South Frontiers* (*Nanjiang yishi* 南疆繹史) and Xu Zi's *Annals of [an Era of] Little Prosperity* (*Xiaotian jinian fuhao* 小腆紀年) and *Biographies of [an Era of] Little Prosperity* (*Xiaotian jizhuan*) are the best-known mid-Qing private works, which aimed at drawing examples from the deeds of the Southern-Ming loyalists for moral education. To highlight the significance of loyalty to the maintenance of Confucian order, Li attached to his work imperial edicts, Qianlong's preface to the *Zhuchen lu*, and an appendix of the Southern-Ming martyrs who were commended during the Qianlong period, unhesitatingly reaffirming the orthodox ideology of proper emperor-minister relationship.<sup>85</sup> In Xu's *Annals*, special emphasis was placed on the moral courage of the loyalists in defending the Neo-Confucian principles of loyalty.<sup>86</sup> Adapted from the *Annals*, the *Biographies* also gave considerable space to the narratives relating to the moral deeds of the historical figures concerned. Different from Li, who strictly followed imperial criteria of evaluation, Xu admired

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<sup>85</sup> Li Yao, *Nanjiang yishi*, in *Taiwan wenxian congkan* 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Taipei: Taiwan Yinhang 臺灣銀行, 1962), no. 132, vol. 1, pp. 1-11 and vol. 6, pp. 721-816.

<sup>86</sup> Xu Zi, *Xiaotian jinian fuhao* 小腆紀年附考, annotated by Wang Chongwu 王崇武 (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 中華書局, 1957), vol. 1, preface, pp. 3-5. Also see Ye Gaoshu, "Xu Zi (1810-1862) de Nanmingshi yanjiu" 徐鼐 (1810-1862) 的南明史研究, *Furen lishi xuebao* 輔仁歷史學報, no. 6 (Dec. 1994): 205-208.

not only the martyrs but also the *yimin* and assigned two *juan* of his work to the latter.<sup>87</sup> To condemn disloyalty, those ministers who betrayed their emperors were placed in the sections on *erchen* and *nichen*.<sup>88</sup>

Like other historiographical writings in the mid-Qing, the works of Li and Xu reveal the profound influence of Qianlong's interpretation of history on the literati's understanding of the history of the Ming-Qing dynastic transition. Existing sources suggest that although the Qing house's ideological control was relaxed after the Qianlong reign, the orthodox ideology of loyalism did not lose its dominance in the discourse on loyalty until the late Qing, at which time anti-Qing sentiment emerged within the context of revolutionary activities. To historians in the Jiaqing and Daoguang periods, loyalty implied one's unalterable personal identification with the Manchu regime. The study of the Southern Ming history was meaningful because it offered useful analogies between the late-Ming and mid-Qing loyalists, who shared an identification with the same Neo-Confucian principle of ministership.<sup>89</sup>

Even in modern China, in the study of Ming-Qing history, loyalism remains an important factor affecting Chinese historians' evaluations of historical figures, although their judgments are largely mingled with

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<sup>87</sup> Xu Zi, *Xiaotian jizhuan*, *juan*, vol. 2, *juan* 56-57, pp. 603-740. In fact, Xu did not adopt the imperial perspective without reservation. For instance, he advanced that the Ming dynasty ended after the subjugation of Taiwan in 1683 and the members of the Zheng family were Ming loyalists. These assertions were different from the official interpretation of Qianlong. See Xu, *Xiaotian jinian fukao*, vol. 2, *juan* 20, p. 987.

<sup>88</sup> Xu Zi, *Xiaotian jizhuan*, vol. 2, *juan* 63-65, pp. 711-753.

<sup>89</sup> Xu Zi, *Xiaotian jinian fukao*, vol. 1, preface, p. 5.



elements of nationalism.<sup>90</sup> It is ironic that in the late Qing, while the significance of a positive evaluation of late-Ming loyalism had shifted from supporting Qing rule to advocating anti-Qing revolution, the revolutionaries shared some points with the absolute monarch in their definitions of loyalty.<sup>91</sup>

The dominance of the official historiographical projects in the high Qing and Qianlong's influence in Chinese historiography are undeniable. From the wider perspective of cultural development, however, the emperor's ambitious attempt to impose an imperial paradigm on the later writings and thoughts of the literati was never fully successful. Notwithstanding the Qianlong inquisition, a large number of proscribed and non-standard works were still available to historians in the early nineteenth century.<sup>92</sup> When the government's control was relaxed, scholars tended to pursue what they found interesting and interpreted the past according to the values of their time.

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<sup>90</sup> This is evinced in several modern Chinese writings on the history of the Southern Ming. See Liu Yazhi 柳亞子 (Liu Weigao 柳慰高, 1887-1958), *Nanming shiliao, shigang* 南明史料·史綱, edited by Liu Wuji 柳無忌 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe 上海人民出版社, 1994); Xie Guozhen, *Nanming shilüe*; and, Nan Bingwen 南炳文, *Nanming shi* 南明史 (Tianjin: Nankai daxue chubanshe 南開大學出版社, 1992).

<sup>91</sup> The most typical example is Zhang Binglin's 章炳麟 (1869-1936) criticism of Huang Zongxi who, although a Ming *yimin*, in the later part of his life, he recognized the legitimacy of Qing rule. Obviously, Zhang's arguments were based on the Neo-Confucian principle of loyalty. See Zhang Binglin, *Zhang Taiyan quanji* 章太炎全集 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe 上海人民出版社, 1985), vol. 4, p. 117, 124.

<sup>92</sup> Lynn Struve, "Uses of History in Traditional Chinese Society," pp. 268-269. Also see, Struve, "Southern Ming History and Southern Ming Historiography," p. 8.

## Concluding Remarks

The history of the resistance movement, 1644-1662, colored by a lot of heroic and moving deeds of the late Ming martyrs, had left its imprint on the cultural and historical perception of the Han Chinese. The loyalists ultimately failed but their laudable attempts to save their country won the respect of the people and were regarded as being the embodiment of Confucian virtue. Heartfelt sympathy with the loyalists was intensified over generations by the survivors' narratives of the history. This strong sympathy provoked an ambivalent feeling among the educated Qing Chinese. Most of them shared some sentiment for the *yimin* and admired the Southern Ming heroes for their courage and integrity in insisting on their Confucian ideals as expressed in the anti-Qing movement. Being Qing subjects, however, they could not take up a pro-Ming political stand without hesitation. Hence, in remembering the Ming martyrs, they experienced a conflict between political and cultural identities. It was a conflict that required reconciliation or at least negotiation and constituted a discourse on how to interpret the events of the Ming-Qing transition. Their introspection finally led to a reinterpretation of that history, one which was purely based on the Confucian moral standards of virtue, going far beyond the simpler issues of maintaining a pro-Ming or pro-Qing political stance. From Huang Zongxi and Wang Fuzhi to Xu Bingyi, Wen Ruilin, and Quan Zuwang there were two generational junctures, at which the focus of the discourse on Southern Ming biographical writing was shifted from ethno-

political conflicts to a general discussion of moral principles and behavior. As a result, a shared Qing perspective stressing the ethic meaning of loyalty gradually evolved among the literati. This shared perspective brought increasing pressure to bear on the Qing house to reevaluate the resistance activists and recognize the loyal deeds of the late-Ming martyrs.

During the Shunzhi, Kangxi, and Yongzheng reigns, the imperial response to the demands for a reevaluation of the Southern Ming loyalists was conservative. Despite openly commending the late-Ming martyrs for their resistance against popular rebellions, the alien regime refused to give any recognition of the anti-Qing movement due to political considerations related to its own legitimacy. It was not until the mid-Qianlong period that this policy was subjected to a full-scale reexamination. After the passing of the *yimin* generation, anti-Qing sentiment faded away and the imperial authorities no longer faced political dissent resulting from Ming loyalism. By this time, remembering the Ming martyrs no longer constituted a challenge to Qing rule but was a form of recognition of Confucian virtues embodied in the deeds of the martyrs. In this sense, the appreciation of Ming loyalists could serve the best interests of the empire as the government now required its subjects to be unconditionally loyal to the dynasty. Therefore, in 1775, 1777, and 1790, Emperor Qianlong ordered the compilation of the *Qinding shengchao xunjie zhuchen lu*, the *Erchen zhuan*, and the *Nichen zhan* to glorify martyrdom and condemn disloyalty. Insisting on the legitimacy of the place of Manchu rule in the dynastic transition, Emperor Qianlong reinterpreted that history in accordance with



the socio-political situation he faced. It was under these circumstances that the official view now corresponded, in part, the literati demand for a reevaluation of the deeds of late-Ming figures.

These historiographical projects marked an end of the early-Qing official interpretation of conquest history which had been upheld by the court for three generations and for a period of one hundred and thirty years. To a certain extent, they also implied a concession of the emperor to the demand of his Chinese subjects for the reevaluation of the resistance history in exchange for their compromise to Manchu-Qing rule. Seen from this point of view, the projects not only played a role of reducing the hundred-year long tension between the Manchu regime and the Han Chinese literati but also concluded the divisive debate on the official interpretation of Southern Ming history. The *Zhuchen lu*, the *Erchen zhuan*, and the *Nichen zhuan* signified the court's reinterpretation of loyalty. As a result of the dominance of Neo-Confucianism since the Song dynasty, loyalty, which stressed the absolute submission of subjects to the throne, had been one of the most important standards for assessing an individual's moral history. During the years of 1644-1662, it also served as a spiritual support to the Ming loyalists in insisting on their resistance against the Manchu invasion. For the early Qing court, however, the term "loyalty" was employed by the conquerors to denote the moral quality of a person who followed the "Will of Heaven" to serve the Manchu. According to this definition, the Chinese could justify their service to the alien regime by following the dictates of moral conscience to work for the well-being of the people and the benefits

of the country, disregarding the consideration of their former dynastic bonds of fealty to the Ming. The early Qing concept of loyalty was evidently an ideological strategy used by the alien regime to elicit the collaboration of the Han Chinese literati and former Ming ministers in the cause of unifying the realm and to consolidate its rule. For this reason, neither Shunzhi nor Kangxi criticized the moral integrity of his Chinese collaborators and these emperors even recognized their deeds by honoring them with posthumous titles.

By the mid-Qianlong reign, the Manchus had been ruling China for over a hundred years. Given that the empire had entered a stage in which its future depended partly on the dynastic allegiance of the subjects against possible revolts, Emperor Qianlong could hardly see any reason to pursue further the political expediency adopted by his predecessors. To him, Ming loyalism was no longer a threat because the Ming *yimin* had all died. To the contrary, the words and deeds of the *erchen* could possibly set a bad example for the traitors who would try to justify their rebellious thoughts and actions under the name of “Will of Heaven.” To prevent disloyalty and promote dynastic devotion, Qianlong thus reiterated that loyalty was a life-long obligation of officials to the throne. He further asserted that as a moral mission, while voluntary for common people, it was compulsory for *yichen* 遺臣 to stay loyal to the fallen dynasty. The *Zhuchen lu* and the *Erchen zhuan* projects reflected the throne’s demand on government ministers and implied that it was the obligation of the Qing officials to give absolute loyalty to the dynasty under any circumstances throughout their life

time and that any violation of this principle would be seriously condemned. It is interesting to note that the Qianlong's definition of loyalty had something in common with certain views of his contemporaries, who also believed in "not serving two dynasties." The official historiographical projects of the Qianlong reign were not only records of the past but also a tool for promoting Confucian virtue and order, especially those relating to the Confucian hierarchic human relation. The ruler, being a sage-emperor, was the only one who was in a position to offer guidance to how to praise and depreciate historical figures. His subjects were expected to follow the throne's judgments. This reveals the emperor's ambition to monopolize the authority of historical criticism.

The Qianlong historical projects were paralleled by the court's nation-wide censorship of the histories relating to the events of late Ming and early Qing. During these "inquisitions," many writings were banned and destroyed and a great number of sensitive materials were deleted from books of all descriptions. The systematized censorship of books under Qianlong should not be oversimplified as being merely a political action taken for quelling dissent. Seen from a wider perspective, it can also be viewed as part of the emperor's efforts to reconstitute intellectual discourse with terms of imperial hegemony. In this process, the inquisitions, and the historiographical projects as well, defined the approved topics and taboos of studies, imposed rules, definitions, and meanings for the production of historical knowledge, and provided criteria to distinguish between true and false narration. Emperor Qianlong's influence on high Qing official



historiography is undeniable. This does not imply however that he succeeded in achieving his political and cultural goals, for discourse is neither a one-sided nor a top-down operation. When making use of cultural legacy to formulate his state ideology, the emperor was also influenced by the education he received, the popular values he shared, and the problems he encountered, which were largely related to the *épistémè*, the condition of possibility of discourse, of his time.<sup>1</sup>

It is unquestionable that Emperor Qianlong was confident in being supremely qualified in his role as a historical arbiter of history and his ability to impose his judgments on the literate public. As a matter of fact, the imperial historiographical projects together with the literary inquisition brought an end to the debates on Southern Ming history and suppressed all views contrary to the imperial interpretation for several decades. They also influenced the transmission of the collective memory for the Ming loyalists, for now the historical figures were transmogrified from being anti-Qing heroes to Confucian martyrs who upheld the principle of dynastic loyalty. Nevertheless, despite the uniformity of eighteenth-century writings on Southern Ming history, the emperor's dream of achieving unquestioned cultural hegemony was never realized, as his ambitious attempts to cleanse the popular heritage of undesirable elements were far from successful. His failure is evident in the fact that despite Qianlong-reign censorship, a large number of proscribed and non-standard works survived into the early

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<sup>1</sup> The concept "*épistémè*" employed here is borrowed from Michel Foucault (1926-1984). See Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, trans., A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), pp. 191-192.

nineteenth century and unorthodox views still had an influence on the writings of the historians. This, however, does not mean that the influence of the Qianlong historiography totally disappeared after his reign. Even in the modern discourse on the Southern Ming history, certain viewpoints whose provenance can be found in Qianlong still affect some of the Chinese historians' perceptions of Ming-Qing history and the historical figures concerned. For instance, when talking about the resistance movement, they unconsciously adopt the loyalists-traitors dichotomy, exaggerating the contributions and achievements of the martyrs and the loyalists. This approach indeed warrants a reexamination in the future study of the history.

n.d.

## APPENDIX

### Chinese texts of the cited and translated materials

Chapter 1, p. 26, n. 84:

「……朕自五齡即知讀書，八齡踐祚，輒以學庸訓詁詢之左右，求得大意而後愉快。日所讀者，必使字字成誦，從來不肯自欺。及四子之書既已通貫，乃讀尚書，於典、謨、訓、誥之中，體會古帝王孜孜求治之意，期見之施行。……（聖人之教，）朕皆反覆探索，必心與理會，不使纖毫扞格。實覺義理悅心，故樂此不疲。但資性不敏，獨於易旨雖極研究，終未洞徹耳。……」中國第一歷史檔案館：《康熙起居注》（北京：中華書局，1984），第2冊，康熙二十三年十一月，頁1249-1250。

Chapter 2, p. 44, n. 12:

「……凡我藩鎮督撫，誰非忠臣？誰非孝子？識天命之有歸，知大事之已去，投誠歸命，保全億萬生靈，此仁人志士之所為，大丈夫以之自決者也。……」李天根：《燭火錄》（杭州：浙江古籍出版社，1984），卷10，頁478。



Chapter 2, p. 59, n. 68:

「古者以天下為主，君為客，凡君之所畢世經營者，為天下也。今也以君為主，天下為客，凡天下之無地而得安寧者，為君也。是以其未得之也，屠毒天下之肝腦，離散天下之子女，以博我一人之產業，曾不慘然！曰『我固為子孫創業也』。其既得之也，敲剝天下之骨髓，離散天下之子女，以奉我一人之淫樂，視為當然，曰『此我產業之花息也』。然則為天下之大害者，君而已矣。」黃宗羲：《明夷待訪錄·原君》，《黃宗羲全集》，冊 1（杭州：浙江古籍出版社，1985），頁 2-3。

Chapter 2, pp. 60-61, n. 72:

「緣夫天下之大，非一人之所能治，而分治之以群工。故我出而仕也，為天下，非為君；為萬民，非為一姓也。吾以天下萬民起見，非其道，即君以形聲強我，未之敢從也。……非其道，即立身其朝，未之敢許也，況於殺其身乎！不然，而以君之一身一姓起見，君有無形無聲之嗜慾，吾從而視之聽之，此宦官宮妾之心也。君為己死而為己亡，吾從而死之亡之，此其私暱者之事也。是乃臣不臣之辨也。……蓋天下之治亂，不在一姓之興亡，而在萬民之憂樂。……為臣者輕視斯民之水火，即能輔君而興，從君而亡，其於臣道固未嘗不背也。」黃宗羲：《明夷待訪錄·原臣》，《黃宗羲全集》，冊 1（杭州：浙江古籍出版社，1985），頁 4-5。

Chapter 2, p. 74, n. 109:

「周之頑民，即殷之義士。是以元紀宋事，則張世傑、陸秀夫、文天祥、謝枋得諸臣並見稱揚；（明）纂元史則余闕、福壽、石抹宜孫、普顏不花之屬殊多褒美。明之臣子，當大兵既至，尚敢奮臂當轍，可謂不識天命。然各為其主，盡忠所事，斯亦曩時頑民之比也。……」徐乾學：《憺園文集》（臺北：漢華文化事業，1971），冊2，卷10，頁524-525。

Chapter 2, pp. 77-78, n. 119:

「國家興廢，何代無之？人各為其主。凡在興朝，必不怒也，不得已而遂其志爾。……本朝初定鼎，首褒殉國諸臣，以示激揚。其在外者，不暇及爾。褒與誅可並行也。且方開史局時，已奉有各種野史悉行送部不必忌諱為嫌之令矣。采而輯之，何傷？」溫睿臨：《南疆逸史》（香港：崇文書店，1971），〈凡例〉，頁3。

Chapter 2, p. 78, n. 121:

「古史於帝王則稱『本紀』，諸臣則稱『列傳』者，『紀』舉一時政令大綱，『列傳』止載一人一事，故稱『紀』以別之。然太史公於項羽亦稱『本紀』，以其號令一時，事多詳載也。今金陵、閩、粵三君，位雖不終，亦自帝其地，各有政教，理合『紀』載。若拘入懷宗之例，則傳且不列，何有於紀，非一代史體也。茲首卷先『紀略』，不稱『本紀』者，避本朝也。其言略者，事固不得而詳也。」溫睿臨：《南疆逸史》（香港：崇文書店，1971），〈凡例〉，頁4。

Chapter 2, p. 79, n. 122:

「《南疆逸史》者何？紀弘光、隆武、永曆三朝遺事也。何不言『朝』？不成朝也。何以謂之『南疆』？皆南土也，勢不及乎北也。」溫睿臨：《南疆逸史》（香港：崇文書店，1971），〈序〉，頁1。

Chapter 2, p. 81, n. 134:

「許文正、劉文靖，元北方兩大儒也。……兩先生皆非宋人，仕元無害。」全祖望：《鮚埼亭集·外編》（臺北：華世出版社，1977），下冊，卷33，〈書劉文靖公退齋記後〉，頁1128。



Chapter 2, p. 81, n. 136:

「許文正與文靖，皆元人也，其仕元又何害？論者以夷夏之說繩之，是不知天作之君之義也！豈有身為元人而自附於宋者？真妄言也。」全祖望：《鮚埼亭集·外編》（臺北：華世出版社，1977），下冊，卷33，〈書劉文靖公渡江賦後〉，頁1129。

Chapter 3, pp. 102-103, n. 32:

「崇獎忠貞，所以風勵臣節。然自昔累朝嬗代，於勝國死事之臣，罕有錄予易名者，惟我世祖章皇帝定鼎之初，於崇禎末殉難之大學士范景文等二十人，特恩賜諡，……。第當時僅徵據傳聞未暇遍為搜訪，故得邀表章者，止有此數。迨久而遺事漸彰，復經論定。今《明史》載，可按而知也。至若史可法之支撐殘局，力矢孤忠，終蹈一死以殉。又如劉宗周、黃道周等之立朝謇諤，抵觸僉壬，及遭時艱，臨危授命，均足稱一代完人，為褒揚所當及。其他或死守城池，或身殞行陣，與夫俘擒駢僇，視死如歸者，……各能忠於所事，亦豈可令其湮沒不彰？自宜稽考史書〔《明史》、《通鑑輯覽》〕，一體旌諡。」桂慶（等編）：《清實錄·高宗純皇帝實錄》（北京：中華書局，1985-1986），冊21，卷996，「乾隆四十年十一月癸未」，頁316-317。

Chapter 3, pp. 112-113, n. 47:

「文淵閣大學士兼戶部尚書賀逢聖，江夏人，廉靜自守，忠謹端方，以疾告歸。崇禎十五年，獻賊陷武昌，被執不屈，衣冠投湖死。妻危氏亦投池死。子觀明、光明及子婦曾氏、陳氏，孫三人皆溺死。（見《明史》及《輯覽》。）賀逢聖學術醇正，行義剛方，殉義捐軀，克全大節，今諡忠愍。」舒赫德（等編）：《欽定勝朝殉節諸臣錄》（臺北：成文出版社，1969），冊1，卷1，頁49。

Chapter 3, p. 113, n. 48:

「南昌知縣劉曙，長洲人。由進士授官，未行，金陵失守，死之。（見江《南通志》）。」舒赫德（等編）：《欽定勝朝殉節諸臣錄》（臺北：成文出版社，1969），冊1，卷6，頁365。

Chapter 3, pp. 118-119, n. 52:

「東閣大學士兼兵部尚書張煌言，鄞縣人。初，以舉人奉表迎魯王至紹興監國，復以兵從至海外。後桂王遙命為大學士。聞滇南平，散遣部曲，遁居懸壘，為兵所襲執，諭降，不從，死。（見《明史》及《輯覽》）。」舒赫德（等編）：《欽定勝朝殉節諸臣錄》（臺北：成文出版社，1969），冊1，卷2，頁84。

Chapter 3, pp. 119-120, n. 57:

「通政使司左通政侯峒曾，嘉定人。南都亡，里居起兵守城。大兵來攻，力竭，城破。峒曾拜家廟，挈二子元演〔玄演〕、元潔〔玄潔〕并投井死。（見《明史》及《輯覽》）。」舒赫德（等編）：《欽定勝朝殉節諸臣錄》（臺北：成文出版社，1969），冊1，卷3，頁125。

Chapter 3, p. 120, n. 59:

「兵部尚書兼右副都御史王翊，餘姚人。魯王航海，聚眾四明山。兵敗被執，不屈死。（見《明史》及《輯覽》）」舒赫德（等編）：《欽定勝朝殉節諸臣錄》（臺北：成文出版社，1969），冊1，卷4，頁195。

Chapter 3, p. 121, n. 62:

「順慶知縣楊呈秀，華陰人，大計罷歸。崇禎七年，賊至，佐有司守禦，力戰被執。大罵，被磔死。」舒赫德（等編）：《欽定勝朝殉節諸臣錄》（臺北：成文出版社，1969），冊1，卷5，頁226。



Chapter 3, p. 121, n. 63:

「勛西知縣曹同（一作同升），巢縣人。崇禎八年，城陷，賊索印，大罵不與。賊擊之，骨肉糜爛以死。（見《江南通志》）」舒赫德（等編）：《欽定勝朝殉節諸臣錄》（臺北：成文出版社，1969），冊 1，卷 9，頁 419。

Chapter 3, p. 121, n. 64:

「拔貢洪法臣，攸縣人。崇禎六年，叛將張克成縱掠，被執，罵不絕口死。（見《一統志》）」舒赫德（等編）：《欽定勝朝殉節諸臣錄》（臺北：成文出版社，1969），冊 1，卷 9，頁 419。

Chapter 3, p. 123, n. 67:

「……明季末造野史甚多，其間毀譽任意，傳聞異詞，必有詆觸本朝之語，正當及此一番查辦，盡行銷燬，杜遏邪言，以正人心而厚風俗，……。」中國第一歷史檔案館（編）：《纂修四庫全書檔案》（北京：上海古籍出版社，1997），上冊，頁 240。

「我朝開創之初，明末諸臣望風歸附……不可勝數。蓋開創大一統之規模，自不得不加之錄用，以靖人心而明順逆。今事後平情而論，若而人者，皆以勝國臣僚，乃遭際時艱，不能為其主臨危授命，輒復畏死倖生，覲顏降附，豈得復謂完人，即或稍有片長足錄，其瑕疵自不能掩。若既降復叛之李建泰、金聲桓，及降附後潛肆詆毀之錢謙益輩，尤反側僉邪，更不足比於人類耳矣。此輩在《明史》既不容闖入，若於我朝國史，因其略有事蹟，列名敘傳竟與開國時范文程，承平時李光地等之純一無疵者毫無辨別，亦非所以昭褒之公。若以其身事兩朝，概為削而不書，則其過蹟輒得藉以揜蓋，又豈以示傳信乎？朕思此等大節有虧之人，不能念其建有勳績，諒於生前，亦不因其尚有後人原於既死。今為準情酌理，自應於史內另立「貳臣傳」一門，將諸臣仕明及仕本朝各事蹟據實直書，使不能纖微隱飾。……著國史館總裁查考姓名事實，逐一類推，編列成傳，陸續進呈，候朕裁定。」桂慶（等編）：《清實錄·高宗純皇帝實錄》（北京：中華書局，1985-1986），冊 21，卷 1022，「乾隆四十一年十二月庚子」，頁 693-694。

Chapter 4, p. 137, n. 16:

「……然朕所以為此言者，非獨為臣子勵名教而植綱常，實欲為君者當念苞桑而保宗社。蓋此諸人未嘗無有用之才，誠使明之守成者能慎持神器而弗失，則若而人皆是任心膂股肱，祖業於是延，人才即於是萃。故有善守之主，必無二姓之臣。……」桂慶（等編）：《清實錄·高宗純皇帝實錄》（北京：中華書局，1985-1986），冊 22，卷 1051，「乾隆四十三年二月乙卯」，頁 51。

Chapter 4, pp. 138-139, n. 19:

「……夫居本朝而妄思前明者，亂民也。有國法存。至身為明朝達官而甘心復事本朝者，雖一時權宜，草昧締構而不廢，要知其人，則非人類也。其詩自在聽之可也，選以冠本朝諸人則不可。……詩者何？忠孝而已耳。離忠孝而言詩，吾不知其為詩也。……」弘曆：《清高宗（乾隆）御製詩文全集》（北京：中國人民大學出版社，1993），冊 10，《御製文初集》，卷 12，頁 414-415。



Chapter 4, pp. 140-141, n. 26:

「國史之修，所以彰善癉惡，信今傳後。……惟「貳臣傳」一門，前經降旨，另為甲乙，乃我朝開創所有，此實扶植綱常，為世道人心之計，自應另立專門，以傳直道。至叛逆之臣，如吳三桂等，亦應明正罪狀，另立一門，……。」桂慶（等編）：《清實錄·高宗純皇帝實錄》（北京：中華書局，1985-1986），冊 23，卷 1191，「乾隆四十八年十月癸未」，頁 928-929。

Chapter 4, p. 145, n. 38:

「張元錫服官本朝，並無劣蹟，雖係明季庶吉士，未經授職，與曾任前明清要，覲顏改節者不同，非但不應列入《貳臣》乙編，並不應列入《貳臣傳》內。」桂慶（等編）：《清實錄·高宗純皇帝實錄》（北京：中華書局，1985-1986），冊 26，卷 1375，「乾隆五十六年三月甲午」，頁 460-461。

Chapter 4, p. 148, n. 45:

「〔《貳臣傳》〕釐為甲乙二編，……部門各三：其入本朝而能沒王事者，列之甲上；……若顯有勳績者，列甲之中；……至著有勞效者，列甲之下；……其略無事蹟者，列乙之上；……其後經獲罪者，列乙之中；……曾經從賊者及初為賊黨者，列乙之下殿焉。」清國史館：《欽定國史貳臣表傳》，冊 1，「臣等謹按」。

Chapter 4, pp. 153-154, n. 59:

「孫定遼，遼陽人。明副將，守大凌河。本朝天聰五年，隨總兵祖大壽等降，賜銀幣、鞍馬、橐鞬、器用諸物。尋授副都統，隸鑲紅旗漢軍。〔崇德〕七年，大軍克松山，詔大凌河諸降將有兄弟妻女在松山、錦州者，俱給完聚。定遼初降時，其從役二人私逃，人謂定遼遣歸明，上不問。至是，諭及之。定遼疏言：『臣奉諭，始知十二年來負此大罪，荷恩不問。今松山、錦州既克，正臣心可白之日。逃去二人，未曾在臣家。如他處察獲，亦可嚴鞫實情。』上慰答之。」清國史館：《欽定國史貳臣表傳》，冊 1，貳臣甲上，〈孫定遼傳〉。

Chapter 4, pp. 154-155, n. 60:

「彼時與我軍交戰，各為其主，朕豈介意？朕之擊敗十三萬兵，得松、錦諸城，皆天也。天道好生，善養人者，斯合天道，朕故恩沾及爾。爾但念朕撫育之恩，盡心圖報可耳。」清國史館：《欽定國史貳臣表傳》，冊2，貳臣甲上，〈洪承疇傳〉。

Chapter 4, pp. 158-159, n. 68:

「先是，給事中許作梅、莊憲祖等交章劾大學士馮銓。睿親王集科道各官質問。鼎孳曰：『馮銓乃背負天啟，黨附魏忠賢作惡之人。』銓曰：『流李自成陷害明帝，竊取神器，鼎孳反順逆賊，竟為北城御史。』鼎孳曰：『豈止鼎孳一人，何人不曾歸順？魏徵亦曾歸順太宗。』王笑曰：『人果自立忠貞，然後可以責人。鼎孳自比魏徵，而以李賊比太宗，可謂無恥。似此等人，祇宜縮頸靜坐，何得侈口論人？』清國史館：《欽定國史貳臣表傳》，冊6，貳臣乙下，〈龔鼎孳傳〉。



Chapter 4, pp. 163-164, n. 76:

「館臣以吳三桂為叛臣，不書其擒桂王由榔事，而以屬之愛星阿。夫愛星阿固為定西將軍領兵，而三桂彼時實為平西大將軍，且立意殄滅由榔『三患二難』之議，發自三桂；即後之進兵，檄緬甸、驅李定國、降白文選，皆出自三桂之籌畫，其功固不可泯也。然其籌畫，豈實為我國家哉？彼時已具欲據滇、黔之心，由榔、定國、白文選在，伊豈能據之哉？……今昔相形，三桂之奸計畢露，又何不可功則功之，而罪則罪之乎？其依國史三桂傳盡載其入緬事莫刪。……」桂慶（等編）：《清實錄·高宗純皇帝實錄》（北京：中華書局，1985-1986），冊 23，卷 1168，「乾隆四十七年十一月庚子」頁 667。

Chapter 4, p. 164, n. 78:

「征緬之役，愛星阿分路督師，吳三桂實主其事。當時三桂叛形未著，方以擒渠服遠為功。臣等編纂初稿，以三桂兇狡不終，削其姓名，但書愛星阿等。仰我皇上神謨燭照，親加指示謂，三桂悖亂性成，爾時已藏禍心，其統兵臨緬，傳諭執送由榔，不足為三桂之功，轉足以正三桂之罪。……此三桂之畜奸，已非一日。……」傅恒（編）：《御批歷代通鑑輯覽》，《景印文淵閣四庫全書》（臺北：臺灣商務印書館，1983-1986）冊 339，卷 120，頁 797。

Chapter 5, pp. 179-180, n. 19:

「『孔子作《春秋》而亂臣賊子懼。』夫《春秋》，亦一編年之書，而曰『亂臣賊子懼』者，蓋謂彰善癉惡，比事屬辭，誅姦諛於已往，杜僭亂於將來，使亂臣子不畏王法者，讀此書而知懼，豈非有功於世道人心者哉？三代而下，孔子之道幾乎息矣，故臣叛其君者有之，子背其父者有之，而亂臣賊無所忌憚。子朱子生於周、程之後，修明絕學，深痛而甚憫之，祖夫子春秋之筆削，因溫公之書，更創義例，為書曰《資治通鑑綱目》。……善善、惡惡、是是、非非，具於一篇之中而無不備矣。然後人知忠臣義士必獲天休也：雖不用於一時，而後世莫不褒歎效法之恐其後也；亂臣賊子必撻天誅也：雖幸免於當世，而千載以下，公議莫逃也。」弘曆：《清高宗（乾隆）御製詩文全集》（北京：中國人民大學出版社，1993），冊1，《樂善堂全集定本》，卷7，頁103。

Chapter 5, pp. 182-183, n. 26:

「朕惟天生聖賢，作君作師，萬世道統之傳，即萬世治統之所繫也。……道統在是，治統亦在是矣。歷代賢哲之君，創業守成，莫不尊崇表章，講明斯道。……」玄燁：《聖祖仁皇帝御製文集》，《景印文淵閣四庫全書》，（臺北：臺灣商務印書館，1983-1986），冊1298，卷19，〈日講四書解義序〉，頁185。

## GLOSSARY

Aixing'a 愛星阿

Alantai 阿蘭泰

Aobai (Oboi) 鰲拜

bagong 拔貢

Bai Wenxuan 白文選

bao bian 褒貶

benchao 本朝

benji 本紀

biji 筆記

boxue hongci 博學鴻詞

bu shi erxing 不事二姓

Cai Lu 蔡祿

Cao Tong 曹同

Chen He 陳鶴

Chen Yuan 陳沅

Chen Yuanyuan 陳圓圓

Chen 陳 (Madam Chen)

Cheng Hao 程顥

Cheng Yi 程頤

Chengmo 范承謨

Cheng-Zhu 程朱

Chongzhen 崇禎

chunqiu, tianzi zhi shi ye 春秋, 天子之事也

da gong zhi zheng 大公至正

Da Qing yitongzhi 大清一統志

da Qing 大清

daotong 道統

Daxue 大學

Dayi juemi lu 大義覺迷錄

Di Shun 帝舜

Dong Wenji 董文驥

Donglin 東林

Duoergun (Dorgon) 多爾袞

Ebilong (Ebilun) 遏必隆

Erchen zhuan 貳臣傳

Fan Jingwen 范景文

Fan Wencheng 范文程

Fang Kezhuang 房可壯

Fang Rujing 方如京

fanli 凡例

Feng Quan 馮銓

Fu 福

Fu Shou 福壽

Fulin 福臨

Fulun 佛倫

Fushe 復社

fuzhi gangchang 扶植綱常

Gao Huangdi 高皇帝

Gao Yutai 高宇泰

Geng Jingzhong 耿精忠

Geng Zhongming 耿仲明

Gong Dingzi 龔鼎孳

Gu Yanwu 顧炎武



Gui Zhuang 歸莊

Gui 桂

Guiren shuo 歸仁說

Guo Xiu 郭琇

Guochao shi biecai 國朝詩別裁

guoshi Wu Sangui zhuan 國史吳三桂傳

Han Yu 韓愈

Hao Xiaozhong 郝效忠

He Fensheng 賀逢聖

He Guangming 何光明

He Jinming 何覲明

Hong Chengchou 洪承疇

Hongguang shilu chao 弘光實錄鈔

Hongguang 弘光

Hongli 弘曆

Hou Dongzeng 侯峒曾

Hou Jin 後金

Hu Weiyong 胡惟庸

Huaizong 懷宗

Huang Baijia 黃百家

Huang Daozhou 黃道周

Huang Ming sichao chengren lu 皇明四  
朝成仁錄

Huang Qing kaiguo fanglüe 皇清開國  
方略

Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲

Huang Zunsu 黃尊素

Huangtaiji (Abahai) 皇太極

Hung Fachen 洪法臣

huohao 火耗

ji chuan 紀傳

jia 甲

jianchen zhuan 姦臣傳

jie gu yu jin 借古喻今

jiemin 節愍

Jin Lüxiang 金履祥

Jin Shenghuan 金聲桓

Jin 金

jing yan 經筵

jingbiao 旌表

Jingnan zhi bian 靖難之變

jinshi 進士

Jiqi 繼起

jiuchen 舊臣

juan 卷

jueren 舉人

Kangxi 康熙

Kong Ji 孔伋

Lan Yu 藍玉

Ledehong (Ledehun 勒德洪)

Li Dingguo 李定國

Li Guangdi 李光地

Li Hongchu 李洪儲

Li Jiantai 李建泰

Li Shimin 李世民

Li Yao's 李瑤

Li Yindu 李因篤

Li Yong 李顥

- Li Yongfang 李永芳
- Li Zicheng 李自成
- Liao Jin Yuan sanshi guoyu jie* 遼金元  
三史國語解
- liemin* 烈愍
- liezhuan* 列傳
- Liu Liangchen 劉良臣
- Liu Shu 劉曙
- Liu Wenjing 劉文靖
- Liu Yin 劉因
- Liu Yingbun 劉應賓
- Liu Zongmin 劉宗敏
- Liu Zongzhou 劉宗周
- Longwu 隆武
- Lü Liuliang 呂留良
- Lu Xiufu 陸秀夫
- Lu 魯
- Ma Xiongzhen 馬雄鎮
- Maleji 麻勒吉
- Manzhou yuanliu kao* 滿洲源流考
- Maqi (Maci) 馬齊
- Meng Qiaofang 孟喬芳
- min gui jun qing* 民貴君輕
- Mingji gangmu* 明紀綱目
- Mingji* 明紀
- Mingjian gangmu* 明鑑綱目
- Mingju 明珠
- Mingmo zhonglie jishi* 明末忠烈紀實
- Mingmo zhuchen zoushu* 明末諸臣奏疏
- Mingshi gangmu* 明史綱目
- Mingshi guan* 明史館
- Mingshi jilüe* 明史輯略
- Mingshi* 明史
- Mingyi daifang lu* 明夷待訪錄
- Muzhai chuxue ji* 牧齋初學集
- Muzhai youxue ji* 牧齋有學集
- Nanjian yishi* 南疆繹史
- Nanjiang yishi* 南疆逸史
- Nanshan ji* 南山集
- Ni Yuanlu 倪元璐
- Nichen lu* 逆臣錄
- Nichen zhuan* 逆臣傳
- nidang* 逆黨
- Nuerhachi (Nurhaci) 努爾哈赤
- Pan Lei 潘耒
- panchen zhuan* 叛臣傳
- Peng Sunyu 彭孫通
- Ping jian chanyao* 評鑑闡要
- ping nan wang* 平南王
- Pingding sannian fang'an* 平定三逆方案
- Puyan Buhua 普顏不花
- Qian Qianyi 錢謙益
- qiangu zhi zuiren* 千古之罪人
- Qianlong 乾隆
- Qinding Ming chen zoushu* 欽定明臣奏  
疏
- Qinding Shengchao Xunjie Zhuchen Lu*

欽定勝朝殉節諸臣錄  
*Qingshi erchen zhuan jiabian* 清史貳臣  
傳甲編  
*Qingshi erchen zhuan yibian* 清史貳臣  
傳乙編  
Qiu Junsun 丘俊孫  
Qu Dajun 屈大均  
Quan Zuwang 全祖望  
*quandi* 圈地  
*renlun* 人倫  
*ri jiang* 日講  
Ruan Changsheng 阮常生  
Ruan Dacheng 阮大鍼  
Ruan Yuan 阮元  
*san gang wu chang* 三綱五常  
*san gang* 三綱  
*sanfan* 三藩  
Shang Kexi 尙可喜  
Shang Lu 商輅  
Shang Zhixin 尙之信  
Shang 商  
Shen Deqian 沈德潛  
*Shengyu guangxun* 聖諭廣訓  
Shi Kefa 史可法  
Shi Lang 施琅  
Shi Runzhang 施閏章  
*Shiguishu houji* 石匱書後集  
Shimo Yisun 石抹宜孫  
*Shu jing* 書經

Shuhede 舒赫德  
Shunzhi 順治  
*si* 死  
*Sijiu lu* 思舊錄  
*Siku quanshu* 四庫全書  
Sima Guang 司馬光  
Song 宋  
Songzhu 嵩祝  
*sui* 歲  
Sukesaha (Suksaha) 蘇克薩哈  
Sun degong 孫得功  
Sun Dingliao 孫定遼  
Sun Qifeng 孫奇逢  
Suo'etu (Songgotu) 索額圖  
Suoni (Soni) 索尼  
Taishi gong 太史公  
Taizong 太宗  
Taizu 太祖  
Tan Qian 談遷  
Tang Bin 湯斌  
Tang Taizong 唐太宗  
*tian beng di jie* 天崩地解  
*tian beng di lie* 天崩地裂  
*tian beng di xian* 天崩地陷  
Tian Xiong 田雄  
*tian zuo zhi jun zhi yi* 天作之君之義  
*tianli* 天理  
*tianming* 天命  
Tianqi 天啓



*tianxia wei gong* 天下爲公

*tianxia youdao, ze shuren buyi* 天下有道，則庶人不議

*tifa* 剃髮

*tong shi* 通諡

*Tongshi shanglunlu* 同時尚論錄

*Wan Sitong* 萬斯同

*Wang Aoyong* 王鼇永

*Wang Fuzhi* 王夫之

*wang guo* 亡國

*Wang Hongxu* 王鴻緒

*wang tianxia* 亡天下

*Wang Wan* 汪琬

*Wang Yi* 王翊

*Wang Yongji* 王永吉

*Wang Yongqing* 王永清

*Wang Zhonghui* 王仲樞

*Wanli* 萬曆

*wei wanshi chenzi zhi gongchang* 爲萬世臣子植綱常

*Wei Xiangshu* 魏象樞

*Wei Yijie* 魏裔介

*Wei Zheng* 魏徵

*Wei Zhongxian* 魏忠賢

*Wei* 危 (Madam Wei)

*wei* 僞

*Wen Tianxiang* 文天祥

*Wen Wang* 文王

*Wenda* 溫達

*wochao* 我朝

*wu chang* 五常

*Wu Sangui* 吳三桂

*Wu Weiye* 吳偉業

*Wu Zhirong* 吳之榮

*Xia Wanchun* 夏完淳

*Xia* 夏

*Xiang Yu* 項羽

*xiaoren* 小人

*Xiaotian jinian fuhao* 小腆紀年

*Xie Fangde* 謝枋得

*Xingchao lu* 行朝錄

*Xiong Tingbi* 熊廷弼

*Xu Bingyi* 徐秉義

*Xu Heng* 許衡

*Xu Qianxue* 徐乾學

*Xu Wenzheng* 許文正

*Xu Yifan* 徐一范

*Xu Yong* 徐勇

*Xu Yuanwen* 徐元文

*Xu Zuomei* 許作梅

*Xuanye* 玄燁

*Xuejiaoting zhengqi ji* 雪交亭正氣集

*Yang Baoyin* 楊寶蔭

*Yang Chengxiu* 楊呈秀

*Yang Fu* 楊富

*Yang Laijia* 楊來嘉

*Yang Lian* 楊漣

*Yang Yuming* 楊遇明

*yanglian yin* 養廉銀

*Yao Qisheng* 姚啓聖

*Ye Chuchun* 葉初春

*yeshi* 野史

*yi Han zhi Han* 以漢制漢

*Yi jing* 易經

*yi* 乙

*yimin* 遺民

*Yinreng* 胤祔

*Yinzhen* 胤禛

*Yisanga* 伊桑阿

*yixia zhi shuo* 夷夏之說

*Yongle* 永樂

*Yongli shilu* 永曆實錄

*Yongli* 永曆

*Yongzheng* 雍正

*you si wu er* 有死無貳

*Yu Minzhong* 于敏中

*Yu Que* 余闕

*Yuan* 元

*Yuanjie* 元潔 (Hou Yuanjie, Xuanjie  
玄潔),

*Yuanyan* 元演 (Hou Yuanyan, Xuanyan  
玄演)

*Yuding zichi tongjian gangmu sanbian*  
御定資治通鑑綱目三編

*Yue Fei* 岳飛

*Yue Zhongqi* 岳鍾琪

*Yupi lidai tongjian jilan* 御批歷代通鑑  
輯覽

*Yupi zichi tongjian gangmu quanshu* 御  
批資治通鑑綱目全書

*Zeng Jing* 曾靜

*Zeng Shen* 曾參

*Zeng* 曾(Madam Zeng)

*Zengzi* 曾子

*Zhang Dai* 張岱

*Zhang Duan* 張端

*Zhang Guozhu* 張國柱

*Zhang Huangyan* 張煌言

*Zhang Jinyan* 張縉彥

*Zhang Kecheng* 張克成

*Zhang Ruogui* 張若淮

*Zhang Shijie* 張世傑

*Zhang Tianfu* 張天福

*Zhang Tianlu* 張天祿

*Zhang Xi* 張熙

*Zhang Xianzhong's* 張獻忠

*Zhang Xin* 張忻

*Zhang Xuanxi* 張懸錫

*Zhang Yong* 張勇

*Zhang Yuanxi* 張元錫

*Zhao Zhilong* 趙之龍

*Zhaoshi jiandang lu* 昭示奸黨錄

*Zheng Chenggong* 鄭成功

*Zheng Zhilong* 鄭芝龍

*zhengtong* 正統

*zhengtong* 政統

*zhitong* 治統

*Zhongguo er yidi ye, ze yidi zhi; yidi er  
Zhongguo ye, ze zhongguo zhi* 中  
國而夷狄也，則夷狄之；夷狄而  
中國也，則中國之

*zhongjie* 忠介

*zhongjie* 忠節

*zhonglie* 忠烈

*zhongque* 忠愍

*zhongxiao* 忠孝

*zhongyi* 忠義

*Zhongyong* 中庸

Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤

Zhou 周

Zhu Di 朱棣

Zhu Guozhen 朱國禎

Zhu Jiazheng 朱嘉徵

Zhu Youjian 朱由檢

Zhu Youlang 朱由榔

Zhu Yousong 朱由崧

Zhu Youxiao 朱由校

Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋

Zhu Yujian 朱聿鍵

Zhu Zhixi 朱之錫

*zhuan shi* 專謚

Zhuang Tinglong 莊廷鑑

Zhuang Xianzu 莊憲祖

Zisi 子思

*Zizhi tongjian* 資治通鑑

*Zizhi tongjian gangmu* 資治通鑑綱目

Zu Dashou 祖大壽

Zu Zepu 祖澤溥

Zu Zerun 祖澤潤

*zu* 卒

Zuo Guangdou 左光斗

Zuo Menggeng 左夢庚



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